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Abstract 
 
This dissertation addresses the empirical issues pertaining to technology adoption 
decisions, agricultural commodity price volatility and the effects of remittances on re-
cipient households combined with the motivation of migration decisions in low-income 
countries such as Nepal under the theories of incomplete and imperfect markets. This 
dissertation contains three substantive essays applying a number of econometric models 
to test a number of the hypotheses using both panel and cross-section data from the Ne-
pal Living Standard Surveys and time series data for commodity prices and farm yields. 
Summaries of these essays are presented as follows. 
The first paper examines factors affecting the adoption of improved seeds and in-
organic fertilizers. I consider the adoptions of both these technologies as a joint decision 
and estimate over two repeated cross-section data from NLSSs. Both probit GMM with 
the moment restrictions and Linear Probability Models for period 2 (2004) combined 
with reduced form probit models for both periods and Tobit models were applied to con-
trol for plot level, household characteristics, and other factors.  The result weakly favours 
the hypothesis of joint decision. The results show significant effects on adoption deci-
sions for farm technologies from four variables: the factor markets for credit and for la-
bour, agricultural extension services, and household labour endowment. Proximity to 
road transport and access to markets also increase the adoption rate of improved seeds 
and inorganic fertilizers. Positive effects were associated with the increasing age and 
education of household heads with some exceptions. The results from Tobit models were 
also consistent with the reduced form and structural models with some exceptions. Well-
functioning factor markets and well-developed infrastructure emerge as the precondition 
for agricultural-led growth in Nepal. 
The second paper explores how price shocks affect the stability of farmers’ in-
come at different levels across different regions of Nepal, using a recent theoretical 
model that allows examination of the household income variance through combination of 
household datasets with price and yield time series under the scenarios of actual, full and 
no exposure to Indian markets. Agricultural income variability is found to be higher 
among the farmers with higher share of agricultural products (more than 65 percent) in 
the total household income, followed by 30 to 65 percent share of agricultural products. 
The results show relatively high income variability in the poor than the non-poor farm 
 iii 
households, but their difference is low. The increased income variability of agricultural 
households, observed in almost all belts and regions, and at all income levels, is attribut-
able to the domestic shocks. In general, the degree of market integration with Indian 
prices seems to be widely affected by the geographical heterogeneity in Nepal. Granger-
causality tests show a higher integration between border markets of both countries, re-
vealing that Nepalese commodity prices follow Indian prices with the exception of some 
commodities in some border markets. 
Finally, the third paper analyses the effect of remittance income on the hours of 
work in remittance-receiving households using panel data from the Nepal Living Stan-
dard Surveys.  The study applies a number of econometric models to explain the impact 
of remittance income on the hours of work in different sectors (i.e. on-farm, self-
employment, off-farm and hired labour) taking into account various methodological is-
sues (endogeneity and selection bias) for migration decision and remittances.  I first use a 
Zero Inflated Poisson model to examine the factors motivating migration. I then apply 
random effects model and instrumental variable Tobit models for estimating the impact 
of remittances on the household work hours both for different sectors and separately for 
working age men and women.  Evidence shows that rural people with larger family size 
and higher per capita income without remittances have higher probability to go migrate.  
Remittances decrease work hours in a number of sectors, but increases work hours of 
hired labour in remittance-receiving households. Remittance income seems to be a sub-
stitute of non-labour income for remittance-receiving households. No significant effects 
on off-farm and self-employment activities were observed in the sample households. In 
contrast, non labour income appears to increase work hours of household members.   
Moreover, demographic characteristics seem to be an influential factor for the allocation 
of household work hours, implying that higher family size leads to higher work hours, 
and a larger number of children leads to a reduction of work hours of females, but not of 
males.  Educated people are also more likely to increase their work hours. 
 
Keywords: farm technology, commodity price fluctuations, remittances, farm house-
holds, labour supply, Nepal 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Nepal, predominantly an agrarian country, is one of the least developed and poor-
est countries in the world. The country is situated between two giant Asian countries viz. 
Tibet region of China in the north and India in the east, west and south.  Before 1951, 
Nepal was under 104-year feudalistic Rana oligarchy and economy was in terrible condi-
tion. The revenue base was so narrow due to the absence of major industries and related 
infrastructures. Nepal initiated five-year development plans under the guidance of the 
Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pa-
cific in 1956 and the economic system evolved to be one of mixed economy that allows 
with limited access to private sectors in development activities. Development efforts 
were mostly undertaken on the basis of planned projects, particularly giving more prior-
ity on infrastructure and agriculture in which the expenditure on such sectors were being 
met by foreign aid in the form of grants and loans.  
Nepal initiated economic reform agendas in the early 1990s in order to accelerate 
the pace of economic development and reduce poverty in the country. However, the pro-
gress of policy reform has been geared up after the political change (i.e. multiparty sys-
tem with constitutional monarchy) in 1990 which implemented economic liberalization 
programmes. Despite a number of economic reforms, nearly a third of the country’s 26.4 
million citizens are still below the national poverty line-with less than $0.25 per day- and 
another third living on less than $2 per day. Due to economic stagnation and other social 
and economic disparities among the rural and urban people as well as among the caste 
and the ethnic groups, Nepal faced a decade–long armed conflict (1996-2006) which fur-
ther caused much damage to the social, economic, and natural environment of the coun-
try. Presently, Nepal is declared as federal republic country and is in process of making 
new constitution based on a federal system that emphasizes the integration of cross-
cutting themes such as youth engagement, community participation, market strengthen-
ing, and social inclusion. Though there are tangible changes in political system, Nepal’s 
economy is still dominated by agriculture sector and agro-based industries. Rural devel-
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opment through agricultural modernization and commercialization is still in the priority 
list of the country’s development plans. 
Nepalese agriculture that accounts for 40.2 percent of total GDP and more than 
73 percent of total employment (WB, 2006), and the bulk of the country’s export earn-
ings (WB, 2005) with a sizeable share of agro-based industries (38.79 percent) in the to-
tal share of industrial GDP (MOF, 2006), remains the most important sector for achiev-
ing economic growth. Recognizing the largest source for broad based economic growth, 
high priority has been given to this sector with a significant amount of the Government’s 
budget being allocated to it during the last decade. Rapid growth in agriculture has been 
emphasized as having the potential to reduce poverty, which was the single most impor-
tant objective of the current Tenth Five-Year Plan of Nepal (NPC, 2002).  
  Despite these endeavours, the agricultural sector has not really been successful in 
making any substantive change in the structure of poverty and deprivation. As a result, 
Nepal is still one of the poorest countries in the world with a GNP per capita of US$270 
in 2006 (WB, 2006a), in which more than 31 percent people still live below poverty line 
(CBS, 2004). Thus, an interest arose to study some challenges in the agricultural devel-
opment and to identify the impact of the growing size of remittances on household in-
vestment and consumption in order to enhance the agricultural growth in Nepal. 
As a backbone of Nepalese economy and the primary means of livelihood, agri-
cultural sector influences other spheres of rural development including migration, for-
estry resource management, energy consumption, and pollution. The government has 
identified the agricultural sector as a key area for the achievement of development goals. 
Thus, the success of overall development is an outcome of what happens in agriculture 
(Addison, 2005). However, the current trend in this sector does not seem satisfactory to 
achieve the targeted growth rate to reduce poverty and raise employment opportunities, 
particularly in rural areas. Commercialization and modernization of the agriculture have 
yet to occur in a substantive manner. Hence, shifting from subsistence to a commercial 
economy is still a central challenge for rural development in Nepal (World Bank, 2006N). 
It is widely discussed in the development literature that as economies grow, 
households shift the farming system away from traditional self-sufficiency goals and to-
wards profit and income oriented decision making (Pingali and Rosegrant, 1995).  An 
understanding of factors encouraging the agricultural sector towards market oriented 
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farming systems through the adoption of new technologies and high value crops could be 
interesting for designing further policies and programs. However, a small number of 
studies in one particular area may not precisely be enough to understand the overall prob-
lems. Further study seems desirable to get better insights of the overall challenges in this 
sector that could enable to address the problems.  
Nepal has been engaged in various policy reforms to continue development and 
adjusting country’s economy to meet its growth potential. The country has initiated the  
economic liberalization programs since mid-1980s, but bold measures of economic re-
structuring took place after the commencement of  trade reform policy in 1992, that in-
cluded tariff cuts, abolition of import license auction, subsidies’ removal, improvement 
of export incentives, deregulation of foreign investment and reformulation of the tax sys-
tem (MOC, 1992). However, these new policies have not increased output of food grain 
at the same rate as population growth. Production increases have come mainly from area 
expansion rather than improvement in productivity. In Nepal, the scope for further ex-
pansion of area is limited; the only feasible option for increasing agricultural production 
now is to apply more advanced technology. Several studies have indicated the potential 
for a significant improvement in productivity through an appropriate policy thrust, sup-
ported by technical backstopping and a reliable supply of farm inputs, including credit 
(NRB, 1994). Moreover, after implementation of trade liberalization programs, domestic 
markets also expose producers to increased risk due to the greater volatility in world 
prices that might also be a possible obstacle to shift traditional farming system in the 
commercial path at least in the short run.  This could have serious implications for sus-
tainability of the agriculture. 
Agricultural commercialization1 that shifts the farmer from subsistence to market 
oriented farming, has been considered as a characteristic of agricultural change. The 
adoption of technologies in terms of using tradable inputs, such as improved varieties of 
seeds and inorganic fertilizers in particular, is regarded as an indication of the agricul-
tural change towards the commercialization path. However, in many low-income coun-
tries, farmers are constrained with access to various resources in order to adopt new 
                                                 
1
 Pingali and Rosegrant (1995) categorized three levels of market orientation as characteristics of food pro-
duction systems with increasing commercialization: subsistence systems with household generated inputs, 
semi-commercial systems with the mix of traded and non-traded inputs and commercial systems with pre-
dominantly traded inputs. 
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technologies resulting from high transaction costs and price volatility (Yesuf and Kohlin, 
2008). It is also discussed in the literature that farmers are risk averse due to absence of 
credit and insurance markets and only economically secure farmers that are in possession 
of sufficient defence against down side risk will undertake profitable capital investments 
and innovations, while the majority of the poor remains under risk-induced poverty trap 
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). It is necessary, for policy, to identify such factors 
that affect farmers to adopt new technologies in farming systems.  
Agricultural commercialization and economic development are linked to each 
other. This linkage can enable both to foster the agricultural commercialization process 
with its development effects and reduce the risks of commercialization. Improved eco-
nomic condition of households through alternative sources can also relax the liquidity 
constraints and permit an opening up toward commercialization options. Diversification 
of income may help to loosen the financial constraints and to manage risk. Non-farm sec-
tors of the rural economy are inextricably tied to agriculture through input and output 
markets and as a source of employment for displaced agricultural labour (Boisvert and 
Raney 1990).  It is widely explained in the literature that, in rural areas of low-income 
countries, market oriented production and income diversification can change not only 
food intake and nutrient adequacy, but also help to cope with risk in the agricultural pro-
duction (Braun, 1992). 
In Nepal, the trend of seeking alternative sources of income to maintain house-
hold livelihoods, even in rural areas is now increasing. Remittance income mostly from 
abroad is the main source of non-farm income. The data show that remittances from 
those working more than six months away from home contribute over 25 percent of total 
household income to nearly a quarter of all rural households (CBS, 1996). Policies influ-
ence the strength and direction of theses linkages (e.g., farm and non-farm incomes) and 
welfare outcomes. 
To conclude, the traditional vision of rural economies as purely agricultural needs 
to assess both its challenges and alternative opportunities. Many low economic countries 
are emphasizing income diversification and as a result, the share of non-farm income is 
also increasing. Thus, the study aims to identify the factors affecting the adoption of 
technology and risk in the agriculture as challenges, and to find out the impact of remit-
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tances on household labour allocation as non-farm income for the improvement of 
household welfare. 
1.2 Motivation  
In Nepal, agricultural development is widely acknowledged as a critical compo-
nent in a strategy to boost livelihoods of the people mostly living in rural areas and is 
now seen as an important part of any development strategy. Realizing this fact, the Gov-
ernment of Nepal has accorded top priority to agricultural growth for the improvement of 
living standards since the inception of a planned economy in 1956 (Aryal, Gautam and 
Thapa, 1999). Several policies were formulated and implemented in order to boost this 
sector. However, desirable progress has not yet achieved, leading the country from food 
self-sufficiency to food deficit in the 1990s (Banskota, 1992). The Agricultural Perspec-
tive Plan (APP)2 is the latest policy attempt to stimulate economic and agricultural 
growth. The data show that Nepal’s agricultural sector grew at roughly 3 percent per year 
from 1993 to 2003; slightly higher than the comparable population growth of 2 percent 
per year (WB, 2005). This sluggish performance of the dominant agriculture sector both 
constrains improvements in food security and reduces the overall economic growth. The 
country’s dependence on agriculture therefore makes the sector critical to the overall 
economic growth and poverty alleviation goals. An understanding of the factors that lead 
to the failure of past efforts and programs to boost the agricultural sector is likely to be 
critical in the formulation and implementation of agricultural policies. 
Although new opportunities have opened for Nepal after the country’s recent en-
try into the World Trade Organization3 (WTO) as an LDC member, the agricultural sec-
tor faces new challenges to meet food safety rules, animal health regulations, and quality 
standards, together with re-evaluating domestic support programs, price controls, and 
comparative advantages. Moreover, farm producers are exposed to several risks both 
market related such as price variation, and non-market related such as weather variabil-
                                                 
2
 Agricultural Perspective Plan (1997-2017) is long term vision to increase agricultural productivity that 
stresses priority inputs (irrigation. rural roads, fertilizer and agricultural technology) to achieve priority 
outputs (increased production of fruits, vegetables, livestock, forestry and promotion of agri-business). The 
APP was designed to promote about 5 percent annual agricultural growth in order to achieve poverty alle-
viation goals set by the Government of Nepal. 
3
 Nepal applied to join the WTO in May 1989 and was admitted WTO member in September 11, 2003. 
Nepal is the second least-developed country (LDC) to join the WTO.  
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ity, where fluctuations of commodity prices and weather can have an effect on domestic 
products. Hence, risk and price risk in particular, will most probably be at the core of the 
problems associated with the implementation of policy reform packages (Quiroz and 
Valdès, 1995). Such price risks may affect relatively more the poor/small producers in 
developing countries. The impact of price risks on domestic producers could be crucial 
for the formulation of risk coping strategies in new WTO member countries. 
  The existence of well-functioning product and factor markets is often considered 
as a prerequisite for the commercialization and modernization of the agricultural sector. 
If these markets do not function well, regional disparities are likely to persist or worsen 
with region specific commercialization (Pingali and Rosegrant, 1995). The literature of-
ten indicates that, if diversification provides an important means by which small-holders 
self-insure against risk, seize income earning opportunities, or accumulate capital for in-
vestment, then the effects of policy on diversification patterns do matter for household 
welfare and merit investigation (Barrett et al., 2001).  In addition, a number of studies 
conclude that income diversification is positively related to farm productivity and con-
tributes to poverty alleviation (Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001; Ellis and Mdoe, 2003). Re-
mittances from abroad in many developing countries such as Nepal have recently 
emerged as supplementary income in order to insure against negative income shocks 
both at the macro and at the household levels. Remittance income can also play an im-
portant role in gaining access to capital, especially among lower-income households. In-
come diversification could help to manage risk, cope with shocks, or escape from agri-
culture in stagnation or in secular decline (Reardon et al., 2006). The study on the impact 
of remittance income on domestic factor markets could provide some insights for policy 
assessment in the low income countries. Besides the agricultural sector, alternative 
sources of income such as remittances are also  important both for modernization of agri-
culture and for rural development: raise non-farm income through job creation, rural in-
dustrialization, and the increased provision of education, health, and nutrition, housing, 
and the variety of related social and welfare services. 
The interpretation of this complexity, especially in the Nepalese agricultural sec-
tor, is crucial for the achievement of the dual goals of economic growth and poverty re-
duction. In Nepal, the factors that lead to the failure of agricultural efforts to increase 
productivity are often analysed with falling average farm size and land fragmentation 
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leading to growing poverty which in turn constrains farmers’ ability to invest from their 
own resources (FAO, 2003).  A number of efforts towards commercialization and mod-
ernization of the agricultural sector have failed due to a poorly developed road network 
that restricts access to markets, constraining agricultural growth and diversification into 
higher value added and non-farm activities (WB, 2005). Poor people and those from food 
insecure areas are mostly restricted by the access to both technology and technical 
knowledge. Several experts and policy makers summarize the slow growth rate in agri-
culture due to the absence of incentives to farmers, weak institutional mechanisms and 
insufficient resources. It is often discussed in the literature that rural markets in develop-
ing countries are generally poorly developed and characterised by high transaction costs, 
arising from transportation costs, high search, recruitment and monitoring costs, and lim-
ited access to information, capital, and credit (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991; 
Sadoulet, de Janvry and Benjamin, 1998). Poorly developed factor markets may also af-
fect farmers’ risk attitudes, because adoption decision may depend on farmers’ attitudes 
toward risk. The literature shows that farmers in the resource poor economies are risk 
averse and the difference in risk preferences affects the farm investment decision-making 
(Binswanger, 1980). For instance, risk averse farmers in the presence of poorly devel-
oped credit markets may delay in technology adoption. Farmers’ risk attitude in the pres-
ence of poorly functioning rural factor markets seems to be important for agrarian re-
forms. Therefore, revitalising economies by promoting growth and rebuilding the models 
for agricultural development are great challenges for the policy makers and economists. 
Most economic analysis in developing countries and Nepal in particular, presup-
poses a Western-style agrarian system that assumes perfect input and output markets 
with zero transaction costs. However, the literature is often discussed that rural house-
holds are systematically exposed to market imperfections and constraints, referred to as 
“failures”, and their behaviour can not be understood without reference to the specificity 
of these failures (Thorbecke, 1993). Under missing and incomplete markets, farmers may 
not enable to employ all factor inputs optimally even if adopting all inputs which could 
be beneficial in production. This could happen when a farmer faces a binding resource or 
liquidity constraint in his/her investment decisions (Feder, Just and Zilberman, 1985). In 
addition, risk can play an important role in the choice of production inputs and the tech-
nology adoption, especially in a situation where insurance markets function so poorly, 
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that it is difficult to pass the risks to a third party (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993).  
Hence, the assumption of perfect markets in this context may lead to misguided analysis 
and policy. There is also growing consensus in the literature that these factors tend to be 
physical manifestations of underlying market and institutional failures (Bojo and Cassells 
1995). Moreover, missing or incomplete markets for output and inputs, including labour 
and capital, result from high transaction costs endemic to poor economies (Taylor and 
Adelman, 2002). A pragmatic theoretical approach to address this complexity of rural 
market structure is always desirable for formulation of policies.   
During last few decades, agriculture has provided a fertile soil for the application 
of theories of incomplete and imperfect markets to economists and other scholars, par-
ticularly in developing countries. Farm household models are the conventional method to 
test various theoretical approaches. The empirical studies on farm households in most 
developing countries were initially based on the assumption of independence between 
farm household production and consumption decisions (Barnum and Squire, 1979; 
Rosenzweig, 1980). They assume perfect substitutability of factor inputs such as labour 
and capital as well as family and hired labour in production, and no disutility is associ-
ated with working off the farm i.e. utility is maximized from the consumption side, pro-
duction and consumption decisions of farm household models are taken simultaneously 
using a two-stage model (Strauss, 1986; Benjamin, 1992). However, these studies are si-
lent as regard to the relative efficiencies of family and hired labour inputs, and hiring-in 
and off-farm employment constraints, which often prevail in rural settings. Violation of 
any of these conditions generally breaks down the separability assumptions of the farm 
household model. Moreover, these studies do not incorporate an integrated structure of 
the farm household model where the implications of factor input of the observed hetero-
geneity have also been derived in a consistent manner and verified empirically. Thus, 
such models are important in evaluating the effects of policies directed at this poorest 
segment of the population (Jacoby, 1993). 
To summarize, this dissertation assesses the agricultural technology adoption de-
cisions. Based on the available literature, the analytical approach for the dissertation has 
been set up under the assumption of market imperfections that constrain farmers as re-
gards commercialization and modernization of farming system. Due to pervasiveness of 
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market failures in Nepal, farmers are more risk averse in adoption of new technology and 
this may lead them to remain in subsistence farming.  
The study also assesses the impact of economic liberalization on Nepalese agri-
culture after entering WTO as a LDC country. This segment of the dissertation explores 
the impact of price risks both domestic and international on agricultural income instabil-
ity, especially under three scenarios such as full, partial and no exposure to international 
markets.  
Finally, the study seeks to find out the impact of remittance income on labour 
supply responses in remittance-receiving households of Nepal. This objective deals with 
the effect of remittance income in household labour allocation, assuming the relationship 
between remittance income and work hours of remittance-receiving households depends 
on the type of good  and constraints such as labour and liquidity faced by the particular 
household. 
This analysis has important implications for policy. If the reduction of transaction 
costs and relaxation of factor input constraints are found to be a real economic factor, 
their simple abolition, as demanded by economists and policy makers, without ade-
quately addressing the factors that accelerate agricultural growth, may simply worsen the 
position of a lot of intended beneficiaries. In addition, if income diversification through 
remittance or other sources of income are found to be more positive for adopting new 
technology in agriculture by reducing credit constraints and insuring against negative in-
come shocks, the result can be helpful to explain their persistence. The findings can also 
have policy implication at micro, meso and macro levels for the improvement of overall 
agricultural growth in Nepal.  
1.3 Aim and scope of the study 
The overall aim of this dissertation is to understand better the challenges in rural 
development of Nepal with particular attention to the issue of low productivity and in-
creasing risk in the agricultural sector which are the underlying issues in this stage. Per-
sistent low performance of Nepalese agriculture needs to stimulate through transforma-
tion of technology. Moreover, increase in agricultural risk both domestic and world 
prices, as well as yields may face shrinking returns and high risk which may further lead 
to negative effects on the income of farmers and the macroeconomic health of the coun-
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try. Policy makers need to address these issues by exploring the degree of market integra-
tion and the impact of price and yield variability on both agricultural producers and con-
sumers in order to formulate risk coping strategies and reduce volatility. The growing 
importance of remittances with an increase in the flow of migration is emerged as an al-
ternative source of non-farm income that may support to raise the standard of living 
through smoothing income, easing liquidity constraint for small business, and financing 
on education and health expenditure in Nepal. The effect of remittances on recipient 
households is therefore likely to be critical to measure household welfare. 
  The theoretical basis for the dissertation is the recent development in microeco-
nomics of theories of incomplete and imperfect markets, which allow the application of 
agricultural household models. Agricultural household models are a staple of micro-level 
research on less-developed country (LDC) rural economies. Household-farm models are 
a useful tool to study how household specific transaction costs shape the impacts of ex-
ogenous policy and market changes in rural areas (Taylor and Adelman, 2002). However, 
other regression analyses will also be taken into account to some parts of the dissertation. 
The specific objectives of the dissertation are following; 
 to explore the factors affecting the adoption of improved seeds and inorganic fer-
tilizers, 
 to assess the commodity price risk and its impact on agricultural income instabil-
ity under the scenario of full, partial and no exposure with international markets, 
and 
 to find out the impact of remittance income on household labour allocation in re-
mittance-receiving households in Nepal. 
A sequence of research questions aim at clarifying the above mentioned objec-
tives. The research questions set up here deal with each objective. However, some re-
search questions may seek to answer from more than one objective. The following re-
search questions guide this dissertation; 
1. In what way rural factor markets contribute to the adoption of new technologies 
in agriculture in resource poor economies? 
2. What are the factors that determine the adoption of new technologies in agricul-
ture, use of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers in particular? 
3. Do Nepalese agricultural commodity prices follow Indian and world prices? 
  
11 
4. How do Indian price fluctuations affect the income of agricultural households in 
Nepal? 
5. What are factors affecting to take migration decisions in Nepal? 
6. What is the impact of remittance income on labour allocation of remittance-
receiving households? 
The size and diversity of the agricultural sector have led to this dissertation being 
focused on technology adoption decisions with particular attention to the use of im-
proved seeds and inorganic fertilizers, assuming that the use of such inputs is an initial 
step in shifting from subsistence to commercialized farming. 
 Fluctuations in Indian (or world) agricultural commodity prices in the context of 
implementing Nepal’s national economic liberalization programs affect the domestic 
markets and increase risks that can also influence the agricultural income instability. The 
analysis focuses on the impact of price fluctuations in major agricultural commodities 
(e.g., rice, maize, wheat, mustard oil and chicken meat) of Nepal. 
Remittance income is often discussed in the literature that it has impact on differ-
ent segments of the domestic economy such as consumption patterns and other social 
sectors. However, the study focuses on how remittance income affects labour supply de-
cisions of remittance-receiving households in Nepal. The study thus highlights the chal-
lenges in agricultural development and the impact of major alternative sources in rural 
livelihoods and factor markets. 
Modernization of the agricultural sector may evolve in two ways. The first is the 
large scale commercialization that consists of mechanizing the farming system derived 
from purely market-oriented purposes as well as the objective of profit maximization. 
The second way is the small holder and small scale plantation deriving from the objec-
tives of both household food security and market oriented commercialization. This dis-
sertation concentrates only on small holder commercialization which seems to be plausi-
ble in Nepal. 
1.4 Description of data set 
 The dissertation uses both panel and cross section data of Nepal Living Standards 
Surveys (NLSS) conducted by Central Bureau of Statistics, Government of Nepal with 
technical and financial assistance from the World Bank. Nepal Living Standards Surveys 
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(NLSS I and II) were conducted in 1995/1996 and 2003/04 using the methodology of a 
household survey approach developed by the World Bank and applied in more than 50 
developing countries in the world. The data set provides the agricultural and other 
household activities covering consumption, income, assets, housing, education, health, 
fertility, migration, employment and child labour. These data sets are supposed to be the 
best and most reliable data set available in Nepal covering all agro-ecological regions as 
well as administrative units both in urban and rural areas. 
Table 1.1: Primary sampling units of NLSS II by region and zone 
Development Region Ecological zones 
East Central West Mid-west Far-west 
Total 
Cross section 75 126 65 39 29 334 
Mountains 9 11 1 6 7 34 
Hills 22 68 45 18 11 164 
Terai 44 47 19 15 11 136 
       
Panel 23 39 19 11 8 100 
Mountains 3 4 0 2 3 12 
Hills 7 23 12 6 3 51 
Terai 13 12 7 3 2 37 
       
Combined 98 165 84 50 37 434 
Mountains 12 15 1 8 10 46 
Hills 29 91 57 24 14 215 
Terai 57 59 26 18 13 173 
 
 NLSS II 2003/04 is the second survey, where the first NLSS was conducted in 
1995/96. NLSS II was designed with similar approach adopted in NLSS I, but this survey 
includes both cross-section and panel samples. The following tables show the primary 
sample, sampling households and its distribution of sample households by region, zone 
and urban/rural residence. 
Table 1.1 shows the distribution of primary sampling units by region and zone 
both cross-section and panel. As presented in the table, administratively, Nepal is divided 
into five development regions (i.e. Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-western and Far-
western) with three agro-ecological zones (Mountains, Hills and Terai i.e. plain and low 
land in southern part of Nepal). Among five development regions, the central region 
where capital city is located, has the highest numbers of sampling units both in cross- 
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section and panel units, and the hilly region occupied relatively higher percentage of land 
area in Nepal, covers 164 sampling units both in cross-section and panel units. 
Table 1.2: Number of sample households of NLSS II by region and zone 
Development Regions  Ecological 
zones East Central West Mid-west Far-west 
Total 
Cross section 900 1512 780 468 348 4008 
Mountains 108 132 12 72 84 408 
Hills 264 816 540 216 132 1968 
Terai 528 564 228 180 132 1632 
       
Panel 276 468 228 132 128 1232 
Mountains 36 48 0 24 48 156 
Hills 84 276 144 72 48 624 
Terai 156 144 84 36 32 452 
       
Combined 1176 1980 1008 600 476 5240 
Mountains 144 180 12 96 132 564 
Hills 348 1092 684 288 180 2592 
Terai 684 708 312 216 164 2084 
 
Table 1.2 shows the number of sample households by region and zone. The sam-
ple households are relatively higher in central (1980) and eastern (1176) than other re-
gions both in cross section and panel due to higher population density. Among ecological 
Table 1.3: Distribution of sample households of NLSS II by region, zone and ur-
ban/rural residence 
Development Region Ecological 
zones East Central West Mid-west Far-west 
Total 
Mountains 108 132 12 72 84 408 
Urban 12 - - - - 12 
Rural  96 132 12 72 84 396 
       
Hills 264 816 540 216 132 1968 
Urban 48 480 168 24 24 744 
Rural  216 336 372 192 108 1224 
       
Terai 528 564 228 180 132 1632 
Urban 156 120 48 48 36 408 
Rural  372 444 180 132 96 1224 
       
Total 900 1512 780 468 348 4008 
Urban 216 600 216 72 60 1164 
Rural  684 912 564 396 288 2844 
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zones, hilly region has the highest number of sample households (2592) followed by 
Terai (2084) and mountain (564) regions respectively. 
Table 1.3 shows the distribution of sample households by region, zone and ur-
ban/rural residence. The distribution of sample households for urban areas is almost nil 
for mountain regions due to poorly developed infrastructure in the region.  
Table 1.4: Enumeration status of primary sampling units and households in the 
NLSS II4 
Enumerated Sample 
sampled Originally Replaced Total 
Not enumer-
ated 
Cross-section 4008 
(334) 
3493 419 3912 
(326) 
96    (8) 
Panel 1232 
(100) 
962 198 1160 
(95) 
72     (5) 
Combined 5240 
(434) 
4455 617 5072 
(421) 
168    (13) 
 
Table 1.4 reveals the enumeration status of primary sampling units. A total of 96 
households were not enumerated in cross-section sampling, while 72 households were 
dropped from interview in panel sampling. 
Though the NLSS covers wider level of data, the study concentrates more on 
NLSS panel and NLSS II data related to agricultural activities and remittance earned 
from abroad. Remaining data will also be used in order to support the result whenever 
necessary.   
The dissertation also uses Nepalese commodity price data collected from the of-
fice of Agricultural Information and Extension, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative, 
Government of Nepal and Indian price data adjacent to Nepalese border from the Nepal 
Rastra Bank (i.e. the National/Central Bank of Nepal) and the International Monetary 
Fund, and yield data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (e.g., FAOSTAT).  
1.5 Outline of the study 
The dissertation is composed into six chapters. Chapter one consists of the intro-
duction, motivation, aims and scope of the study and data set under the heading of gen-
eral introduction by giving the overview of development challenges in the Nepalese agri-
                                                 
4
 Figures represent the number of households; figures in parentheses represent the number of primary sam-
pling units 
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culture sector, especially that of a transformation of subsistence and semi-subsistence to 
commercialized farming. Chapter two reviews the existing literature that covers the evo-
lution of theoretical approaches, particularly focusing on the developing world. 
Chapter 3 deals with the first objective of the dissertation. This part analyses the 
decisions of more advanced technology adoption in the agricultural sector. The analysis 
intends to explore the factors determining the adoption of agricultural technologies in 
Nepal and considers as driving force for the transformation of subsistence and semi-
subsistence agriculture to commercialized farming. For this, it applies farm household 
models using equations of both improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers under the new 
economic paradigm of market imperfections. The study argues that under market imper-
fections, farmers face many constraints (i.e., cash income, family time, endowment of 
fixed productive assets, and production technologies), and it assumes that the production 
decision is derived by the consumption decision and not by the motive of profit maximi-
zation. The presence of missing and incomplete markets may disrupt the process of agri-
cultural commercialization.  
 Chapter 4 addresses the second objective that assesses the impact of the price risk 
in agriculture. This part sheds light more on the impact of Indian agricultural commodity 
price fluctuations in domestic agricultural producers of Nepal. This part argues that in 
many low income countries, domestic prices are highly volatile due to poorly developed 
private sector, weak market infrastructure, and incomplete or poorly functioning finan-
cial and risk markets.  
Chapter 5 analyses the impact of remittance income on household labour supply 
decisions in different sectors such as on-farm, off-farm, self-employment activities and 
hired labour in Nepal. It examines the assumption that an increase in the household in-
come through remittances may increase household leisure and reduce working hours, if 
remittance is a normal good. Moreover, remittance income may loosen the liquidity con-
straint and then increase farm investment that may lead to higher work hours on farm 
sector because of the presence of missing and incomplete labour markets. 
 The final chapter provides the detailed information of major findings, summary 
and conclusion of the study. This chapter deals more specifically with the synthesis of 
findings and requirements for further studies on the technology adoption and risks in ag-
riculture, Nepal in particular.  
    
CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the economic theory in relation to the risk and technology adoption in 
agricultural households and the effects of remittances on recipient households, particularly dealing 
with the context of low income countries as the study analyses the data from Nepal. During the last 
two decades, there have been a large number of studies on the issues of rural development with par-
ticular focus on the theory of incomplete and imperfect markets. It is therefore important to distin-
guish the different factors involved in rural economies. This chapter covers the role of factor mar-
kets in rural economies and the theoretical framework used in these studies, mostly applied in micro 
level studies in low income countries like Nepal. 
2.1 Factor markets and their role in rural economies 
 In many agrarian countries like Nepal, agriculture is the main engine of economic develop-
ment in rural areas, and the growth in agriculture is important for the improvement of rural liveli-
hoods. Development practitioners and economists commonly emphasize that productivity growth in 
agriculture is required for a transformation out of the subsistence, low-input, low productivity pro-
duction systems that characterize most of the developing world (Pingali, 1997; Doss, 2006). Due to 
the broader linkages of the agricultural sector, several factors are needed to be taken into account 
during the transformation of traditional agriculture system, especially in low income countries. The 
role and status of factor markets (e.g., labour, land, capital and insurance) are generally considered 
as the deriving factors for the commercialization and modernization of agriculture, because the 
transformation of the subsistence economy to a market oriented one by promoting commercializa-
tion in agriculture production may be determined by the nature of factor markets in the particular 
region. Indeed, the commercialization of agriculture is not only the marketing of agricultural output, 
but also the fact that the purchase of inputs and product choice are done based on the principles of 
profit maximization. The substitution of non-traded inputs in favour of purchased inputs, the spe-
cialization of farms and the declining proportion of farm income in total household income as la-
bour is allocated somewhere else are all signs of transformation of subsistence agriculture (Pingali, 
1997). Agricultural transformation is also necessary for the development of factor markets in devel-
oping countries. Because, for instance, by promoting market demand for inputs, the use of modern 
varieties of inputs may induce private sector investment which improves the availability of key in-
puts that can be used on a wide range of crops. In addition, commercialization may support private 
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investment in infrastructure and human capital development that leads to broader benefits for other 
economic activities.   
 It is often discussed in the literature that technological change and agricultural commerciali-
zation are interconnected with the development of the factor markets such as rise in wage labour, 
land lease, and large-scale loans and investments, and on the other hand, failure of such factor mar-
kets may lead to large inefficiencies in resource allocations (Binswanger and Braun, 1991). Agricul-
tural commercialization may have linking power between input and output sides of a market. For 
instance, demand for new technologies promotes the input sides of production and facilitates the 
development and advancement of technological innovations. The use of new technologies can also 
lead to higher productivity and then can induce output markets. On the other hand, in the absence of 
the market for outputs, farmers have to be self-sufficient in basic staples (de janvry, Fafchamps, and 
Sadoulet, 1991). Technological change may also be affected by the factor markets functioning in 
the particular region. For instance, land rights and security of land tenure influence farmers’ in-
vestments via the incentives and the constraints. Farmers may have higher incentives to invest on 
their own farm, if they have secured property rights on land. Secured land rights may also enable 
liquidity-constrained farmers to use their land as collateral for obtaining credit, allowing them to in-
crease investment. Moreover, in the presence of incomplete labour markets, household labour en-
dowments may also determine farm investment decisions, if the new technology is more labour in-
tensive. It is therefore a general convention that the pattern of technological choice may deviate 
from an efficient path in the presence of incomplete factor markets such as land, labour and credit.  
Farmers’ risk attitudes related to the rural factor markets are also crucial for agricultural trans-
formation in the developing world. Because new technology is often regarded as high-risk high re-
turn activity and the adoption decision may be affected by the farmer’s attitudes toward risk. Many 
empirical evidences show that farmers in the rural sectors of developing countries are more risk 
averse arising often from the incomplete and missing factor markets such as credit and insurance 
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979; Binswanger, 1980; Fafchamps, 2003).  For instance, in the absence of 
insurance market, farmers are willing to avoid new technologies (Feder et al., 1985). In other words, 
exposure to risk is likely to affect the ex ante production choice (Fafchamps, 1992).  Therefore, an 
understanding of the role of factor markets towards farmers’ risk attitudes is likely to be critical for 
agrarian reforms.  
However, in many developing countries, farmers encounter with many constraints in relation 
to each of labour, capital and land due to poorly developed factor markets. These binding con-
straints which may be the result of factor market imperfections, may limit the adoption of new tech-
nologies in agriculture. It is widely discussed in the literature that market imperfections arising from 
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high transaction costs are common in rural markets in developing countries (Hoff, Braverman and 
Stiglitz, 1993). It is the rule rather than the exception that there are market imperfections in rural 
economies in developing countries (Holden, Taylor and Hampton, 1998). Market imperfections in 
this context imply missing markets (absence of particular market such as output or factor), partly 
missing markets (rationing, seasonality), thin markets and interlinked markets (land market with la-
bour market, credit market with land) (Holden and Binswanger, 1998). Market imperfections pre-
vail due to high transaction costs that include not only the transportation costs but also the conse-
quences of imperfect and asymmetrical information leading to adverse selection and moral hazard 
as a consequence of the opportunist behaviour it allows; shallow local markets (high negative co-
variation between household supply and effective prices); and price risk and risk aversion (i.e, in-
fluence the effective price used for decision making) (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995).   
The pervasiveness of market imperfections in many developing countries varies across time 
and countries and these include: (i) monopoly, or imperfect competition in land markets that leads 
to monopolistic and monopsonistic  behaviour, (ii) incomplete credit markets and land with credit 
contracts, or interlinked markets5 (iii) imperfect (non-clearing) labour markets and conditions of 
“surplus labour”, which make household labour utilization dependent on land ownership, and (iv) 
underdeveloped insurance markets, which make land ownership the key to food security and a 
source of insurance against food-price shocks that is unavailable to landless households (Benjamin 
and Brandt, 1997).  
Holden, Taylor and Hampton (1998) have developed a typology of villages in the context of 
market imperfections, which are characterised along with two main domains in relation to transac-
tion costs or isolation from the outside world and to the degree of internal differentiation of access 
to resources. These types of farm households are characterised by a number of market failures for 
some products (e.g., some foods, particularly the most perishable or bulky, or those with high price 
risk) and for some factors (e.g., child or family labour with low access to the labour market or fac-
ing price discrimination) (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). This may cause the factor markets non-
tradable or locally tradable. For instance, in the absence of labour market, household composition is 
an important determinant of farm labour use (Benjamin, 1992), where the labour time cannot be 
purchased and valued (Ellis, 1993). In this context, the result may be endogenous village prices, 
perhaps observed in local markets or be in shadow prices and are internal to households and various 
contractual arrangements (Holden and Binswagner, 1998). 
Nepal is facing many development challenges for the improvement of living standard of the 
people. The central challenge is now to shift from subsistence to a commercial agriculture, because 
                                                 
5
 Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984) also termed it as interlinkages market. 
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agriculture is the main source of food, income and employment for the majority, particularly in ru-
ral areas. The history of economic development in Nepal indicates that agricultural productivity has 
been the major source of sustained improvements of rural livelihoods. It is often discussed at the 
policy level that the commercialization of agriculture, which mostly relied on imported agricultural 
technologies, including improved seeds, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, will enhance productiv-
ity growth. Adoption of such agricultural technologies can only be possible when the input and out-
put markets are functioning well in all agro-ecological zones in Nepal. The small number of studies 
relating to Nepal show that proximity to markets and the size of cities are strongly associated with 
different patterns of agricultural production (Jacoby, 1998). Participation of markets both input and 
output varies with distance as well road access and level of infrastructure development. Another 
study done by Asian Development Bank (2004) explores the argument that the commercialization 
of high value agricultural products is constrained by lack of access to adequate credit in rural areas 
of Nepal.  So policy needs to address the importance of input and output markets to encourage a 
transformation out of subsistence oriented farming in Nepal. In the perspective of many develop-
ment economists, missing or imperfect markets constitute the crucial step in our understanding of 
the economic problems of developing countries (Ray, 1998).  
The impact of modernization of agriculture, particularly on small farm holders has been dis-
cussed for decades as being a driver for reducing poverty and hunger. However, pervasive market 
failures often create undue risks for farmers to engage in significant commercialization activities 
(Dorward et al., 2004). Such market failures that lead to factor market imperfections resulting 
mostly from high transaction costs is widely recognized as an obstacle to transformation of agricul-
ture in many low-income countries such as Nepal. Reduction of transaction costs through the policy 
reforms and infrastructure development in all ecological belts now seems inevitable for the signifi-
cant achievements of rural development and agricultural commercialization programs, because ef-
forts made to boost this sector in the past could not materialize due to physical constraints as a land-
locked country and mountainous terrain with poorly developed infrastructure that limited the 
opportunities of agricultural marketing in Nepal (see, World Bank reports). A report prepared by the 
World Bank6 mentions that limited access to resources, weak and poorly integrated institutions and 
inadequate technical support for supply chain development are the major constraints towards the ag-
ricultural commercialization in Nepal. Development of rural factor markets for labour, land, and 
credit is necessary to increase the access to resources, especially for small-holders and to facilitate a 
transformation in agricultural production. 
                                                 
6
 This information is drawn from the assessment report prepared by World Bank under the heading of Agricultural De-
velopment in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EXTSAREGTOPAGRI/0,,contentMDK:2
0273771~menuPK:548215~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:452766,00.html  
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2.2 Theoretical framework for rural economies  
 A key to an investigation of rural economics is to develop a theory for the behaviour of the 
farm household, which is the elementary unit of analysis in modelling the rural economy.  This the-
ory must cover farm production, the marketing of agricultural commodities, and the demand for 
food, the performance of product and factor markets, the linkages between agriculture and other 
sectors of the economics, and the rest of the world. An understanding of household behaviour is im-
portant to analyze the effects of government interventions (e.g., pricing policies, investment) and 
external changes in market conditions on the rural economy, rural livelihoods, poverty and house-
hold decisions (e.g., production and consumption). Agricultural households, particularly in re-
source-poor economies, are faced with a complex set of issues that influence, to a very large extent, 
their livelihoods and livelihood strategies (Ellis, 1993; Caillavet, Guyomard and Lifran, 1994; Car-
ney, 1998). Their behaviour of rural households needs to be analyzed in terms of production and 
consumption decisions that are taken simultaneously. This is because, rural households often con-
sume at least a small portion of the output of their own product, and household labour is often an 
important input into the production process of the enterprise7 (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). In other 
words, most rural households in the developing world are characterised by the mixture of both pro-
duction activities (the level of output, the demand for factors and the choice of technology) and 
consumption activities (labour supply and commodity demand). Agricultural households make joint 
decisions over consumption, production, and time (labour/leisure) allocation for work8. The agricul-
tural household model provides a framework for analyzing such household behaviour that integrates 
these three decisions and it is considered as a staple of micro research on less-developed country ru-
ral economies (Taylor and Adelman, 2003). Moreover, agricultural household models are micro-
economic models of household behaviour which are built theoretically and applied empirically. 
Conventional models of agricultural households often neglected the interdependences of consump-
tion and production decisions (Lopez, 1987). 
 Agricultural household models were initially developed and applied by Chayanov (1920) 
and Nakajima (1957) who believed that the behaviour of farm households was best understood in a 
household-firm framework. Later, this model is formalized by Becker (1965) in the “new home 
economics”, in which the author explained the time allocation of household members when labour 
has an opportunity cost and the utility of household is not only derived by market goods but also by 
household produced goods and total household time endowment. The model took its full shape by 
                                                 
7
 Bardhan and Udry (1999) explain that the insights of agricultural household model can also apply in the households 
that operate enterprises such as small-scale trading or petty manufacturing that often uses a certain percentage of 
households’ labour and other inputs. 
8
 Farm households or agricultural households that imply the same meaning in this thesis are used interchangeably. 
Hence there would not have been any confusion using both terms frequently.   
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Barnum and Square (1979) and was further elaborated by a series of articles in a book entitled “Ag-
ricultural Household Models: Extensions, Applications, and Policy” edited by Singh, Squire and 
Strauss (1986). This book, one of the most widely referred books for agricultural household models, 
is known as the new-classical farm household model in the academic arena. The model was further 
developed under missing or incomplete markets by de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991). The 
section below first deals with the agricultural household model under the assumption of perfect 
markets and then elaborates under missing or incomplete markets. 
2.2.1 Household models with perfect markets  
 The simple agricultural household model, followed by Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) is a 
combination of consumer and producer model into a single model, in which the model typically as-
sumes that households maximize its utility subject to a budget constraint, which incorporates pro-
duction on assets owned by the household. In other words, households take the decisions of produc-
tion, consumption, and labour supply separately with the following setup: 
• the household produces one food crop (Qa), one cash crop (Qc) using labour and one pur-
chased input, 
• the household consumes the food crop (Ca), one non-food good (Cm), 
• the household allocates time endowment between farm labour (LH) and leisure(  ); labour 
can be sold off-farm and can be hired in, meaning that there are no efficiency differences, 
and  
• the model excludes non-farm labour earnings as these make no difference to the analysis. 
The model assumes perfect markets for production, consumption and labour, and supposes 
that prices are exogenous to the household. The model also assumes perfect credit and insurance 
markets. Consider a farm household in which adult male and female jointly choose their decisions 
of consumption of both agricultural goods (Ca) and non-agricultural or market goods (Cm) and their 
time endowment (T) between household work (LH) and leisure (  ). The model can be written as 
follows: 
(2.1)  }{
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Subject to following constraints; 
(2.2)  Production: g (Qa, Qc, LT, x) = 0. 
(2.3)    Time endowment: T = LH+  . 
(2.4)  Income:  Pa(Qa-Ca) + w(LH- LT) +PcQc =PxQx + PmCm. 
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Where LT is total labour both household and hired used in production, and x is factor input for 
production, and Pi is the prices of agricultural goods (a), market goods (m) and inputs (x). w is the 
wage of labour. The term (Qa - Ca) will be positive, if the household is net seller and negative if the 
household is net buyer. Likewise (LH- LT) is positive if the household is net seller of labour time and 
negative if the household is net buyer of labour time. After combining (2.3) and (2.4), the full in-
come budget constraint is expressed as: 
(2.5) PaCa + Pm Cm  + w = Pa Qa + PC QC – PX x –  wLH  +  wT  )( *y≡ ,    
the left hand side of the constraint represents the value of all consumption, including own produced 
food and leisure, while the right hand side of the constraint is the value of full income. The term 
“(Pa Qa + PC QC – PX x –  wLH)” is farm profit )( *pi and wT is the full value of time. Using Lagrange 
multiplier )(λ , the first order conditions are: 
(2.6) 0=−
∂
∂
a
a
P
C
U λ , 
(2.7)
 
0=−
∂
∂
m
m
P
C
U λ , 
(2.8) 0=−
∂
∂
w
U λ

, and 
The equations (2.6 -2.8) show that marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio of any two 
goods. Moreover, if γ is the Lagrange multiplier for production constraint (i.e. 2.2), then the first 
order conditions are: 
(2.9) 0=+ aa gP λ
γ
, 
(2.10)
 
0=+ cc gP λ
γ
, 
(2.11) 0=− cgw λ
γ
, 
(2.12) 0=− xx gP λ
γ
, and 
where the equations (2.9-2.10) imply that marginal rate of transformation equals to price ratio for 
any two outputs, and the equations (2.11) to (2.12) also imply that value of marginal product equals 
the factor price. 
These results imply that production decisions over x and LT affect consumption decisions via 
farm profit in the full income constraint. However, consumption decisions do not affect production 
decisions, implying that production is independent of household preferences and income. 
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Comparative statics: As we discussed earlier, this model gives a useful benchmark to study the 
household’s response to price changes.  
A. Demand for food 
Based on the above household model, the demand for food at the optimum level can be written 
as: 
(2.13)  Ca = Ca (Pa , Pm, w, y*), 
this equation implies that demand for food is the function of the prices of food and non food goods, 
wage rate, and the household full income ( )*** wTwLxPQPQPy Hxccaa +−−+= . This demand 
function is different than usual demand function because here prices have an added effect on in-
come through profits.  
Differentiating Ca with respect to Pi, then the result follows as: 
(2.14)  
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the first term on the right side is standard Slutsky equation, while the second term on the right hand 
side is income effect (
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. The first term on the right can also 
be decomposed into substitution and income effect using the Slutsky equation.  
(2.15)   
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the first term on the right is the substitution effect and is negative, implying that an increase in the 
price of food decreases the consumption of food item. If food is normal good, then 
*y
Ca
∂
∂ is positive, 
while the sign of this term )( aa CQ − is determined by the household status as a net seller, 
0)( >− aa CQ  or a net buyer 0)( <− aa CQ of food. The net term can provide more information re-
garding the household response. For net buyer of food, the sign of aa PC ∂∂ /  is unambiguous. If the 
household is large enough marketed surplus, then aa PC ∂∂ / can be positive, particularly if income 
elasticity is large. 
B. Demand for leisure 
The demand function for leisure (or home time) at optimum is: 
(2.16)  ),,,( *ywPP ma = . 
Differentiating the demand function for leisure with respect to wage, and decomposing as 
before, yields: 
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The first term on the right hand side is negative, if the household is net purchaser of labour. 
This implies that an increase in wage rate will reduce leisure time and increase work hour. On the 
other hand, if the household is net seller of labour (e.g., landless workers and small farmers), the 
elasticity can be either sign. For them, wage is revenue. Income elasticity of leisure is likely to be 
high at low income level, so the consumption of leisure will be low. However, it depends on the 
size of income elasticity and market surplus of labour. 
 
C. Marketed surplus 
(2.18)  aaa CQMS −= , where MS is the market surplus of food. 
If marketed surplus of food ( aa CQ − )>0, then the response of marketed surplus to price can 
be expressed as: 
(2.19)  
*
tan
)(
y
CCQ
P
C
P
Q
P
MS a
aa
tconsUa
a
a
a
a
a
∂
∂
−−
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
=
. 
As we know, the first term on the right hand side is positive because this is supply response 
of production. The second term is also unambiguously positive, an implication of the standard the-
ory of consumer demand. However, the third term depends on the type of good. If the good is nor-
mal, then this term is negative. If marketed surplus (MSa) is large enough, it is possible that the con-
sumption response of households may outweigh its output response giving an overall negative 
response. More normally, we would expect the first two terms to dominate so that markets surplus 
responds positively to the traded good price. 
Farm household theoretical literature has recognized that marketable surplus supply re-
sponse is influenced by the price and income elasticities of own-consumption (Strauss, 1984; Davis 
and Zong, 2002). However, the response of price change depends on whether the farmer is a net 
seller or buyer matters.  The study on the market surplus households in 6 countries (Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Taiwan, and Thailand) shows a positive response of price change 
in different crops such as rice in Korea, Malaysia, and Sierra Leone, sorghum in Nigeria, and farm 
output in Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995) and rice in Madagascar (Bar-
ret and Dorosh, 1996).   
2.2.2 Household models with market failure  
The agricultural household model mentioned in the previous section is based on the assump-
tion of perfect markets called as separable (or recursive) household model, implying that production 
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decisions are independent from consumption decisions of the farm household. Under this assump-
tion, all products and factors are tradable and the opportunity cost of any product or factor held by 
the household is its market price. However, rural households of developing countries are systemati-
cally exposed to a number of market failures due to high transaction costs (e.g., high transportation 
costs because of distance to markets, high marketing margins because of poor infrastructure, mer-
chant with local monopoly, high search and recruitment costs because of imperfect information, and 
supervision and incentive costs of hired labour); price risks and risk aversion (e.g., risk averse 
households calculate with low sales prices and high purchase prices); limited access to credit (e.g., 
low collateral and seasonality of agricultural expenditures). More specifically, a market fails when 
the cost of a transaction through market exchange creates disutility greater than the utility gain that 
it produces, such that no market transaction occurs (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991). The 
extreme case of market failure is nonexistence of a market (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). How-
ever, in general case, the market exists but the gains for a particular household may be below or 
above the cost under which conditions some households may participate and some may not partici-
pate in the markets. The market definition is therefore household specific but not commodity spe-
cific (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991).  
With market failure, the particular good or factor becomes nontradable in which prices are 
no longer determined by the market. Under the presence of market failure, the separability assump-
tion breaks down and consumption decisions are affected by the production decisions of the house-
hold9. In real life, rural households may face various kinds of market failures (e.g., missing markets, 
partly missing markets, and thin markets) for some goods but not all, resulting in a mixture of trad-
ables and nontradables (Taylor and Adelman, 2003). The study of the agricultural household there-
fore needs to include both tradables and nontradables goods in the model. The agricultural house-
hold model with market failure follows the procedure developed by de Janvry, Fafchamps and 
Sadoulet (1991) and mentioned by de Janvry and Sadoulet (1995). The model is presented below in 
detail.  
The household’s optimization problem is to solve: 
(2.20)  }{
}{ qc
CCMax     U ma
,,
,,
      

 , 
Subject to the budget constraint: 
(2.21)  ( )∑ ∑
∈ ∈
+=
TRi
ii
TRi
iii TQPCP ,    
                                                 
9
 A number of literatures on market imperfections focusing in low income countries can be found. Some noted papers 
are: Stiglitz (1986, 1989), de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991), Bejnamin(1992), Thorbecke (1993), Jacoby 
(1993), Skoufias (1994), de Janvry and Sadoulet (1995), Bardhan and Udry (1999), and de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006). 
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where Pi is the price of good i[i= agricultural goods(Pa) and non food or market goods(Pm) in con-
sumption; and food crop (Pa) and cash crop (Pc) in production], Ci is the quantity consumed of good 
i(i.e. Ca and Cm), Qi is the quantity of good i[i=food crop (Qa) and cash crop (Qc)] in production, Ti 
is the total household initial labour endowment. The term TR stands for the set of tradable goods. 
Production function of the household is: 
(2.22)  ,0),,( =xLQg Ti where outputs both food crop and cash crop (with positive values; 
Qa, Qc>0) and inputs (with negative values; LT, x <0),     
and a self-sufficiency constraint for nontradable goods (i.e. equilibrium for nontrabables): 
(2.23)  ,iii CTQ =+  NTRi ∈ (nontradable goods), 
the model assumes exogenous market price for tradable goods referred as: 
(2.24)  ,ii PP =  TRi ∈  , 
reorganizing the above constraints and using the Lagrange multiplier, the maximization problem is: 
(2.26)  )(),,()(),( iii
NTRi
iTi
TRi
iiiii CTQxLQgCTQPCUL −+++





−++= ∑∑
∈∈
φµλ , 
first order conditions with respect to consumption and production are: 
(2.27)  ,0' =− ii PU λ   TRi ∈ , consumer goods, 
(2.28)  ,0' =+ ii Pg λµ   TRi ∈ , producer goods, 
(2.29)  ,0' =− iiU φ   NTRi ∈ ,  consumer goods, and  
(2.30)  ,0' =+ iig φµ   NTRi ∈ . producer goods 
To simplify the notation, the prices of tradables and nontradables are presented by the first 
order conditions of constrained maximization problem in which the price of nontradable commodity 
is converted into an endogenous price which is written as: 
 (2.31)  λ
φi
iP ≡  for all NTRi ∈ , 
the model can be solved by defining endogenous decision prices  for nontradable goods and exoge-
nous prices for tradable goods, which are as follows: 
(2.32)  ,* ii PP =  TRi ∈ (Tradable), and 
(2.33)  ,/* λφiiP =  NTRi ∈  (Nontradable), where *iP  in nontradable is called as shadow 
price.  
It is noteworthy to mention that market prices for tradable commodities are common across 
households and exogenous to individual households while shadow prices are endogenous and 
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household specific and are obtained by the equilibrium between production and consumption of 
goods (2.23).  
 The reduced form of the model can be shown after the calculation of first order condition in 
which production decisions of all tradables and nontradables are represented by a system of input 
demand and output supply in the decision price *iP : 
(2.34)  ),( *iii PQQ =      
on the production side, the household is assumed to maximize profit with shadow prices ( *iP ), 
where the maximum profit at optimum levels of products and factors can be written as: 
(2.35)  ∑= ii QP**pi .   
On demand side, the household also makes decisions based on shadow prices ( *iP ), the full 
income constraint using shadow prices ( *iP ) from (2.21) to (2.33) follows as: 
(2.36)  ∑∑ =+=
i
ii
i
ii yTPCP ,
**** pi    
and the demand system is: 
(2.37)  ),( ** yPCC iii = .     
 In this model, the demand for consumption is determined by the shadow prices ( *iP ) and in-
come (y*).  
Comparative statics:  
 The market response of agricultural household models under missing markets with the 
change in market conditions is different than the conventional models under the assumption of per-
fect markets that allow only exogenous prices for all production and consumption goods. For this, 
let us take a simple case with a single nontradable good and let us analyze what is the response of 
the household to a change in price of an unconsumed output, say a cash crop. Consider now that 
there is absence of market for cash crop, indicated by the shadow price ( *cP ) and exogenous price 
( cP ) for a tradable cash crop. Total differentiating supply equation (2.34) with respect to price in 
logarithmic form (for global elasticities), then the result is: 
(2.38)  
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this equation reveals that the effect of a change in the price of the cash crop can have two effects: a 
direct output response and an indirect output response because of the possible effect of the change 
in market price on the endogenous shadow price of the cash crop. If we assume there is no change 
in this shadow price ( 0* =cdP ), then the first term on the right hand side will be positive 
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. This would be the case if the cash crop had a clear market price. Instead, in the ab-
sence of market for cash crop, the second term on the right hand side will be negative 
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, because the indirect effect of the external price via the internal price change would 
have opposite to the direct effect. In the absence of market,  market price is more likely to be higher 
than the shadow price, if the household is a net purchaser and lower if the household is a net seller 
of food. So the supply response of the market price to the shadow price may be opposite.  The third 
term will be positive 



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
> 0
ln
ln *
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, implying that an increase in the price of cash crop raises the 
shadow value of food. In other words, cash crop supply elasticity will be smaller when we include 
missing market in the model. 
 The market response of the agricultural household can also be analyzed in demand function. 
Consider now that there is absence of market for food, marked by the shadow price ( *aP ), and that 
one market price mP  changes, then totally differentiating the demand function with respect to 
prices, gives: 
(2.39)  
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, where aP is exogenous price for food 
commodity. 
As discussed in the literature, supply and demand elasticities do not simply have unambigu-
ous signs (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991). However, the response to a change in the 
price of food and non-food goods could be interesting under missing markets of some commodities. 
In equation (2.39), the first term on the right hand side is positive because of cross price elasticity 
with respect to other goods and the second term is also positive because of two effects: substitution 
and income. In this case, the income effect is positive, if employment in production is smaller than 
the total income available to the household. However the sign may be negative in the case of a 
household having very large area in which labour costs reduce the household’s income dramati-
cally. Moreover, if the shadow price of good, say food, increases, then the household’s income 
would increase through the higher income of shadow price, which also increases the consumption 
of the household, i.e. 0
ln
ln *
>
m
a
Pd
Pd
. The overall effect is positive, implying that non food/market 
good cross-price demand elasticity becomes larger when the effect of missing market is accounted 
in the model.  
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 It is noteworthy to say that the agricultural household model is a useful vehicle for rural pol-
icy assessment, allowing to analyze the effect of demands for all sorts of commodities and labour 
supply via cross price effects and it is potentially important for policy design and the assessment for 
policy impact. This model provides a description of the effect of policy changes in the agricultural 
sector not only in production, but also in consumption and labour supply and demand. Due to its 
significance in empirical application, a number of studies are also found to extend this model in 
other fields such as health and nutrition, rural energy consumption, fuel wood and fodder collection, 
storage, and human resource development.  
2.3 Conclusions  
 This chapter reviewed the literature related to the theoretical framework applied in the rural 
economy, particularly in the context of developing countries. The chapter examined the literature 
critically both theoretical approaches and applied studies in which agricultural household models 
that capture households both as producers and as consumers, as well as under perfect markets and 
under missing or incomplete markets in the model are found to take into account both household 
and local characteristics of the rural economy.  
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CHAPTER 3  
ADOPTION OF IMPROVED SEEDS AND INORGANIC    
FERTILIZERS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Agriculture is the main source of food, income, and employment for the majority of low in-
come households in Nepal, most of which are rural.  Growth in agriculture is, therefore, critical for 
reducing poverty and hunger in the country because the majority of the poor are small-holders 
(NPC, 2002). The conventional wisdom in Nepal is that the low productivity in agriculture is pri-
marily due to subsistence-oriented farming that applies traditional technologies for cultivation and 
the wide use of low yield varieties of seeds10. Technology transfer in this regard seems to be a pre-
condition for increasing productivity, as well as for shifting from subsistence to commercial farm-
ing. This transformation encourages the adoption of more advanced technologies such as high yield 
varieties of seeds and inorganic fertilizers. Many studies have viewed technology as a means to end 
poverty (Besley and Case, 1993). It is often claimed in the literature that the transfer of technologies 
through the adoption of modern varieties of seeds and fertilizers can substantially provide an oppor-
tunity to increase productivity and income (Feder, Just and Zilberman, 1985) 11. The contribution of 
technological change to agricultural productivity in developing countries has been extensively 
documented (see, Sunding and Zilberman, 2000; Doss, 2006). In other words, technological change 
can have enormous effects in many respects such as income increases, creation of labour opportuni-
ties for the poor, food prices, environmental sustainability, and linkages with the rest of the econ-
omy. An understanding of adoption decisions of new technology in agriculture is therefore crucial 
for formulating effective policies.  
Recognizing the importance of the agricultural sector in the national economy, the Govern-
ment of Nepal has made numerous efforts such as the distribution of intermediate inputs, improved 
seeds, and inorganic fertilizers to enhance agricultural-led growth, but past programs to increase 
                                                 
10
 Traditional technology refers to the endogenous methods of cultivation to provide subsistence using local technolo-
gies such as non-marketed of local seeds, animal traction and organic fertilizer/manure. Technology transfer refers to 
changes in both technology and motive for farming, e.g., use of purchased seeds such as improved seeds and fertiliz-
ers, and tractorization. 
11
 Adoption of a new technology is a choice between traditional and new technology such as rice, maize and wheat. It is 
often believed that modern varieties of seeds lead to higher yields than the traditional varieties. For econometric 
analysis, the definition of adoption depends on whether the adopter is a discrete state with binary variable (use or not) 
or a continuous measure (e.g. proportion of land allocated to technologies as measure of adoption), as explained by 
Doss (2006). 
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Figure 3.1: Yields of major crops
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productivity have mostly failed (NPC, 2002). Adoption and dissemination rates of new agricultural 
technologies are relatively lower than in other South Asian countries, especially India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Bangladesh due to Nepal’s late participation in the Green Revolution (Herath and 
Jayasuriya, 1996). Inorganic fertilizers are used on about 50 percent of total farmland in Nepal, and 
most predominantly in paddy farming. However, the use of improved seeds is much lower covering 
about 30 percent of farmland on average. The average level of fertilizer use is 100 kg per household 
and 56 kg per hectare (AFCI, 2003). The percentage of land area planted with modern seed varieties 
is about 40 percent for paddy (Herath and Jayasuriya, 1996) and 54-58 percent for maize, including 
both improved varieties and those seeds recycled for one or more seasons (Adhikary et al., 2001; 
Aquino et al., 2001; Ranson, Paudyal and Adhikari, 2003); these rates are lower than 15 percent in 
remote areas. The Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS; CBS, 2004) shows that the percentages of 
households using improved seeds in selected crops are 20.7 percent for winter vegetables, 17.8 per-
cent for onions, 16.3 percent for winter potatoes, 11.9 percent for summer vegetables, 5.6 percent 
for wheat,  5.4 percent for paddy, and 4.3 percent for summer maize12. Likewise, the percentage of 
households using inorganic fertilizers are 66.4 percent for paddy, 56 percent for wheat, 34 percent 
for summer maize, 21.6 percent for winter potato, 8.1 percent for winter vegetables and 3.7 percent 
for summer vegetables. The adoption rate of both improved seeds and inorganic fertilizer is higher 
in urban and semi-urban areas as well as in Terai (southern plain land) than in mountain and hilly 
regions (CBS, 2004). 
The Green Revolution, introduced in the late 1960s in South Asia, is considered to be the 
evolution of new technology 
comprising high yielding 
varieties of seeds in association 
with inorganic fertilizers 
(Farmer, 1986). However, 
Nepal was slow to adopt these 
technologies in comparison to 
other South Asian countries, 
and thereby benefited less from 
the Green Revolution than its 
neighbours. The yields per 
hectare of major crops such as 
                                                 
12
 NLSS II (2003/04) report explains improved seeds as high-yielding varieties (HYV) of crops (in Nepali language 
called as bikase biu) introduced more recently than the existing improved seeds (e.g. improved recycle seeds). This 
study includes both newly introduced improved seeds and recycled improved seeds. 
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rice, maize, and wheat have not significantly improved even after adopting new technologies (see 
Figure 1 ). The data show that rice productivity increased from 2.09 to 2.72 metric ton per hectare 
from 1987 to 2005. Likewise, in the same year, the productivity of maize increased from 1.34 to 
2.04 and of wheat from 1.25 to 2.07 metric tons per hectare.   Such sluggish performance in the ag-
riculture sector has raised a number of important questions about the policies adopted by the Gov-
ernment for improving the agriculture sector. It is also widely recognized that most low-income 
countries are confronted with multiple constraints due to inadequate capital, poor road and commu-
nication networks that often negatively influence the timely distribution of farm inputs such as im-
proved seeds, inorganic fertilizers, and farm credit, thereby reducing the probability of adopting 
new farm technologies. Thus, understanding the adoption processes in rural settings is a high prior-
ity for improving the living standards of rural people. 
In addition to the studies related to output variability and technology adoption in the agricul-
tural sector, a number of studies have also raised issues relating to the theoretical implications of 
models in which the adoption decisions about improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers are often es-
timated as a single equation assuming that the adoption decision about improved seeds is different 
than the adoption decision about inorganic fertilizers. The literature shows that a single equation 
approach may cause bias, inconsistency, and inefficiency in parameter estimates if simultaneity in 
decision making is detected and/or unobserved heterogeneities are correlated for these decisions 
(Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2003). On the other hand, bivariate probit models can capture the interre-
lation between the two decisions as opposed to the situation in which two separate probit (or logit) 
models are estimated. Numerous factors can affect joint decisions of technology adoption such as 
improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers. For instance, it may occur due to interlinakges and syner-
gies in farm production. Adoption decisions about inorganic fertilizers are more likely to occur 
when farmers decide to adopt improved seeds, but not necessary the other way round. It may be 
possible that farmers in low income countries decide to adopt new technologies as a package, in-
cluding for example, improved seeds with other supplementary components like inorganic fertiliz-
ers and pesticides (Kaliba et al., 2000). If it can be shown that joint decisions are indeed made, then 
policy makers need to give more emphasis to the adoption of improved seeds. If the findings sup-
port joint technology adoption, then policy should focus on a package program of technology adop-
tion. An understanding of the factors affecting the adoption decisions of technologies in Nepal is 
likely to have policy implications for other countries at similar levels of development. 
 The analysis of adoption behaviour of farm technologies with the application of both single 
and simultaneity decisions using panel data may give better insights about the adoption behaviour 
of farmers in Nepal. This study intends to capture the underlying characteristics of farm households, 
  
33 
such as simultaneity decisions in technology adoption and prevalence of missing and incomplete 
markets, which are often neglected in the past studies. Such characteristics may be crucial for policy 
implications. The use of panel data is also an important contribution, enabling to capture changes in 
the adoption decision over time which may not be possible in the conventional static models. The 
study  thus aims to add to the literature on the adoption of new farm technologies and examines the 
policy implications for Nepal. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors affecting adoption decisions about im-
proved seeds and inorganic fertilizers under the assumption of incomplete and missing markets, 
where both decisions are considered to be interdependent. This paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 3.2 reviews the literature on technology adoption and diffusion; Section 3.3 outlines the theo-
retical framework; Section 3.4 presents the data and descriptive statistics; Section 3.5 specifies the 
econometric models; Section 3.6 presents the findings; Section 3.7 discusses the results; and Sec-
tion 3.8 concludes. 
3.2 Literature on farm technology adoption and diffusion 
In most developing countries of the world, agriculture is considered as the backbone of 
country’s economy and the livelihoods of the majority of people, who live rural areas. Increase in 
the productivity of agricultural sector is critical to improve livelihoods of poor people as well as to 
economic growth and development (Datt and Ravallion, 1996). An understanding of the sources of 
agricultural productivity is thus important for these countries.  The adoption and diffusion of agri-
cultural innovations are widely regarded as the way to transform traditional agricultural systems to 
enhance agricultural productivity. A substantial number of studies on the adoption and diffusion of 
agricultural innovations have been done extensively over the last 50 years. The major challenge is 
to understand the farmers’ perception towards new technology and its impact on farm production 
(Doss, 2006).   
Everett Rogers (1983), considered by many as pioneer in adoption and diffusion research 
since publishing the widely cited book “Diffusion of Innovation” in 1962 defined adoption as, “the 
mental process an individual passes from first hearing about an innovation to final adoption”. The 
term “adoption” refers to the stage in which a technology is selected for use by an individual 
(farmer) or decision making unit (farm household), while diffusion is the process in which the tech-
nology spreads to general use and application. Innovation is often used with the nuance of a new or 
innovative technology (e.g., high yielding varieties of seeds) being adopted. In other words, the in-
novation systems’ concept refers as “the network of organizations, enterprises and individuals fo-
cused on bringing new products, new processes and new forms of organization into social and eco-
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nomic use, together with the institutions and policies that affect their behaviour and performance” 
(World Bank, 2007). 
However, there is growing concern regarding the definition of adoption and the analysis of 
adoption behaviour and particularly regarding the application of empirical approaches due to varia-
tion of the definition of adoption across regions. For instance, adoption can be measured both in the 
timing and extent of new technology utilization by individuals (Sunding and Zilberman, 2001). In 
this case, it will be difficult to capture the adoption behaviour of farmers without uniform definition 
of adoption. It is also the fact that the adoption of new technologies in the agricultural sector is 
complicated to define. Farmers can adopt only one improved variety of seed, or many improved va-
rieties of seeds, or partially both traditional and improved varieties of seeds (Doss, 2006). In em-
pirical research, the analysis of adoption behaviour is often applied by a discrete choice (e.g., adop-
tion or no adoption), or by a continuous variable (e.g., percentage of land planted new variety of 
seed). As in the analysis of the adoption behaviour, diffusion can also have several indicators for a 
specific technology. One possible way to measure may be the percentage of farming population us-
ing new technologies, or the share of land using new technologies in total land (e.g., Sunding and 
Zilberman, 2001). This section intends to shed lights on the adoption decisions of new farm tech-
nologies with particular attention to micro studies in the developing world. 
3.2.1 Technology adoption behaviour: early approaches 
 The literature shows that the study of adoption and diffusion is initiated by sociologists. 
Ryan and Gross (1943), two prominent rural sociologists analyzed the switch to hybrid corn seeds 
among farmers in two communities in Iowa state of the United States, focusing on the importance 
of communication process on technology adoption. Their motivation on diffusion research was 
guided by the improvement of extension services and the marketing of new seeds and technology. 
Another prominent sociologist (Rogers, 1962) also conducted studies on the diffusion of hybrid 
corn in Iowa and compared diffusion rates in different counties.  The general outcome of the results 
on diffusion rates was S-shaped13 function of time. Most rural sociologists also highlighted the 
socio-psychological factors that determine individual adoption that focused on the individual atti-
tude, education, and economic status on adoption behaviour. 
 The empirical model developed by Griliches (1957) for diffusion of agricultural innovations 
is another milestone in the literature of technology adoption and diffusion. This model was novel 
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 In S-shape diffusion curve, early adoption rates will be relatively low and will take high adoption rates called as take-
off periods. In this period, marginal rate of diffusion increases and the diffusion curve is a convex function of time. 
After takeoff periods, the diffusion rates reach a peak (i.e. saturation), then fall down. Finally new technology will be 
replaced the old one after declining diffusion rates. 
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and original in every respect and it still remains a prime example of powerful, thorough, and origi-
nal empirical research. The basic model of diffusion is: 
(3.1)  [ ] 1)(1 −+−+= btat eKY , 
where Yt is diffusion at time t (i.e. percentage of land for farmers adopting an innovation), K refers 
as long-run upper limit of diffusion, a is the diffusion at initial period, and b measures the pace of 
diffusion.  
  The study of the diffusion of agricultural innovations in developing countries is found to be 
influenced by Griliches (1957, 1960, and 1962) in which the author explained that the adoption be-
haviour was largely affected by the profitability of innovation and other economic variables, reject-
ing the explanations made by rural sociologists. Griliches’s use of S-shaped diffusion curve has be-
come widespread in several areas, such as in marketing to depict diffusion patterns in many 
products. Diffusion studies have become a foundation for economic literature for quantitative re-
search in developing countries. Often in these theoretical and empirical works, farmers were as-
sumed to behave as profit maximizers including other determinants of diffusion patterns such as the 
heterogeneity of attributes and resource endowments among individuals in which the profit maxi-
mization problem depends on the utility of adoption for farmers. A number of studies have been 
carried out under the basic idea of Griliches with further elaborating and revising the numerous fac-
tors affecting the adoption behaviour of individuals, deriving the insights and policy recommenda-
tions that were basic for the design of most technological change efforts implemented as part of the 
Green Revolution and agricultural development programs (e.g., Falcon, 1970; Bell, 1972; Perrin 
and Winkelmann, 1976; Ruttan, 1977; Feder et al., 1985; Byerlee and Hesse de Polanco, 1986;  
Smale et al., 1995; Kaliba et al., 2000;  Sunding and Zilberman, 2001; Smale, 2005; Dixon et al., 
2006; Doss, 2006; Monge et al., 2008). 
The analytical approach of agricultural innovation processes has been divided into two dis-
tinct areas such as in the field of economics (individualistic and profit-maximizing approaches) and 
in the field of sociology (socio-psychological approach), particularly after 1970. These two ap-
proaches encounter a number of issues regarding the analysis of agricultural innovations. Since 
then, the analytical approach of agricultural innovations has been spurred in economics with more 
emphasis on the methodological aspects, in which the adoption behaviour of farmers is often con-
sidered as rational decision markers (Feder, Just and Zilberman, 1985; Gladwin, 1989b; Reardon, 
1989). The paper on the adoption of agricultural innovations in developing countries, reviewed by 
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Feder, Just and Zilberman14 (1985), one of the widely cited articles, has raised several issues on 
methods and modelling, comparing the work conducted on the Green Revolution technologies. 
These authors highlighted five areas in which we need to focus on innovation research, which are: 
(i) examining the intensity of adoption; (ii) addressing the simultaneity of adoption of different 
components of a technology package; (iii) analyzing the impact of incomplete markets and policies 
of adoption decisions; (iv) contextualizing adoption decisions within social, cultural, and institu-
tional environments; and (v) paying attention to dynamic patterns of changes in landholdings and 
wealth accumulation among early and late adopters. Their studies show that the adoption decisions 
are mostly influenced by the costs of the technology, farm size, farmer’s human capital, labour 
availability, membership in an extension services, and liquidity constraints (Feder, Just, and Zil-
berman, 1985; Feder and Umali, 1993). The literature also shows that over the past two decades, a 
large number of studies focusing on the introduction of new inputs such as high-yielding varieties, 
fertilizers, pesticides, or machinery are undertaken focusing on the first two issues (Doss, 2006).  
3.2.2 Technology adoption behaviour: present trends 
 The current literature on theoretical innovation systems has undertaken a significant change 
from the conventional, linear perspectives on agricultural research and development (Spielman, 
2006).  According to Doss (2006), the present literature on technology adoption decisions focuses 
on three main areas: (i) innovative econometric and modelling methodologies, (ii) examinations of 
the process of learning and social networks, and (iii) continuation of micro-level studies based on 
local data collection with an aim to shed light on local contexts for policy purposes.  
 The application of econometric methodologies and modelling has been spurred in the recent 
studies on technology adoption behaviour due to use of sophisticated econometric techniques, fo-
cusing on the issues of endogeneity and simultaneity. Besely and Case (1993) who provided a brief 
overview of technology adoption modelling in developing countries, describe that the empirical ap-
proach for modelling technology adoption should be consistent with an underlying theoretical 
model of optimizing behaviour. They raised a number of issues pertaining to the methodological 
application such as the simultaneity in decision making. The conventional model used in the tech-
nology adoption behaviour was mostly based on binary choice (whether or not to adopt), and a 
functional relationship between the probability of adoption and a set of explanatory variables esti-
mated using the logistic distribution for the logit procedures and the normal distribution for the pro-
bit procedures. However, such estimates may not capture farming decisions on sequential adoption 
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 They also distinguished individual adoption (farm level) from aggregate adoption. Individual adoption refers as the 
degree of use of a new technology in the long-run equilibrium if farmers have full information about new technology 
and its potential, while aggregate adoption is the process of spread of a technology within a region. 
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components of a package of technology improvements and the intensity of the use of new technolo-
gies. There has been a growing body of literature on econometric modelling, taking into considera-
tion the simultaneity in the decision making. For instance, Smale et al. (1995) applied adoption de-
cisions as three simultaneous choices: the adoption choice of the components of the recommended 
packages, allocation decisions of different technologies across the land area, and the decision on the 
quantity of inputs such as fertilizers. Others investigated the models accounting for the interrela-
tionships among adoption decisions, causing selectivity biases (Roberts et al., 2002; Fernandez-
Cornejo et al., 2001; Khanna, 2001; Napier et al., 2000; Traore et al., 1998; Dorfman, 1996). In ad-
dition, Pitt and Sumondiningrat (1991) used both seed-variety-specific profit functions and a meta-
profit function which allow for the effect of risk preferences, uncertainty, and schooling on the cul-
tivators’ seed variety choice. Kaliba et al. (2000) applied adoption of improved seeds and inorganic 
fertilizers, where the authors assume that farmers first decide to allocate land for improved seeds 
and then decide to use inorganic fertilizers. Yesuf and Kohlin (2008) estimated simultaneous deci-
sions of new farm technologies and soil conservation using the bivariate probit model. 
 A number of researches (in a second strand) have attempted to model the effect of the learn-
ing and social networks on adoption decisions of farm technology, where Benerjee (1992) and 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) are early contributors in this field.  Studies carried out by Besely and 
Case (1994) and Forster and Rosenzweig (1995) investigated the importance of learning in the dy-
namic adoption process. Besely and Case (1993) applied the model farmers as being uncertain 
about profitability of the new seed compared to the known ones and  simulated the sub-game per-
fect number of plots to be planted to the new seed. Their model assumes that farmers learn about 
the profitability of the new seeds through experience. On the other hand, Foster and Rosenzweig 
(1995) modelled the optimum input use as being unknown and stochastic. These studies show that 
farmers learn about the optimal combination through their experience and from the experience of 
their neighbours. There are a number of studies using learning models to test the effects of social 
interactions, continuously refining the specification of social learning effects (e.g., Pomp and Bur-
ger, 1995; Fischer et al., 1996; Henrich, 2001; Marra et al., 2003; Munshi, 2004; Alene and 
Manyong, 2006; Monge et al., 2008). Moreover, Besely and Case (1993) and Cameron (1999) ap-
plied panel data in order to analyse the dynamic model instead of static model that allows to address 
the adoption decisions over time on the same farmers. The literature also includes some models 
build up on Bayesian approaches combined with the assumption of free access of information from 
individual and social networks (Conely and Udry, 2004; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). 
  The literature on the third strand focuses on a particular technology in a particular location 
or region with an aim to support agricultural technology policy. These studies are primarily under-
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taken with the collaboration of international organizations such as the International Centre for 
Wheat and Maize Improvement (CIMMYT) and International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). For 
instance, Singh et al. (2006) analyse the adoption pattern and constraint of Basmati rice in north In-
dia. Mendola (2007) modelled the adoption of rice varieties on poverty reduction in rural Bangla-
desh applying a propensity-score marching analysis. Likewise, Minten and Barret (2008) examined 
rice technology adoption and studied the link between agricultural performance and rural poverty in 
Madagascar, using spatially-explicit dataset. Samaddar and Das (2008) investigated ecological dif-
ferences between the drought-prone and wet zones affecting the adoption of rice technology in two 
villages of West Bengal, India. Likewise in Pakistan, Iqbal, Khan and Ahamad (2002) analysed the 
adoption of recommended wheat varieties in irrigated Punjab province using the probit model. In 
Nepal, Ransom et al. (2003) used the adoption of maize varieties in the hills of Nepal. Joshi and 
Pandey (2006) examined farmers’ perceptions and adoption of modern rice varieties in two districts 
of southern Nepal. In Africa, CIMMYT with collaboration of national research institutes conducted 
22 micro-level studies on adoption of improved varieties of wheat and maize, as well as chemical 
fertilizers in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. In America, Mather et al. (2003) analysed the 
adoption of disease resistant bean varieties in Honduras. 
3.2.3 Analyses of adoption behaviour in Nepal: current status and research gaps  
 Studies on the adoption and diffusion of agricultural innovations begin after the Green 
Revolution, South Asia in general and Nepal in particular. However the pace of research on adop-
tion and diffusion of agricultural innovations conducted by economists and other researchers in Ne-
pal is found to be slow as in the case of the implementation of Green Revolution. Though the litera-
ture shows that studies on technology adoption and diffusion were carried out on staple food crops 
such as rice, wheat and maize, mainly as parts of the project reports. However, some studies show 
that the research on maize in an organized way was initiated in 1965 (Paudyal and Poudel, 2001). 
Based on the information available in journals and other publications, the adoption studies started in 
the beginning of 1980. For instance, Upadhaya et al15. (1983) examined the adoption and impact on 
productivity of modern varieties of rice in Nepal using a Tobit model. They found low irrigation 
level and poor irrigation facilities as constraints to adopt high-yield modern varieties. Malla (1983) 
applied the logit model to analyse the adoption of modern varieties of rice and fertilizers in Dhanusa 
district of Nepal, in which the factors affecting adoption decisions were schooling, family size, farm 
size, proportion of irrigated land, and extension services. Another study conducted by Khadka 
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 This paper was based on the data G.B. Thapa’s PhD dissertation entitled “The impact of new agricultural technology 
on income distribution in the Nepalese Terai” (submitted to Cornell University in 1989) and H.K. Upadhaya’s PhD dis-
sertation entitled “Labour market effect of modern rice technology and its implications on income distribution in Nepal” 
(submitted to University of Philippines in 1988). 
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(1983) on factors influencing the adoption of modern rice varieties and fertilizers in the south-
eastern part of Nepal applying both multivariate probit and Tobit models, shows that higher fre-
quency of irrigation, tenure status and access to credit significantly influenced the adoption deci-
sions. These factors are also found influential in the adoption decisions of improved maize varieties 
in Chitwan district (Paudel and Matsuoka, 2008), in Terai, the southern part of Nepal (Shakya and 
Flinn, 2008), and in mid-hills of Nepal (Karki and Bauer, 2004). 
Pachico and Ashby (1983) examined the study of the diffusion of new rice varieties among 
small farm holders in Nepal and recommended to decentralize the biological screening to small-
scale site specific trials with farmers, highlighting the need of extension efforts. Floyd et al. (2002) 
conducted an adoption study of 15 improved technologies including agriculture, horticulture, live-
stock and forestry production in the western hills of Nepal. They applied both univariate and multi-
variate statistical methods to analyse the data suggesting that the adoption decisions are largely in-
fluenced by the extension input, ethnicity and household food self-sufficiency of the household. The 
result shows that only 10 percent households are multiple adaptors (of about four technologies).  
Ransom et al. (2003) applied the Tobit model to analyse the adoption of maize varieties in 
the hills of Nepal. There are many studies conducted by Nepal Agricultural Research Council 
(NARC)  staff in collaboration with CIMMYT in Nepal, particularly in the area of new varieties of 
maize and wheat and the adoption decisions of these varieties (Adhikary et al., 2001; Aquino et al., 
2001; Paudyal and Poudel, 2001; Tripathi et al., 2006; Ortiz-Ferrara et al., 2007). 
 There are also a number of studies on the adoption of rice varieties in Nepal and these stud-
ies tried to capture the famers’ perceptions on adoption decisions. For instance, Joshi and Pandey 
(2006) analysed the farmers’ perception and adoption of modern rice varieties. The results show 
that in addition to farm and farmer characteristics, farmers’ perception towards new technology is 
also important in adoption decisions. Joshi and Bauer (2007) examined the loss of Nepali rice land-
races and the factors affecting the probability of cultivating the most dominant landraces. Their re-
sult shows that changes in the production environment, farmers’ preferences for consumption and 
market integration have influenced the adoption of rice landraces. Moreover, Dusen, Gauchan and 
Smale (2007) examined the adoption of various rice varieties in Nepal testing for simultaneity in the 
decision to plant landraces or the decision to plant modern varieties, and whether their decision to 
plant particular landrace constituted the genetic diversity of interest for future crop improvement. 
Their results support the simultaneity in decisions in certain cases. 
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 With regard to analytical models in adoption decisions of improved varieties of seeds and 
fertilizers, all reviewed studies except (Dusen, Gauchan and Smale, 200716) used the conventional 
static models modelling the decision as a single equation such as logit, probit and Tobit using cross-
section data. Hence the study of the adoption of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers consider-
ing simultaneity in decisions of both technologies seems to be important to fill the gap in the re-
search of agricultural technology adoption in Nepal. To better understand farmers’ adoption deci-
sions, one needs to assess whether farmers take adoption decisions of improved seeds and fertilizers 
separately or simultaneously over time. 
 In Nepal, many studies in the past have given emphasis on the analysis of adoption of mod-
ern varieties of seeds and other technologies such as inorganic fertilizers and land conservation 
practices separately without paying more attention on the simultaneity decisions of adopting more 
than one farm technology, while most of these studies used cross-section data. However, there is 
growing concern in the farm technology adoption literature that adoption behaviour of farmers us-
ing simultaneous decisions seems to be plausible, particularly in the developing world like Nepal 
due to pervasive market imperfections. Moreover, adoption is a dynamic process and farmers often 
adopt new technologies through learning process. Adoption analysis using panel data may capture 
the dynamic process of adoption by learning. 
3.3 Theoretical framework of the study 
 Over the last few decades, various theories based on the foundation of microeconomics have 
been applied to development issues. These theoretical approaches argue that the neoclassical expla-
nations of household responses may not capture the behaviour of economic agents in many low in-
come countries due to pervasive market imperfections arising from high transaction costs and im-
perfect information. These market imperfections are particularly common in relation to land 
resources, labour, credit, risk/insurance, and some basic commodities (de Janvry, Fafchamps and 
Sadoulet, 1991). More recently, theories of incomplete and imperfect markets have been incorpo-
rated into the modelling of the agricultural household responses in various sectors such as farm 
technology adoption decisions in rural settings. This approach suggests that the assumption of per-
fectly competitive markets is not plausible in resource poor economies due to weak formal institu-
tions (e.g., finance, public services, government) and informal problems, such as imperfect monitor-
ing of labour or imperfect information on borrowers that contribute to incomplete or missing 
markets (e.g., labour, land, credit and insurance). Under this prevailing market structure, household 
preferences and market imperfections (e.g., in capital markets) are not independent; and lead to 
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 This study concerns more on the conservation of crop diversity of rice varieties rather than the adoption and diffusion 
of agricultural innovations.  
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non-separable household models, where production decisions are affected by the consumption deci-
sions of the household (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989). In this theoretical framework, technology 
adoption processes need to focus on the decisions making of farmers regarding the use of technolo-
gies at each point by taking into account the prevailing factor markets. The study thus aims to ana-
lyse farm technology adoption decisions under the conceptual framework of the imperfect factor 
markets in which the insights are mainly drawn from Feder Just and Zilberman (1985), Feder and 
Onchan (1987), Doss (2006), and Yesuf and Kohlin (2008).  
 The theoretical framework of the study is therefore based on the farm household model un-
der incomplete and imperfect factor markets, where farmers’ decisions over a given period of time 
are assumed to be derived from the maximization of a discounted utility of farm profit subject to la-
bour and credit constraints. Farm profit is a function of the farmers’ choice of mixed technologies, 
in which for a discounted expected utility maximising decision maker, adoption decisions of both 
technologies are taken jointly. For instance, the decision to adopt improved seeds and inorganic fer-
tilizer is made simultaneously (Smale, Just and Leathers, 1994). In addition to the technology used 
for production, other factors such as household and land characteristics, ex ante and ex post risks, 
and subjective discount rates can also affect farm profits. However, the adoption of technologies in 
agricultural households depends on whether the discounted expected utility with adoption is larger 
than without adoption. In other words, adoption decision about new technologies compared to the 
traditional is primarily based on the motive of farm profit maximization.  
Consider a farm household in which adult male and female jointly decide the consumption 
goods (C) and their time endowment (T) between work and leisure (l). The household produces 
food crops on fixed land using labour, seeds and other inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides. The 
household maximization problem deriving from the utility function with production, time constraint 
and income constraints (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2005) defined as:  
(3.2)  U(C,l)Max U =  
subjective to following constraints: 
(3.3) production: X)Q(LQ ,= , 
(3.4) time constraint: lLh +=T , and  
(3.5) income constraint: KlTwQPCP qc +−+= )( . 
Where Q is the quantity of output produced. L is the total labour time used for production 
(i.e. mh LL +=L ) and mL  is hired labour and K is non-labour income (e.g., pension, interest, divi-
dends and other social securities). Pc and Pq are the prices of consumption goods and farm outputs. 
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The model assumes that farmers are price taker either in the national market or in the local market.  
By substituting (3.4) into (3.5), household full income is obtained as: 
(3.6)  KXPLLwQPCP xmhqc +−−+= )( , 
combining equations (3.6) and (3.3), the expression (3.2) can be maximized subject to full income 
constraint (3.6):  
(3.7)  { } ),()(),( XLQKXPLLwQPCPlCU xmhcc ϕλ −+−−−−−=  
where λ  and ϕ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with full income and production constraints. 
First Order Conditions (FOCs) associated with consumption goods are: 
(3.8)  
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the equations show that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption goods and leisure is 
equal to the ratio of the wage rate and the price of consumption goods. The FOCs for production 
constraint are: 
(3.9)  
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  The last two equations imply that the value of marginal products is equal to the factor prices. 
At the optimum level, the demand for labour input on farm is: 
(3.10)  ),,,* KPwL(PL xq= and 
the demand for factor input is: 
(3.11)  ),,,* KPwX(PX xq= . 
These equations show that input demand functions are determined by the prices of farm out-
put goods, factor inputs and household full income. If the optimal input demand functions are sub-
stituted in the production function, then the supply function of farm output can be written as: 
(3.12)  ),,* xq PwF(PQ = . 
 Finally the maximum household income may be expressed as: 
(3.13)  KXPwL)PwF(PP xxqq +−+= *** ,,pi  
As discussed earlier, adoption of new technology is based on the expected utility of farm 
profit. Let Aij be the adoption decision of seed j (equals to1 if improved and 0 traditional or local 
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seeds) by farmer i. Farmer may adopt new technology (e.g. improved seeds) if the difference of ex-
pected farm profit between new and traditional or local is greater than zero, which is given as: 
(3.14)  
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If the household used new technology, then it equals one otherwise zero. The term 
)( **1 ioiE pipi − is the difference of the expected gains in profit between improved varieties of seeds and 
local or traditional seeds. If the household used improved seeds, then the expected farm profit using 
improved seeds ( *1ipi ) exceeds the expected farm profit using traditional or local seeds ( *iopi ). This 
expression can also apply in the adoption of inorganic fertilizers in a similar way.  
The theoretical framework presented here is the simple mathematical interpretation. How-
ever, on empirical application, the adoption of improved seeds ( htiseed ) and inorganic fertilizer 
( htifert ) may be influenced by the factors such as alternative technologies applied by the household 
i, the profitability index of the technology adopted on the farm land l ( htpftl ), the ownership of land 
( htownl ), the household’s access to credit and labour markets ( htclmkt ), the household’s informa-
tion on new technology ( htntif ), whether households receive any remittance income ( htR ), and 
other random factors such as isdhtµ  and ifthtµ , representing improved seed and inorganic fertilizer 
adoption decisions respectively. These random factors are assumed to have zero mean and constant 
variance. 
 A growing body of literature defines the decision to adopt soil conserving and/or output en-
hancing technologies depending on the perception of soil erosion and soil fertility (Pender and Kerr, 
1996; Shiferaw and Holden, 1999; Yesuf and Kohlin, 2008). This study assumes that the farmers’ 
perception of technology adoption depends on farm/plot characteristics ( hlc ) ─ such as plot/farm 
size, soil quality, irrigation facility of land, and ownership of land; human capital of the household 
( hhc ) as measured by family size (or number of adult members the households), gender, age and 
education; and agro-ecological characteristics ( rac ) ─ such as rainfall and temperature17. Although, 
there could also be other factors such as farmers’ perceptions of adoption decisions and risks asso-
ciated with new technologies, these factors are not included in this model due to lack of data avail-
ability. The functional relationship of the adoption of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers in 
this study can be specified as: 
(3.15)  ),,,,,,,,,( isdhtrhthhththththththt achclcRntifclmktownlpftlifertfiseed µ= ; 
                                                 
17
 This study will analyse from both plot level (GMM  for reduced form GMM probit for period 1 and Linear Probabil-
ity Model and structural probit model for period 2) and farm level (Tobit model) characteristics. 
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(3.16)  ),,,,,,,,,( ifthtrhthhththththththt achclcRntifclmktownlpftliseedfifert µ= .  
 Market proximity and road access are often included in the model, considering as factors af-
fecting the adoption of new technologies. The conventional argument for use of such exogenous 
variables is that greater access to roads and markets can promote adoption of new technologies such 
as improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers in farm production due to higher possibilities of access 
to resources in both input and output markets. In Nepal, areas located near cities have more diversi-
fied and more market-oriented activities (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2005), and improving road access 
to markets confers substantial economic benefits on average (Jacoby, 2000). On the other hand, 
theory assumes that better road access to markets may also lead to higher off-farm employment op-
portunities that can take away labour from the farm sector, and then may discourage investment in 
the adoption of new technologies on farms, if the new technology is more labour intensive. This 
ambiguous effect of distance from the market and paved road needs to be taken into account while 
analysing farm technology adoption decisions. The study also uses extension services received by 
farm households as a variable for households’ information about technology. 
 The assumption of missing or incomplete markets for inputs and output, including labour 
and capital, has become common in micro-level research on most developing countries’ rural 
economies. The literature on these issues takes the view that rural households are systematically ex-
posed to market imperfections and constraints, referred to as “failures”, and their behaviour cannot 
be understood without reference to the specificity of these failures (Thorbecke, 1993). These fail-
ures are characterized by partial engagement in markets, which are often imperfect or incomplete 
(Ellis, 1992). Under these circumstances, farm households with limited access to credit and labour 
are relatively more affected than those households with higher access to resources. In other words, 
credit-constrained households adopt a more diversified crop portfolio and make less use of high 
yielding varieties (Morduch, 1990). In Nepal, farm credit is considered as one the constraints limit-
ing the adoption of high yielding and high value crops (ADB, 2004). However, there are many 
credit programs such as micro credit, Small Farmers Development Program (SFDP) under the Agri-
cultural Development Bank/Nepal, Intensive Banking Program under the Commercial Banks target-
ing small farm holders, and many saving and credit programs initiated by Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs). However, access to these programs by small holders and poor farmers is 
limited. The survey report of NLSS II shows that about 69 percent of households received loans, of 
which only 15.1 percent got loan from banks and 2.3 percent from NGOs/Relief Agencies, while 
the rest of the loans were received from informal sectors (e.g., businessmen, relatives and local 
money lenders). The credit borrowed for the purpose of business or farm use only constitutes 24.2 
percent of the total loan disbursement (CBS, 2004).  Evidence from the formal sector shows that to-
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tal loan charges, including interest, transactions cost, and corrupt side payments, have remained 
high (Adams, Brunner and Raymon, 2003). This is likely to inhibit taking loans from formal institu-
tions for credit-constrained farmers who are keen to adopt new farm technologies. The marginal 
contribution of credit in farm investment is more likely to be high in households that have a higher 
binding constraint than in those of that are less-constrained (Simtowe and Zeller, 2006). Under pre-
vailing market conditions, the theory hypothesizes that credit-liquidity constraint affects the adop-
tion decision about new farm technologies, implying that liquidity less-constrained households have 
higher probabilities of adopting new farm technologies than liquidity constrained farmers. In addi-
tion, it is also hypothesized that seed-fertilizer technologies associated with the Green Revolution 
are relatively more labour-intensive than traditional varieties and practices (Farmer, 1986). Adop-
tion of improved seeds and fertilizers can be influenced by the prevailing labour market and house-
hold labour endowment. In other words, households with higher number of family members can 
have more possibilities to adopt external inputs than lower number of family members, particularly 
under missing or incomplete labour markets. 
 The literature also explained that non-farm income such as remittances can have impact on 
farm investments. It is discussed in the literature such as “The New Economics of Labour Migra-
tion” that migrants can play the role of financial intermediaries, enabling rural households to over-
come credit and risk constraints on their ability to achieve the transition from subsistence to com-
mercial production (Stark, 1991). However, the effect of remittances can be ambiguous. 
Remittances can have positive effect on farm technology adoption, particularly on credit constraint 
households; on the other hand, the effect may be negative for labour constraint households because 
of loosing a family member due to migration, especially under the incomplete and missing markets. 
 Adoption decisions about new farm technologies are also associated with property rights 
over farmland. A substantial number of studies explore the condition that farmers are more willing 
to invest in land improvement under which they have security of land tenure (Feder, Just and Zil-
berman, 1988; Basely, 1995; Deininger and Jin, 2006). The rationale for this hypothesis can be ana-
lysed in terms of three positive effects (Basely, 1995): (i) security-induced demand for investment; 
(ii) collateral availability; and (iii) the potential for gains-from-trade. However, there are two speci-
fications in the context of Nepal: first, land rights are fully secured in terms of buying and selling, 
collateral for loan, and production decisions; and second, the adoption of improved seeds and fertil-
izers is more likely to be a short-term phenomenon (e.g., at least for one crop cycle), which may not 
be affected even if farmers do not have property rights (e.g., sharecroppers or renters). In Nepal, 
sharecropping is quite common and the contracts for sharecropping are usually for a minimum of 
one crop cycle. New farm technologies, the cost and benefit streams of which are very short dura-
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tion, will be less affected by property rights than those with lengthier benefit streams (Place and 
Shallow, 2000). Nevertheless, credit-constrained farmers may be affected by the ownership of land, 
implying that the adoption decisions about new farm technologies are likely to be lower in share-
cropping land, because land ownership is often considered as prerequisite for obtaining credit 
(Doss, 2006). Land ownership also enhances capital formation by providing better incentives and 
improved access to credit (Feder and Onchan, 1987). Hence, the relationship between new farm 
technology adoption and land ownership may depend on the liquidity availability to individual 
farmers. If farmers are liquidity-constrained, then land ownership increases the probability of farm 
technology adoption. 
 The impact of farm size on the technology adoption decisions is one of the key issues in 
most developing countries. It is often hypothesized that small farms could limit adoption due to 
high fixed costs especially for tractors, tubwells and oxen and tend to adopt more slowly than large 
farms. The relationships between farm size and intensity or farm size and technology adoption are 
still debated on the academic arena. Two paradigms address this issue (Yesuf and Kohlin, 2008): 
one is Boserupian theory, which argues that due to population pressure, small farms lead to inten-
sive use of land through adoption of new technologies; and the second is new-Malthusian group, 
which argues that population pressure leads to the cultivation of marginal lands, and  then degrade 
the land. The impact of farm size on respect to technology adoption can be positive or negative. 
 The impact of access to information on the adoption decision is one of the policy variables 
(Doss, 2006). Several studies have shown that adoption decisions are likely to be dependent on in-
formation about new technologies (Zhao, 2005), since farmers do not adopt new technologies with-
out adequate information. Increased information about new technologies is likely to increase adop-
tion decisions, when new technologies are profitable to farmers. In other words, the variable (i.e. 
access to information) can show some indications regarding the government performances in dis-
seminating information to the farmers about new technologies. To operationalize this variable, ex-
tension services are often used as a measurement (Doss, 2006). One way to measure the variable of 
access to information is a binary one, which is based on whether farmers receive any extension ser-
vices from the government offices. However, there are other ways to measure the variable of access 
to information such as the number of extension services received by the farmers (Herath and Ta-
keya, 2003), and whether or not they received any extension services during a particular period 
(Ranson, Paudyal and Adhikari, 2003). Other approaches to measuring access to information could 
be farmers’ perceptions about the particular technology. This study includes only the dummy vari-
able whether or not farmers received any extension services.  
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 Regardless of the many factors affecting technology adoption decisions, development 
economists often believe that the slow diffusion of new technology could be the key to understand-
ing the persistent poverty of subsistence farmers in low income countries, as slow diffusion may re-
flect individual risk attitudes and social learning processes. These determinants can not be observed 
or assessed directly from standard household surveys. However, these factors are often captured in 
models by the variable of access to credit due to the existence of interlinked markets in rural set-
tings. For instance, liquidity-constrained households use credit as insurance. The literature shows 
that poor and small farm holders have high consumption smoothing problems and therefore high 
subjective discount rates, which in turn discourage land investment decisions (Holden, Taylor and 
Hampton, 1998; Yesuf and Kohlin, 2008).  Moreover, farmers’ risk preferences may also affect the 
adoption decisions of new technologies. A number of studies have empirically investigated technol-
ogy adoption taking into account farmer’s perceptions about the degree of risk concerning future 
yields (Feder and Umali, 1993). This study does not include any individual risk preference variable 
in the model due to unavailability of data. However, microeconomic theory often shows that under 
missing or incomplete markets, access to credit is often used as a proxy for risk preference, particu-
larly risk-averse farmers who may use credit as an insurance that may also reduce the subjective 
discount rate and consumption risk of the farm households. In addition, some authors also use 
wealth as a proxy for risk aversion (Erin et al., 2001).  
3.4 Data set and descriptive statistics 
The data used in this paper are the part of Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) panel data 
compiled during surveys conducted in 1995/96 and 2003/04 covering almost all parts of the coun-
try. These were nationally representative surveys of households and communities undertaken by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics with technical and financial assistance from the World Bank. The panel 
data include 952 households in each survey, covering both rural and urban households as well as 
farm and non-farm activities. The analysis is based on households having some sort of activities on 
farms: owned, rented or sharecropped. Since the main objective of the study is to explore the deter-
minants of technology adoption decisions, the data cover plot level information on the adoption of 
improved seeds for rice, wheat, maize, seasonal vegetables, and other crops and inorganic fertiliz-
ers. However, the data do not cover the intensity of new technology used on the plot. 
The data include the characteristics of sampled households, farm and non-farm activities, 
adopters and non-adopters, socioeconomic and locational characteristics covering all agro-
ecological zones and all regions of Nepal. The data also cover plot level characteristics such as size, 
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irrigation facility and soil quality. A total of 4352 farm plots18, including both owned and share-
cropped plots, are reflected in the data, where the average plot size is 1.16 hectares. Table 3.1 fur-
ther shows that about 68 percent of plots and 65 percent of farm households used inorganic fertiliz-
ers and the use of improved seeds both new and recycled is about 43 percent of the total plots and 
34 percent of total farm households. The survey also provides the information on the amount spent 
on the adoption of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers, including other information such as 
farm credit, labour status (hired or family) and extension services from the Agriculture Develop-
ment Office. 
3.5 Econometric specification  
 This study examines factors affecting the adoption decisions about improved seeds and in-
organic fertilizers considered as new farm technologies, under the assumption of incomplete or im-
perfect markets. The basic assumption is that farmers make adoption decisions about improved 
seeds and inorganic fertilizer jointly. A single equation approach to determine whether improved 
seeds affect fertilizer use is subject to simultaneity bias. The bivariate probit model, which is a natu-
ral extension of the probit model, enables us to control for the simultaneity problem as suggested by 
Maddala (1983). However, in this paper, I use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) proce-
dure as an alternative due to some identification problems in the bivariate probit model. Identifica-
tion problems possibly arise in the  simultaneous equations such as bivariate probit models, if the 
exogenous variables included in the second equation are exactly the same as in the first equation. 
Parameters that are not identifiable cannot be estimated and there need to have exclusion restric-
tions if there is no variation of the exogenous regresssors (Wilde, 2000).  As the main purpose of 
the paper is to explore technology adoption decisions, other non-technology variables which can 
have effects on technology adoption decisions are assumed to be exogenous. The structural equa-
tions are as follows: 
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where *htiseed and 
*
htifert are latent dependent variables referring the household’s adoption decisions 
about improved seeds and inorganic fertilizer respectively. itx is the vector of explanatory variables, 
α and β vectors of unknown parameters, and 1itε and 2itε  are the error terms of respective equations. 
The model has the following characteristics: the first is that the dependent variables are binary; the 
                                                 
18
 This study is based only on same plot repeated in the period 2 of the two-year panel data. Those plots which are not 
matched in the both year are deleted from the analysis.  
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second is that the binary dependent variable of first equation is entered as covariate in the second 
equation and vice versa; the third is that the unobserved heterogeneities of the two decisions are as-
sumed to be correlated i.e. [ ] 0, 1 ≠ititifertE ε and same for the [ ] 0, 2 ≠ititiseedE ε . 
The econometric literature also shows the frequently used two-stage for the probit and logit 
models with endogenous regressors, as suggested by Maddala (1983), to be inconsistent – see 
Dagenais (1999). The two-stage logit or probit approach is often problematic due to possible com-
plexity arising from the external (i.e. direct effect through exogenous variables) and the internal (i.e. 
indirect effect through the same exogenous being as an endogenous variable) validity of instrumen-
tal variable interpretation. Consistency of two stage estimators depends on their allowing the inter-
pretation of instrumental variables. The nonlinearity of the logit and probit estimators prohibits an 
instrumental variable interpretation of the corresponding two stage estimator. It is therefore no basis 
for asserting these estimators to be consistent. By contrast, the Linear Probability Model (LPM) can 
be consistently estimated either by two stage least squares or instrumental variables and gives con-
sistent parameter estimates.  However, the LPM fitted values lack a probability interpretation (since 
they can lie outside the zero-one interval). Using GMM, the LPM can give consistent estimates of 
the average impact of exogenous variables on the dependent variables (e.g., adoption of improved 
seeds and inorganic fertilizers), as a function of the observed variation. LPM may also provide good 
estimates of the partial effects on the outcome probability close to the centre of the distribution of 
exogenous variables. 
Moreover, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) gives estimates that are both consistent 
and allow probability interpretation (Dagenais 1999; Wilde 2008). GMM can also exploit the sam-
ple moment counterparts of population moment conditions of the data generating process and it has 
large sample properties which are easy to characterize in ways that facilitate comparison and can 
also be constructed without specifying the full data generating process. In addition, GMM is found 
to be relevant in various reasons: (a) many estimators (e.g., OLS, IV) are special cases of GMM; 
and (b) GMM is often possible where a likelihood analysis is extremely difficult. The method needs 
only a partial specification. GMM also provides a means for testing over identifying restriction on 
which the structural parameters estimates  are based (Newey, 1985). GMM model fits the probit 
models applying maximum likelihood by methods of moments. In addition, GMM is also common 
approach to apply in case of facing problem of heteroscedasticity, because it makes use of the 
orothgonality conditions to allow for efficient estimation in the presence of heteroscedasticity 
(Baum et al., 2003).  GMM is usually applied method for the estimation of instrumental variables.  
Since the main purpose of this study is to examine the factors affecting adoption of new 
technologies and to test whether farmers take adoption decision jointly, the bivariate equations 
  50 
without exclusion of some variables either of the equation may create the problem of identification 
which is common problem in simultaneous equations. Due to absence of instrumental variables in 
this data set, the study uses GMM in lieu of bivariate probits, incorporating the predicted values 
( 1ˆidisee , 1ˆitifer ) of reduced form probit models19 obtaining from the period 1 (1996) as instruments 
for period 2 (2004). In the second stage, this paper estimates Linear Probability Model (LPM) struc-
tural equations using predicted values of period 1 and other variables such as iseedi1, iferti1, and the 
proportion of household using improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers in the sample unit as in-
struments. Finally, this exercise estimates the structural GMM probit with moment restrictions. The 
estimates derived from the probit models for period 1, combined with period 2 are also discussed as 
supporting evidences. In addition to this,  I also estimate both random effects and simple Tobit 
models from panel data based on the household level data in order to test some consistency and ro-
bustness in the results. The econometric models applied in this study presented from the period 1 
probit model to the period 2 LPM and GMM probit models and then Tobit models follow as:  
Probit model for period 1 
Probit estimation is based on underlying latent variable of *1iiseed and 
*
1iifert  (adoption of 
improved seeds or inorganic fertilizers respectively) with the explanatory variables 1ix . The vector 
β  contains K deterministic coefficients and 1iε denotes error term. The model is expressed as (cf. 
Bertschek and Lechner, 1998; Greene, 2004): 
(3. 18)  
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ifert x b
 = + ε

= + ε
, 
where  ( )*1 11 0i iiseed iseed= > ,and ( )*1 11 0i iifert ifert= >  i= 1, ….,n  and iseed= improved seeds, 
ifert=inorganic fertilizers. ' '1( ,......, ) 'Niseed iseed iseed=  and  ' '1( ,......, ) 'Nifert ifert ifert=  
are 1×N vectors and ' '1 11 1( ,.... ) 'NX x x= is an n K× matrix of regressors. Latin letters (a, b) denote re-
duced form coefficients and Greek letters (α, β) the corresponding structural coefficients. Coeffi-
cients are allowed to differ across the two periods. The error terms )',....,( ''1 Nmi εεε =  (m=1,2) are as-
sumed to be jointly normally distributed with zero mean and diagonal covariance matrix Σ  . Errors 
are taken to be independent across the two periods. These assumptions imply that I can set the error 
variances to unity without loss of generality.  The explanatory variables should be independent with 
Σ  that implies strict exogeneity. 
                                                 
19
 In the case of simple binary equation, probit model performs better results in terms of the smallest standard errors and 
high adjustment R.-square and also solve the problem of the LPM (lying outside zero-one interval), while in the case of 
simultaneous equations, LPM performs better than probit model.  
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The conditional expectation of iseedi1 given xi is;  
(3. 19)  E[iseedi1|xi] = Pr ( 1 1| )iiseed x= =Pr( *1 10 | )i iiseed x>  
    =Pr ( 1 1 1'i ix aε > −  
    = [ ]1 11 ( ' )ix a− Φ −  
    = 1 1( ' )ix aΦ  
(.)Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Likewise, the conditional expectation 
of iferti1 given xi1 can be calculated in the same way because of same exogenous variables and the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function for iferti1 is 1 1( ' )ix bΦ .  
 The typical approach to deal with probit models is to apply maximum likelihood (ML) 
based on single cross-sections (cf. Maddala, 1983);  
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∑ ∑
∑ ∑
, 
this model is appropriate under the assumption that the error variance matrix is diagonal.  
LPM and Structural GMM for period 2 
The process of GMM for this analysis is described as follows. Let 2iz be a (1×G) vector of 
instruments20 which may contain some or all of the determinants of iseedi2 and iferti2. In particular, I 
include the period 1 reduced form fitted values of iseedi1 and iferti1 as instruments. Let 2iw represent 
the vector { }2 2 2 2, , ,i i i iiseed ifert x z .  Then the moment conditions can be defined as: 
(3.21)  
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 β β = = − Φ β + β 
, 
where α and β  are the parameters to be estimated. It is assumed that the instrumental variables, iz , 
satisfy the following orthogonality conditions:  
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the corresponding sample moment conditions are  
                                                 
20
 Instrumental variables for improved seeds are the predicted value of period 1 (i.e. 1iiseed ) for period two (i.e. 2004) 
and proportion of seed adoption in the particular village. For inorganic fertilizers, instrumental variables are the residual 
of fertilizers of period one (
1iifert ) for period two and the proportion of fertilizers adoption in the particular village. 
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(3.23)  
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GMM estimates are obtained by minimizing 
(3.24)  
1
1 20 2 1 20 2 1 20 2
1
2 20 2 2 20 2 2 20 2
( , , ) ( , ) ' ( , )
( , , ) ( , ) ' ( , )
n n
n n
J g g
J g g
−
−
 α α Λ = α α Λ α α
 β β Λ = β β Λ β β
, 
for arbitrary weighting matrices Λ1 and Λ2.  The optimal GMM estimators result by choosing  
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where 1 '12 2 20 2 2 2ˆ ˆ(i i ie iseed ifert x= − Φ α + α  and 2 '2 2 20 2 2 2ˆ ˆ( )i i i ie ifert iseed x= − Φ β + β , the estimated struc-
tural residuals. 
 
The Tobit model 
It has been suggested in the literature that the binary choice model seems to be more appro-
priate in the context of farmers growing either local varieties or improved seeds exclusively (Feder 
et al., 1985; Doss, 2006). On other hand, in the case of partial adoption of both improved seeds and 
inorganic fertilizers, a continuous measure of adoption is more appropriate (Doss, 2006), since it al-
lows the use of the Tobit model by enabling it to capture the behaviour of adopters. The estimates 
compare both results (e.g., reduced form probit and structural probit using GMM and Tobit) for 
consistency of the outcomes.  The Tobit model is used to estimate better the adoption behaviour of 
farm households. The model, originally developed by James Tobin (1958), is expressed as: 
)0,max( *jitjit YY =  j= [improved seeds, inorganic fertilizers],  
where the *jitY ’s are latent variables generated by the classical linear regression model 
(3.26)  ,'* jitjiitjit XY µγδ ++=  
where δ is the vector of coefficients, itX  is the set of explanatory variables, and the error term jitµ  
is assumed to be independent with itX and is independently and identically distributed over time 
and across individuals. Unobserved time invariant characteristics of the households are captured in 
the individual effects jiγ . *jitY is latent variable that is unobservable, and j refers to either the adop-
tion of improved seeds or inorganic fertilizers. If the data are above the limiting factor, then Y is re-
ferred to the proportion of farm land used for improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers and observed 
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as a continuous variable, if Y is at the limiting factor, then it remains at zero. In other words, the 
mathematical presentation of this relationship can be shown as follows: 
000 ≤=>= j*it
j
it
j*
it
j*
it
j
it , if  Y,  and  Y,  if  YYY . 
These two equations represent a censored distribution of the data. For this, the Tobit model 
is used to estimate the expected value of jitY as a function of a set of independent variables (Xit) 
weighted by the probability that jitY >0 (Tobin, 1958). The estimated coefficients (δ ) of the Tobit 
model do not give the direct effect as marginal effects, but it provides the relationship between de-
pendent and explanatory variables. 
The explanatory variables for the Tobit models are the same variables used in the previous 
section. These models are estimated without considering simultaneity decisions.  Moreover, this 
study also analyses the simple Tobit models for period 1 and 2 as well as pooled from both periods 
by using same explanatory variables (e.g. in the probit and LPM models) which are as follows: 
(3.27)  ),,,,,,,( zaextservdistroadatmarketfarmcredithirlabirrlandfsizeftechi = , 
where techi is the proportion of farm land under the adoption of either improved seeds or inorganic 
fertilizers and the explanatory variables are farm size (fsize), ratio of irrigation land (irriland), hired 
labour (hirlab), farm credit obtained, access to market (atmarket), distance to road (distroad), re-
ceiving agricultural extension services (aextserv) and other household characteristics (z) such as age 
and education level of household head and total adult members in the household.  
3.6 Empirical results 
3.6.1 GMM structural model results 
 Table 3.2 presents estimates of the GMM probit models using the moment restrictions for 
period 2 (i.e. 2004). The results show relatively higher Pseudo R2 for the adoption of inorganic fer-
tilizers (0.10) compared with improved seeds (0.06), which are not so unusual in two-stage binary 
regressions. The interpretation of Pseudo R-square is not same as in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
method. These values, however, often interpret like in OLS as an approximation of the proportion 
of variance of the response variables explained by the predictors. As discussed earlier, the use of 
GMM can reduce the problem of heteroscedasticity by allowing orthogonality conditions for effi-
cient estimation even in the presence of heteroscedasticity. So heteroscedasticity would not be a 
problem for this analysis.  As the main interest of this estimation is to investigate whether farmers 
decide both improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers simultaneously, the result shows only weak 
evidence about simultaneity decisions. The estimates show that farmers are likely to use inorganic 
fertilizers if they adopt improved seeds, but fail to establish the reverse effect. This result may be 
  54 
the fact that farmers adopt new technologies in a step-wise as in the result of Byerlee and Hesse de 
Polanco (1986).  Few exogenous variables are found to be significant. For instance, the probability 
to adopt improved seeds is found to be positive with the variables: the number of adult members 
and head’s age. The result further reveals that household with more information about new tech-
nologies may have higher probability of adopting new technologies allowing us to assume that 
farmers want to acquire adequate information about new technology before using it. This finding 
also indicates that the government should expand extension services throughout the country to in-
crease agricultural productivity through the adoption of new technologies. Moreover, the lack of 
adequate information about new technologies also seems to be a major factor for not adopting im-
proved seeds, revealing that farmers do not want to take more risks by using new varieties of seeds, 
as in the case of the adoption of improved varieties of maize in the hills of Nepal (Ranson, Paudyal 
and Adhikari, 2003) and in lowland zone of Tanzania (Kaliba et a., 2000), and modern varieties of 
rice in the southern part of Nepal (Joshi and Pandey, 2006). On the other hand, the probability of 
adopting improved seeds is likely to be low, if the local market from the household is far. The re-
sults of probability of adopting inorganic fertilizers are found to be similar with the adoption of im-
proved seeds. However, there are some exceptions, for instance, the probability of adopting inor-
ganic fertilizers is more likely to be positive, if the households hire farm labour. No significant 
difference between male and female headed households is found, suggesting that gender does not 
matter for the adoption of new farm technology at least in this model. Moreover, age and education 
level of household head are also not significant in these models. 
The coefficients of irrigated land are significant and negative for both technologies, which 
are a bit surprising at least in these estimates and are counterintuitive with our hypothesis. Possible 
explanation may be that the majority farmers used improved seeds for those crops which might not 
frequently require irrigation. For instance, out of the total improved seed adopters, about 40 percent 
farmers used improved seeds for the summer crops such as maize and other vegetables which are 
normally cultivated on rain-fed land during the monsoon season and about 50 percent of the total 
farmers who adopted inorganic fertilizers, also used inorganic fertilizers for the summer crops. The 
negative sign of irrigated land may be the higher use of both technologies for the summer crops.  
Another possible explanation may be due to difference between direct and indirect effects of the 
same exogenous variable when it becomes endogenous in the model. Because irrigated land is posi-
tive in Tobit results. However, further investigation is necessary.  
 The results of probit GMM structural models do not conclusively demonstrate the simulta-
neity of decisions to adopt both technologies, but there is some evidence of simultaneity of adopting 
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both technologies and simultaneity can not be ruled out while using adoption decisions, particularly 
in low-income countries, such as Nepal.        
3.6.2 LPM results for period 2 
 Two-stage LPM for period 2 (i.e. 2004) is presented in Table 3.2, in which the model tests 
the simultaneity decisions. It is noteworthy to mention that the LPM coefficients are not directly 
comparable in scale with the probit estimates. The estimates in the LPM models are based on the 
robust standard errors, because in two-stage GMM for LPM, the results are often estimated in ro-
bust standard errors. So there is no need to test about heteroscedasticity. R-square values are 0.09 
for improved seeds and 0.23 for inorganic fertilizers. 
   The results of LPM which includes the joint decisions of adoption of improved seeds and 
inorganic fertilizers show that the coefficients of both endogenous variables are significant and 
positive in the other equation, supporting the hypothesis of simultaneity in adoption decision of new 
technologies. The extent of their effect on the adoption decision varies. The results show that the 
probability to adopt improved seeds is found to be higher when farmers use fertilizers. Moreover, 
few exogenous variables are found to be significant in this model, with some of estimated parame-
ters showing surprising results. For instance, the head’s age has positive impact on the adoption of 
improved seeds, but negative on fertilizer adoption. Likewise, the coefficients of the number of 
adult members in the household show positive impact on improved seeds and negative on fertiliz-
ers, followed by similarly mixed results for distance from the market and paved roads. In addition, 
the coefficient of hired labour is found to be significant and positive for fertilizer adoption, and the 
coefficient of agricultural extension services is significant and positive for improved seeds. 
3.6.3 Probit model results for period 1 and 2 
 Table 3.3 displays the results of reduced form probit models for period 1 and 2. As the pro-
bit models for period 1 estimated to obtain the predicted values as instrument for period 2, the re-
sults can provide some insights to compare probits models with period 2, as well as with Tobit 
models. The values of Pseudo R-square for probit models are 0.07 (period 1) and 0.05 (period 2)  
for improved seeds and 0.13 (period 1)and 0.22 (period 2) for inorganic fertilizers. The LR Chi-
square statistics which have the same interpretation as F-statistics in OLS showing explanatory 
power of the regression equation, are significant and suggest that at least one of the regression coef-
ficients in the model is not equal to zero. 
The results in the probit model for period 1 show that the adoption of new technologies is 
significantly affected by the factor markets such as credit and labour markets in Nepal, implying 
that the probabilities of adopting modern varieties of seeds and inorganic fertilizers are positive for 
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those farmers who employ farm labourers and obtained credit, combined with receiving agricultural 
extension services. These outcomes are also supported by the variable of the number of adult mem-
bers in the sampled households which show that those with a higher number of adults lead to a 
higher probability of adopting new farm technologies, probably labour-intensive technology and ex-
istence of missing labour markets. This argument is also supported by the significant and positive 
sign of age of household head, assuming that higher age of household head may have better experi-
ence and information about new technology than relatively younger household head, and thereby 
can lead to a higher probability of technology adoption, if such technology is profitable to farmers. 
To summarize, the results support the hypothesis of incomplete or missing factor markets as bind-
ing constraints for the adoption of new farm technologies. However, the coefficients of education 
level of household’s head show surprising results that the probability of adoption of new technolo-
gies is low, if the household head is more educated. The reason is perhaps due to more preferences 
to work in the off-farm sectors by the educated people.   
The coefficients of plot size are found to be significant and positive for improved seeds and 
inorganic fertilizers, suggesting that farmers are more likely to adopt modern varieties of seeds 
(e.g., rice, maize, wheat etc.) in larger plot size. This outcome is found to be similar with the adop-
tion of improved maize varieties in the hills of Nepal (Ranson, Paudyal and Adhikari, 2003). How-
ever, the coefficients of irrigated land and soil quality show mixed results. For instance, farmers are 
likely to use fertilizers in non-irrigated land than the irrigated land, while the adoption of improved 
seeds is likely to be high on the land where the soil quality is better. 
Distance from the market can also affect the probability of adopting improved seeds, but not 
for inorganic fertilizers. However, distance from the paved road does not show any significant im-
pact on adoption decisions at least in this data set.  
 The results of probit models for period 2 are found to be compatible with the results of pro-
bit models for the period 1 with some exceptions. For example, factor markets such as hiring labour 
and obtaining credit have positive impact on the adoption of new technologies. In a similar line, the 
number of adult members in the sampled households affects the possibility the decisions to adopt 
improved seeds and fertilizers. In addition, the coefficient of information about the new technology 
is also significant and positive, suggesting that agricultural extension services need to extend 
throughout the country.  
 The coefficients of distance from the market and distance to paved roads are also found to be 
significant and negative with an exception of the distance to paved road for improved seeds. This 
result implies that the probability of adoption is more likely to increase with an improvement in in-
frastructure facilities.  
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The results of plot size contrast with period 1 results, revealing that the adoption of new 
technologies is likely to be high in smaller plot size than the larger plot size. In addition, the results 
suggest surprisingly that adoption of both technologies is likely to be high on non-irrigated land 
than on irrigated land. The coefficients of soil quality do not show any effect on adoption decisions. 
Some coefficients related to household characteristics are found to be significant. Male 
headed households are likely to use inorganic fertilizers than their female counterparts. There is also 
a positive impact of education level on fertilizer adoptions but not on improved seeds. This result 
contrasts with the coefficients for the period 1 probit models. Nevertheless, the coefficients of 
head’s age are found to be compatible with period one. 
3.6.4 Tobit model results 
 Random effects Tobit models for the adoption of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers 
are presented in Table 3.4 for the purpose of comparing consistency with the probit results. The de-
pendent variables used in these exercises are the proportion of land using improved seeds and inor-
ganic fertilizers by the sampled households with the same exogenous variables used in previous 
models21. The results of Wald Chi-square tests which have the same interpretation as F-statistics in 
OLS and LR Chi-square in probit models, are significant, rejecting the null hypothesis that exoge-
nous variables included in the models have zero influence.   
The results of the random effect Tobit models are found to be consistent with the probit 
models, suggesting that access to credit and labour markets and agricultural extension services in-
crease the adoption of both technologies. Human capital (i.e., head’s educational level) and labour 
endowment in the sampled households also have positive impact on the adoption of improved 
seeds. The adoption of inorganic fertilizers is likely to be high in small farms, while no significant 
effects are found for the adoption of improved seeds. Likewise, younger farmers are more likely to 
use inorganic fertilizers. However, the coefficients of head’s gender do not show any effect on 
adoption decisions in Tobit models.  
 The study further estimates the simple Tobit models for period 1 & 2 and pooled from both 
periods (see Table 3.5 and 3.6). in which LR Chi-square tests are significant in all equations and the 
Pseudo R-squares are between 0.03 to 0.04 for improved seeds and 0.05 to 0.09 for inorganic fertil-
izers. The results show that factor markets such as hired labour and farm credit have positive impact 
on adoption of improved seeds, followed by agricultural extension services and household labour 
endowments. Adoption of improved seeds seems to be high with the education level of household 
                                                 
21
  In theory, there are some other exogenous variables (e.g., number of livestock, receiving remittances, and sharecrop 
land) which are assumed to be influential in the adoption decisions and supposed to be included in the models. But 
none of these variables were found significant in any of the model, so that these variables are excluded from the mod-
els. 
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head. However, large farm households use less improved seeds (in pooled Tobit model).  The re-
sults from the adoption of inorganic fertilizers are in line with the results of improved seeds with 
some exceptions. The distance to paved roads and distance from the market centre seem to be con-
straints for the adoption of fertilizers in Tobit models, while agricultural extension services do not 
show any significant impact on the adoption of inorganic fertilizers in these exercises.  
The results show differences of some coefficients in Tobit models in contrast to GMM pro-
bit models. For instance, the proportion of irrigated land is found to be positive in Tobit models in 
contrast to the period two probit models. Likewise, distance from the market centre and distance to 
paved roads also contrast with the results of Tobit models.  
3.7 Discussion of the results  
 The results from various models show both consistency and contradiction, particularly as far 
as the signs and level of significance of the estimated parameters are concerned, and surprising 
given the hypotheses of the models. As the study assumes the adoption of improved seeds and inor-
ganic fertilizers as joint decisions, the structural probit GMM results weakly favours this assump-
tion with the adoption of improved seeds being dependent on the decision of adopting inorganic fer-
tilizers, but not other way round, while the reduced form LPM models are compatible with the 
hypothesis of joint decisions of adopting both technologies jointly.  The coefficients in regards to 
factor markets such as labour and credit markets and obtaining agricultural extensions services give 
rise to the significant role in farm adoption decisions in the context of low-income countries. De-
spite many satisfactory results, few statistically insignificant coefficients combined with counter-
intuitive signs have raised some issues related to the hypotheses that underlie the theoretical models 
and the consistency of the results.   
 Estimated parameters of variables such as the age and the education level of household 
heads, the irrigated land, the distance from the market centre and the distance to road networks dif-
fer in the level of significances and the signs among the different models (e.g., reduced form probit, 
structural GMM, and random effects Tobit models). In this case, some authors suggest that the re-
sults of the structural form may differ from the reduced form coefficients, because the coefficients 
of structural form provide estimates of the direct effects of exogenous variables and often ignore the 
indirect effects of the same exogenous variables on dependent variables (Weber and Dudney, 2003). 
Likewise, Ford and Jackson (1998) point out that in jointly dependent variables, when the relevant 
dependent variable changes in response to an initial change in an explanatory variable, the joint de-
pendent variable will also respond to this change and this change gives rise to further changes in the 
relevant dependent variable and/or in dependent variables in other equations. This may be due to the 
assumption of considering all other variables in the structural coefficients as constant. A study car-
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ried out by Eppe and McCallum (2005) shows that among the 26 existing textbooks, no example 
with actual data in which all parameters estimates are of the proper sign and are statistically signifi-
cant. The analytical basis for these results may not only depend on the few counter-intuitive results, 
especially in the case of estimating many simultaneous equations. It may rather be to consider these 
results as natural outcomes of the difference between the reduced form and the structural form 
models. Nevertheless, our results in this regard are in favour of the assumption of joint decisions of 
adopting improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers, particularly in this data set.  
3.8 Conclusions  
Increases in agricultural productivity through the adoption of new technologies such as im-
proved seeds and inorganic fertilizers are considered as a primary means to reduce poverty and 
hunger and to shift from subsistence to commercial farming in Nepal. This objective has not been 
achieved in terms of increasing incomes through higher productivity in agriculture, even though 
high priority has been given to it by the government and a large amount of the budget in the na-
tional planning has been allocated to this sector. Since the performance of this sector has yet to im-
prove in a substantive manner, many policy makers and agricultural economists have tried to under-
stand the underlying mechanisms of new technology adoption in a broader perspective in order to 
improve policy formulation. This study has analysed agricultural technology adoption decisions in 
Nepal under the assumptions of missing or incomplete factor markets which are often pervasive in 
most low-income countries. 
This study applies several econometric models to analyze the adoption of improved seeds 
and inorganic fertilizers using NLSS data, assuming that farmers often take adoption decisions 
about improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers jointly. The application of a single binary model, by 
ignoring simultaneity in decisions, may lead to bias, inconsistency, and inefficiency in the parame-
ters estimated. This study thus applies the reduced form probit models for the period one (1996) in 
order to get instruments for LPM and GMM simultaneous probit models for the period two (2004), 
and then further applies Tobit models utilizing the proportion of land using both improved seeds 
and inorganic fertilizers by farm households as dependent variables. 
The results of probit GMM structural models partially favour the assumption of joint deci-
sions, implying that the probability of adopting improved seeds is likely to be influenced by the 
adoption of inorganic fertilizers, but not by improved seeds for fertilizer adoption. In the LPM, the 
results support the hypothesis of adopting improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers as joint deci-
sions. However, there are some contradictions in estimated exogenous parameters, especially dis-
tance from the market centre and distance to paved roads for improved seeds (i.e. positive instead of 
negative signs) and household labour endowments for inorganic fertilizer adoption. 
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The results from the reduced form probit models for the period one (i.e. 1996) show that the 
adoption of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers are significantly affected by local factor mar-
kets such as credit and labour, combined with household labour endowment. In addition, distance 
from the market seems to be an influential factor for improved seeds adoption. Information about 
new technology is vital: adoption decisions about new farm technology are observed to be higher in 
those households receiving extension services from the Agriculture Development Office. This find-
ing clearly indicates that the government should increase extension services throughout the country. 
Adoption decisions are found to be high in larger farm size. Head’s age has positive impact on 
adoption of new technologies but the head’s education appears to affect adoption negatively. 
The results from the reduced form probit models for the period 2 (i.e. 2004) are consistent 
with period 1, particularly on variables, such as labour, credit, the household labour endowment, ex-
tension services, distance from the market centre, distance to paved roads,  and the age of household 
head. However, the results contrast with the period 1 coefficients as far as plot size and head’s edu-
cation are concerned.   
The coefficients of Tobit models are also found to be consistent with the factor markets 
(credit and labour), level of infrastructures, and agricultural extension services. Moreover, human 
capital (i.e., educational level) can also affect decisions to invest in new technologies, improved 
seeds in particular. 
To summarize, the evidence shows that the jointly adoption of improved seeds and inorganic 
fertilizers can not be ruled out and hence is in favour of the assumption of simultaneous decisions. 
Despite this, well-functioning of factor markets such as labour and credit, combined with agricul-
tural extension services and infrastructural development are a prerequisite for agricultural-led 
growth in Nepal. 
While this study focuses on adoption decisions about improved seeds and fertilizers, further 
research is needed to find out how the intensity of technology adoption over a period of time influ-
ences the behaviour of farmers making adoption decisions. 
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APPENDIX-3 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of farm technology adoption (both periods)  
Variables Description of variables Type of 
Variables 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
   From Plot level data From Farm level data 
Seed  
Households adoption of improved 
seeds  
Binary 
0.43 0.46 0.34 0.47 
fert 
Households adoption of inorganic 
fertilizers 
Binary 
0.68 0.48 0.65 0.48 
Sedfert 
Whether household has used both 
improved seeds and inorganic fer-
tilizers in the same plot 
Binary 
0.31 0.46 0.27 0.44 
plotsize Size of plot in hectares Continuous 1.17 2.54 6.381 11.65 
soilquality 
Soil quality of plot (1 best and 5 
worst) 
Continuous 
2.73 1.01   
Irrigation Irrigation facility in the plot Binary 0.34 0.47 0.14 0.35 
Shareland Any sharecropping land Binary 0.11 0.31 0.18 1.13 
farmcredit Receive any farm credit Binary 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 
Hirlab Hired any farm labour  Binary 0.82 0.38 0.77 0.42 
Dirtdroad 
Distance of paved road from the 
households (in hours) 
Continuous 
12.25 10.86 10.83 9.68 
locamarkt 
Distance of local market centre (in 
hours) 
Continuous 
6.97 6.88 6.77 6.93 
Agritech 
Receive any advice from Agricul-
ture Development Office about 
new farm technology  
Binary 
0.07 0.25 0.07 0.23 
Sex 
Sex of household head (1=male, 0 
otherwise) 
Binary 
0.86 0.34 0.85 0.36 
Age  Age of household head Continuous 48.12 18.16 46.97 17.22 
Edulevel 
Education level of household head 
(in years) 
Continuous 
2.35 3.87 2.42 3.91 
Adult 
Number of adult family members 
in the household 
Continuous 
3.87 1.87 3.63 1.78 
 1 total farm size 
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Table 3.2: Results of GMM structural models and LPM for period 2 (2004) 
Improved seeds Inorganic fertilizers 
Variables Coefficients 
(GMM probit) 
Coefficients 
(LPM) 
Coefficients 
(GMM probit) 
Coefficients 
(LPM) 
Improved seeds  
 
 4.72 
(1.18) 
1.24* 
(7.25) 
Inorganic fertiliz-
ers 
0.73* 
(4.27) 
0.26* 
(4.63) 
 
 
 
Plot  size -0.08 
(1.25) 
-0.03 
(1.28) 
-0.12 
(0.74) 
-0.005 
(0.15) 
Irrigation land -0.13* 
(4.04) 
-0.05 
(4.01) 
-0.50* 
(2.39) 
-0.007 
(0.36) 
Soil quality 0.01 
(0.17) 
-0.005 
(0.16) 
0.20 
(0.93) 
0.05 
(1.23) 
Sex of HH head -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.00 
(0.003) 
0.02 
(1.18) 
0.001 
(1.02) 
Age of HH head 0.05* 
(3.39) 
0.01* 
(3.41) 
-0.03 
(0.91) 
-0.01* 
(2.65) 
Education level of 
HH head 
-0.02 
(0.28) 
-0.007 
(0.31) 
-0.10 
(0.59) 
0.03 
(0.95) 
Number of adult 
members 
0.07* 
(4.20) 
0.03* 
(4.25) 
0.04 
(0.64) 
-0.02* 
(2.36) 
Distance of road 0.006 
(1.88) 
0.001* 
(1.98) 
-0.09 
(1.82) 
-0.01* 
(8.09) 
Distance of local 
markets 
-0.01* 
(2.82) 
0.003* 
(2.27) 
-0.03* 
(2.53) 
-0.01* 
(2.79) 
Hired labour -0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.004 
(0.14) 
2.43* 
(2.38) 
0.17* 
(3.91) 
Farm credit 0.01 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.38 
(1.61) 
0.05 
(1.64) 
Information 0.33* 
(2.91) 
0.12* 
(3.07) 
0.96 
(1.44) 
-0.11 
(1.92) 
Constant -0.70 
(0.22) 
0.24* 
(3.22) 
-0.78 
(0.89) 
0.18 
(1.57) 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.09 
 
0.10 
 
0.23 
Number of obser-
vations 
2176 2176  
* at least 5 percent level of significance  
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Table 3.3: Results of probit models on reduced form for period 1 (1996) & 2 (2004) 
Improved seeds Inorganic fertilizers Variables 
Coefficients  
(period 1) 
Coefficients 
(period 2) 
Coefficients 
(period 1) 
Coefficients  
(period 2) 
Plot  size 0.03*** 
(3.49) 
-0.12* 
(17.36) 
0.05* 
(5.6) 
-0.21* 
(42.83) 
Irrigation land -0.01 
(0.22) 
-0.20* 
(6.77) 
-0.03* 
(7.52) 
-0.39* 
(14.73) 
Soil quality -0.25* 
(2.61) 
0.08 
(0.98) 
-0.003 
(0.03) 
0.31 
(0.42) 
Sex of HH head -0.001 
(0.57) 
0.001 
(0.051) 
-0.001 
(0.52) 
0.004* 
(2.44) 
Age of HH head 0.05* 
(6.38) 
0.03* 
(3.56) 
0.03* 
(2.91) 
0.006 
(0.84) 
Education level of 
HH head 
-0.16* 
(2.13) 
0.003 
(0.04) 
-0.05* 
(2.01) 
0.12* 
(2.02) 
Number of adult 
members 
0.04* 
(2.54) 
0.07* 
(4.71) 
0.05* 
(2.68) 
0.06* 
(4.19) 
Distance of road -0.01 
(1.90) 
-0.002 
(0.77) 
-0.003 
(0.97) 
-0.04* 
(19.69) 
Distance of local 
markets 
-0.01* 
(1.97) 
-0.008* 
(1.99) 
0.002 
(0.59) 
-0.012* 
(3.85) 
Hired labour 0.31* 
(4.12) 
0.33* 
(0.062) 
0.77* 
(10.82) 
0.88* 
(17.39) 
Farm credit 0.39* 
(2.52) 
0.07 
(0.55) 
1.43* 
(6.09) 
0.39* 
(2.35) 
Information 0.63* 
(5.02) 
0.37* 
(3.35) 
0.30* 
(2.01) 
0.32* 
(2.84) 
Constant -0.80 
(4.55) 
-0.16 
(0.98) 
0.13 
(1.42) 
0.77* 
(5.58) 
LR )12(2χ  180.29*** 152.29*** 376.00*** 
 
587.45*** 
 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.05 0.13 
 
0.22 
Number of obser-
vations 
2176 2176 2176 2176 
* at least 5 percent level of significance.   
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Table 3.4: Random Effects Tobit models 
Variables improved seeds inorganic fertilizers 
Farm size -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Irrigation land 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Sex of HH head 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Age of HH head -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
Education level of HH head 0.01* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Number of adult members 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Distance to road -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Distance to local markets -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Hired labour 0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.19*** 
(0.03) 
Farm credit 0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Information 0.14** 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
Constant -0.24*** 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.57) 
Wald ( 152χ ) test  49.07*** 101.55*** 
Number of observations 1585 1585 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 3.5: Tobit models for adoption of improved seeds 
Adoption of improved seeds Variables 
Period 1(1996) Period 2 (2004) Both 1&2(1996&2004) 
Farm size -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Irrigation land 0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Sex of HH head 0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.81) 
-0.024 
(0.05) 
Age of HH head -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Education level of HH head 0.004 
(0.009) 
0.01** 
(0.005) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
Number of adult members -0.001 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.011) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
Distance to road -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Distance to local markets -0.001 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Hired labour 0.16** 
(0.04) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
Farm credit 0.53*** 
(0.15) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.20*** 
(0.04) 
Information 0.28** 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.16** 
(0.07) 
Constant -0.73*** 
(0.17) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.40*** 
(0.08) 
LR 112χ  32.84*** 33.61*** 80.34** 
Pseudo  2R  0.04 0.03 0.04 
Number of observations 797 788 1585 
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Table 3.6: Tobit models for adoption of inorganic fertilizers 
Adoption of inorganic fertilizers Variables 
Period 1(1996) Period 2 (2004) Both 1&2(1996&2004) 
Farm size -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.04*** 
(0.02) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Irrigation land 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Sex of HH head 0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Age of HH head -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.003) 
Education level of HH head 0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
Number of adult members 0.01 
(0.011) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.006) 
Distance to road 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Distance to local markets -0.005** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
Hired labour 0.20*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.19*** 
(0.03) 
Farm credit 0.27*** 
(0.09) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Information 0.10 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
Constant -0.01 
(0.08) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
LR 112χ  57.13*** 82.09*** 102.6*** 
Pseduo  2R  0.05 0.09 0.05 
Number of observations 797 788 1585 
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CHAPTER 4  
PRICE VOLATILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON AGRICULTURAL 
INCOME INSTABILITY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Agriculture is a risky business. Farmers encounter a number of risks and uncertainties, both 
market–related, such as fluctuations of input and output prices, as well as non-market–related, such 
as climatic shocks. This persistent risk is costly, particularly in less developed countries (LDCs), 
due to a poorly developed private sector, weak market infrastructure, and incomplete or poorly 
functioning financial and risk markets (Dorward et al., 2004). Market related risk is most acute in 
landlocked LDCs, such as Nepal, due to the wedge between export and import prices resulting from 
high transportation costs.  
Recently, weather risks have also posed a major challenge in agriculture. Fluctuations of tem-
perature and precipitation have increased over the last decade due to global climate changes that 
have most severely affected rain-fed agriculture, where most farmers are poor smallholders22 (Siva-
kumar and Hansen, 2007). Variation of production due to climatic shocks may also lead to food 
prices being more unstable, leading to unstable agricultural income. Uncertainty in commodity 
prices has been a major problem to primary product exporting countries, both at the farm level and 
at the macro level. The issue of risk and uncertainty has, therefore, been a challenging task for pol-
icy makers and economists from a theoretical, as well as from an applied perspective.  
Staple food crops, such as rice, wheat, maize and potatoes are the most widely consumed 
products, as well as source of income to the farmers living in low income countries. Instability in 
these prices is obviously a problem for agriculture dependent countries because of the high depend-
ence on agricultural exporting commodities (Dana and Gilbert, 2008; Brown, Crawford and Gibson, 
2008). Rural households participate in agricultural commodity markets in various ways, and the 
overwhelming evidence is that the majority of rural poor people, including smallholders are the net 
purchasers of food grain, both in LDCs in general (e.g., World Development Report, 2008 in ‘Agri-
culture for Development’), and in Nepal in particular23. Rises in food prices can have a severe im-
pact on welfare, especially for food-deficit households in rural areas, because poor are the most 
                                                 
22
 In the Nepalese case, majority of farmers have less than 0.5 hectares of farmland, and fewer than 100,000 farmers 
have more than 3 hectares of cropland. 
23
 In DFID’s Nepal report, more than 60 percent of landholding households are shown as having a food deficit for some 
time during year. 78 percent of these deficits last for 4-6 months - http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/Nepal-
facts.asp .  
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vulnerable to instability in staple food prices (Brown, Crawford and Gibson, 2008). Several policy 
makers have insisted that food purchasing farm households should diversify into high-value crops, 
but such attempts depend on their confidence in being able to procure food at tolerable prices 
(World Bank, 2008).  Price instability can act as a disincentive to diversify cropping patterns that 
raise farmers’ incomes but also increase the risks inherent they face in food markets (Fafchamps, 
1992). 
Moreover, commodity price volatility notoriously creates instability and uncertainty for com-
modity-dependent developing countries. An estimated two billion people, nearly a third of the 
global population, depend on the production of primary commodities, such as rice, wheat, and cot-
ton. In addition to this, a large portion of non-food expenses such as school fees, health care and 
clothing costs are also covered by the agricultural income. The data show that 95 of the 141 devel-
oping countries derive at least half of their foreign exchange earnings from commodity exports 
(Brown, Crawford and Gibson, 2008). Food price volatility can therefore pose acute economic, so-
cial and political consequences in agriculture-dependent countries. This can further lead to ineffi-
cient agricultural production decisions, particularly when credit and risk markets are poorly devel-
oped (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Williams and Wright, 1991). An understanding of the sources of 
price volatility of food staples and its impact on rural household income is therefore of great impor-
tance for policy formulation in developing countries, such as Nepal.  
Many developing countries started to reform their economic policies towards the liberalization 
of domestic markets24, especially during 1980s and 1990s, mostly within the context of broader 
structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank25 with the aim of restoring fiscal and current 
account balance, reducing or eliminating price distortions and facilitating efficient price transmis-
sion. This policy came into effect in the context of the then prevailing view that government inter-
ventions in the food sectors were too costly to continue due to rent-seeking behaviour, where politi-
cally powerful groups gain influence over the operations of parastatals to transfer income to 
themselves. This new policy was thus formulated with an aim to reduce rent-seeking behaviour and 
to transmit the benefit of higher export prices in domestic markets (World Bank, 2005). The impact 
of the  liberalization is still a matter of debate among academics and policy makers. Producers in 
many low income countries faced increased price fluctuations arising from the world markets due to 
                                                 
24
 Before 1980s, many developing countries adopted semi-autarkic economic policies. During that period, the coping 
strategies for food price instability and risk took the form of direct intervention of the government in food markets in 
the form of public procurement of food, price controls, internal and external trade restrictions, and crop insurance.  
25
 The World Bank’s view on food marketing policy had three planks: (i) liberalize food markets and reduce direct gov-
ernment purchasing and selling; (ii) encourage the development of private-sector marketing services and innovation 
by investing in public goods, such as marketing infrastructure,  marketing information, and grades and standards sys-
tems; and (iii) put greater reliance on international and regional trade, rather than government buffer stocks, to even 
out local imbalances in supply and demand (Meerman 1997). 
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slow progress in market reform programs, as well as weak technical skills for risk management. In 
many cases, reform programs have subsequently been partially reversed (ibid). It is also claimed 
that many developing countries only partially implemented food market reforms (Baffes and Gard-
ner, 2003). Several reports carried out by the World Bank (e.g., WDR, 2008 in ‘Agriculture for De-
velopment’) recommended that these low income countries need to take into account the country-
specific constraints such as the structure of local markets, public service deliveries, and functioning 
of financial institutions while implementing market reform policies to manage risk. Indeed, the ab-
sence of adequate insurance markets has provided a significant part of the rationale for government 
intervention, particularly for government price stabilization programmes (Newbery and Stiglitz, 
1981).  It is well known that risks and uncertainties can be more problematic to farmers when local 
prices do not move in line with prices on international markets, perhaps resulting from a number of 
factors, such as transportation costs, local policies, grade or quality differences, and local supply-
demand characteristics (Larson, 1999). The evidence also shows that countries with excess food 
import bills are strongly affected by price rises despite a lower instability in world cereal markets 
(Sarris, 2000). An understanding of risk and its consequences to manage the inherent variability of 
agricultural income through price and yield volatility is therefore of great importance in low income 
countries. 
Commodity price instability and its impact on the economy of low income countries are obvi-
ously a major concern for economists and policy makers. The impact of commodity price variability 
can have effects on economies in various ways and can distinguish between ex ante effects of vola-
tility and ex post effects of extreme output (Dehn, Gilbert and Varangis, 2004). Many studies have 
shown that commodity price fluctuations in the context of economic globalization and increased 
liberalization of commodity markets have seriously affected the weaker economies of the develop-
ing world (Dehn, 2000; Byerlee, Jayne and Myers, 2006; Ivanic and Martin, 2008). However, fewer 
studies have focused on the impact of international and domestic market shocks on the income of 
farm producers. Most recently, Rapsomanikis and Sarris (2005) have analysed the impact of domes-
tic and international price fluctuations on the agricultural income instability in developing countries 
using microeconomic approach for different income groups of households in Ghana, Vietnam and 
Peru. The authors estimated household’s income variances and coefficients of variation which al-
lowed them to compute the level of income variability under several scenarios. They found higher 
shocks from domestic prices and production variability as compared with international price shocks 
in the household income instability.26 Similarly, Bourguignon, Lamvert and Suwa-Eisenmann 
                                                 
26
 The theoretical approach of this study was an extension of previous work by one of the authors (Sarris, 2002) who 
had developed this model and applied in Ghana for the commodity price insurance demand, using the Ghana Living 
Standards Survey data and monthly price data for both domestic and international prices. 
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(2004) applied a computable general equilibrium model to explore the impact of trade instability on 
domestic incomes. Their results show the effect of world agricultural trade instability on diverging 
domestic incomes for different groups of income earners.  
The analysis of domestic market exposure to international markets could be relevant to exam-
ine the impact of domestic price volatility on various commodities. It is widely realized that domes-
tic markets in many low income countries are incompletely integrated because of high transporta-
tion costs, poor infrastructure and communication services. In such case, international price changes 
will not be fully transmitted to domestic markets, indicating that price signals will not be transmit-
ted in the same manner in all parts of the country. Studies such as those can capture several assump-
tions in order to understand the level of world price transmissions in domestic markets in different 
commodities.  
The study of the issue of the impact of Nepal-India border price, as well as the world price 
fluctuations on agricultural household income instability can provide significant contribution in the 
literature due to a limited number of studies of Indian price transmission to the Nepalese markets 
and this study is one step towards this direction. This study attempts to fill the gap in this area by 
examining the impact of regional (i.e., India) and domestic price shocks on the agricultural house-
hold income instability in Nepal. The study with the regional markets is important in the Nepalese 
context, since India is the biggest trade partner of Nepal. Indian price shocks especially food staples 
may be more volatile for Nepal rather than the world commodity prices. The study thus aims to as-
sess the impact of price volatility on agricultural income instability, applying data from both time 
series price data of both Nepal and India, and the Nepal Living Standard Survey 2003/04 under 
theoretical approach developed by Sarris (2002) and further extended by Rapsomanikis and Sarris 
(2005). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature on agricultural risk. Sec-
tion 4.3 discusses trade policy regimes, particularly dealing with Nepalese agriculture. Section 4.4 
explores various econometric models and procedures to calculate the coefficient of variation of ag-
ricultural household income. Data and descriptive statistics are given in section 4.5. Section 4.6 
analyses the empirical results of the study and section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2 Literature on agricultural risk 
Agriculture is exposed to many risks and sources of uncertainty starting at the stage of plant-
ing to post-harvest and marketing because of various factors such as weather, yields, prices, gov-
ernment policies, global markets and other human related factors. An ever-changing landscape of 
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possible price, yield, and other outcomes may affect farmers’ financial returns and overall welfare. 
In particular, the variability of prices and yields is often considered as the major source of risk in 
agriculture (Patrick, 1998). However, in the economic literature, there are various forms of risk in 
agriculture. The major risks in agriculture are as follows (OECD, 2008): 
• Production risk may occur from the uncertain natural growth processes of crops and live-
stock. For instance, weather, disease, pest, and other factors are major sources of production 
risk. The impact of these types of risk is in the quantity and quality of commodities pro-
duced. 
• Price or market risk is the risk related to price fluctuation of both produced commodities 
and inputs used for production that may vary from country to country or commodity to 
commodity. 
• Financial risk refers to the risk facing a farm business that borrows money and creates ob-
ligation to repay loan. Such risk may include rising interest rates, credit constraints, and 
other hidden costs for acquiring loans from lenders. 
• Institutional risk arises from uncertainties of the government policies and actions. Some 
examples of government decisions are tax laws, regulations for inorganic fertilizer use, rules 
for animal waste disposal, and the level of price or income support payments. These deci-
sions can have impact on the farm investment decisions. 
• Human or personal risk is associated with the problems of human health or personal rela-
tionships which can affect the farm business. This risk includes accidents, illness, death, lo-
calized wildlife damage or pest infestation, and events such as fire or theft that can also af-
fect the farm activities.  
In the literature, risk is also divided in terms of its effects. If the impact of risk is felt by 
many households in the same locality, then the risk is called as covariate or collective risk, while if 
the effect of risk is concentrated only on a single household and is unrelated to that of neighbouring 
households, it is termed idiosyncratic. Human or personal risk falls under the category of idiosyn-
cratic shocks, while all others are covariate shocks. In other words, idiosyncratic risks are due to 
characteristics of the individual household, while collective or covariate risks are external to the 
household and include macroeconomic shocks and natural hazards.  
Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) distinguish between systematic and non-systematic risks. Sys-
tematic risks are related to events that repeat over time with a pattern of probabilities that can be 
analyzed in order to have a good estimate of the actuarial odds. On the contrary, non-systematic 
risks are characterized by very short or imperfect records of their occurrence and, therefore, diffi-
culties in estimating an objective pattern of probabilities or distribution of outcomes. This distinc-
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tion is similar to the distinction between risk and uncertainty and no clear cut line can be drawn be-
tween these two types of risk. 
Risk can have an effect to both producers and consumers. For instance, price variability may 
create risks and uncertainties that can threaten agricultural performances, and negatively impact on 
the income and welfare of the producers and consumers (Quiroz and Valdès, 1995; Fafchamps, 
2003; Brown, Crawford and Gibson, 2008). Moreover, these persistent shocks of prices and yields 
often create a big problem for commodity-dependent countries and developing countries in particu-
lar, probably due to a gap between world and domestic prices and cross-country variations in agri-
cultural prices. The analysis of commodity price shocks is important in the sense that about 25 per-
cent of world merchandise trade consists of primary commodities, and both long-term trends and 
short-term fluctuations in primary commodity prices are key determinants of development in the 
world economy (Cashin, Liang and McDermott, 2000). The study on agricultural commodity price 
volatility has been recognized as an important phenomenon for policy implications due to its 
broader impact on economic growth, income distribution, and the impact on the poor, especially in 
low-income countries. This section attempts to review the literature on commodity price volatility 
and its impact on the producers and consumers with special reference to low-income countries. 
There are a substantial number of studies related to risk in agriculture in which price risk is 
analyzed in terms of international price transmission to domestic markets.  These studies are typi-
cally quantitative. In commodity markets, price fluctuations are discussed under the rubric of vola-
tility – how much prices are changing over a give period.  There are various ways of measuring 
price volatility. Although, there is a long debate about the appropriate method of measurement, it is 
true that volatility arises from random price movements which occur naturally in every market. The 
rest of this section reviews the literature of international commodity price transmission to domestic 
markets with special attention to the agricultural products in the first part and the impact of com-
modity price volatility on household welfare in the second part, particularly in the context of devel-
oping countries. A literature review related to commodity price volatility and the research gaps in 
Nepal are presented in the final part. 
4.2.1 Price transmission and spatial market integration: an overview 
The study on the relationship between prices of two spatial markets helps to explain market 
performance and their degree of integration in which price transmission can be used to assess the 
direction of causal relationship between two spatial market prices. The analysis of market perform-
ance of two spatial markets is generally based on whether the difference of prices between two 
markets equals or is different than the transfer costs.  Broadly speaking, the study on price transmis-
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sion reflects the competitiveness of markets, effectiveness of arbitrage, efficiency of pricing, and 
the extent to which domestic markets remain insulated (Abdulai, 2006). 
Price transmission is used to analyse the extent to what changes in the price of one market 
led to changes in prices in another market of the same commodity. If the change in price of one 
market has no effect to another then there is no market integration and hence no price transmission 
from one market to another.  Price transmission is often measured by a coefficient from an applica-
tion of quantitative analysis (e.g. correlation, regression), depending on the model applied to ana-
lyze price transmission. 
It is often discussed in the literature that if the marketing system is well-integrated, then the 
price increases should be transmitted to the same extent as the price decreases, i.e. there is not rigid-
ity of price adjustment in the marketing system (Goletti and Babu, 1994). On the other hand, any 
deviation from this norm indicates some sort of inefficiencies in two spatial markets perhaps due to 
nonexistence of perfectively competitive markets. A number of analytical approaches using quanti-
tative techniques have been applied to address the issue of spatial market integration. This section 
thus aims to review the literature related to price transmission and market integration. 
A large body of literature of empirical analysis on price transmission and spatial market in-
tegration has been undertaken by applying various quantitative techniques. A comprehensive review 
of literature on spatial price analysis can be found on Facker and Goodwin (2001), Balcombe and 
Morrison (2002), and Rapsomanikis, Hallam and Conforti (2004) in which the authors mention a 
number of theoretical and analytical aspects. In the literature, the initial approaches to deal with 
price transmission were simple bivariate correlation coefficients (Mohandru, 1937; Blyn, 1973), but 
this approach ignored the presence of other factors such as price inflation, seasonality, population 
growth, and procurement policy (Lele, 1971; Jones, 1972). This traditional approach treats all price 
movements as indicating price instability, which is usually measured as the variance or standard de-
viation of a price index. This approach tends to overstate variability in non-trending series (Swaray, 
2006). It does not account for predictable components such as trends in the price evolution process 
and does not have constant range and the squaring tends to accentuate the effects of outliers (Offutt 
and Blandford, 1986). On the other hand, the confidence intervals of volatility forecasts can vary 
over time.  In addition, there is also trend to measure price instability by ratio method, in which the 
variability of price level is calculated by measuring the standard deviation of log prices (Pt/Pt-1), 
where Pt is price of period t and Pt-1 is price of period t-1. Another approach analysing volatility is 
one which distinguishes between predictable and unpredictable components of price series. But the 
weakness of this method is that it assumes price volatility as time invariant (Sekhar, 2003). It is true 
that many time series data are often confronted with the problems of nonstationarity and are time 
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variant while simultaneous-equation models based on the assumption of stationarity are not valid, if 
the time series are indeed realizations of nonstationary processes. A nonstationary series that has 
time dependent statistical properties may contain stochastic or deterministic trends. Nonstationary 
series with stochastic trends contain unpredictable variation. On the other hand, a stationary series 
that has constant mean and finite covariance structure does not vary systematically with time and 
tends to revert to its mean value and to fluctuate around it within a more or less constant range.  
The analytical approach of price transmission and spatial market integration has been chang-
ing rapidly due to availability of time series data of commodity prices. In these studies, price 
movements over time and the associated margins are seen as subject to various shocks. Many au-
thors have studied  price transmission within the context of the Law of One Price (e.g., Adreni, 
1989; Baffes, 1991) or within the context of market integration (e.g. Ravallion, 1986; Palaskas and 
Harriss, 1993; Gardner and Brooks, 1995; Blauch, 1997). In addition, studies can also be found re-
garding the policy reform evaluation such as market integration of post structural adjustment pro-
grammes assessment implemented in the developing world (Goletti and Babu, 1994; Dercon, 1995). 
The research on vertical price transmission combined with the supply chain from the consumer to 
the producer level can also be found in the broader area of price analysis (e.g., Wohlgenant, 1985; 
Prakash, 1999; von Cramon-Taubadel, 1999). The remaining part of this section provides a sum-
mary and overall assessment of econometric approaches and empirical applications of price trans-
mission and spatial market integration. 
The Law of One Price (LOP) is often considered as the basic building block of the interna-
tional trade literature, in which the LOP postulates that in the presence of a free market regime, and 
in the absence of transport costs and other barriers to trade, prices of identical products sold in dif-
ferent markets will be the same when expressed in terms of a common currency (Froot and Rogoff, 
1995). The basic idea of the LOP is that market participants can exploit arbitrage opportunities by 
purchasing the commodity in the cheaper market and selling it where prices are higher. On the other 
hand, market integration analyses prices in widely spatial locations connected either by trade (Ra-
vallion, 1986) or by locations that have one-for-one price changes (Goodwin and Schroeder, 1991). 
The spatial integration of markets depends on the difference between market prices. The general 
norm in the principles thought to underlie price differences are: (a) trade will only occur, when 
price differentials between two regions (or markets) at least equal or exceed transfer costs; and (b) 
trade will not occur when price differentials between two regions (or markets) do not exceed trans-
fer costs (Faminow and Benson, 1990).  
The LOP is the conventional tests for spatial market integration, as well as an important 
component for the study of international commodity markets. It postulates that after adjusting ex-
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change rates and transportation costs, an equilibrium price among spatially separated markets exists 
(Enke, 1951; Samuelson, 1952; and Takayama and Judge, 1971). This model is often known as the 
Enke-Samuelson-Takayama-Judge model) and the conventional equations of spatial markets are: 
(4.1)  cPP BtAt +=  
where itP  is the price level of a commodity at the location i in the time t and c is a constant that is 
often assumed to be transfer costs.  Indeed, spatial arbitrage is expected to trigger trade between two 
markets until price differences are at least reduced to the level of transfer costs and the trade be-
tween two markets can only exist, if the following inequality holds: 
(4.2)  cPP BtAt ≤− , 
Fackler and Goodwin (2001) refer this equation as the spatial arbitrage condition and explain that it 
identifies a weak form of the LOP, while equation (4.1) is mentioned as the strong form. In equation 
(4.1), if the condition holds, the two markets are said to be perfectly integrated. But in general, the 
condition of perfect market integration is unlikely, particularly in the short-run. In the short-run, the 
prices may drift apart, as shocks in one market may not be instantaneously transmitted to other 
markets due to delays in transport (Rapsomanikis, Hallam and Conforti, 2004).  Empirical evidence 
from recent studies on international trade of agricultural commodities also shows mixed results and 
strongly reject the LOP hypothesis (Miljkovic, 1999). In addition, the LOP ignores the time series 
properties of individual price data series that may lead to the problem of serial correlation in the 
empirical test. Under the presence of serial correlation , test result of the LOP may give inferential 
biases and inconsistencies (Adreni, 1989; Goodwin, 1992). Therefore, there was a conventional 
wisdom on how to incorporate and address the time-series price data to model spatial price analysis. 
It is a fact that traded commodities are often bulky and costly to transport and involve delivery lags 
and other impediments to adjustment and this adjustment of shocks may take several periods to be 
complete (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). The analysis of such shocks may require dynamic time se-
ries price data in which precise measurement of different degrees of integration can be achieved by 
measuring the magnitude of price transmission with the help of dynamic multipliers. Moreover, the 
analysis of dynamic adjustments also allows to compute the speed of price transmission.  
The concept of price transmission is widely analysed under the three notions, or components 
(Prakash, 1999; Balcombe and Morisson, 2002; Rapsomanikis, Hallam and Conforti, 2004) which 
are as follows: 
(i) co-movement and completeness of adjustment price changes in one market are fully 
transmitted to other at all points of time; 
(ii) the dynamics and speed of adjustment which refers as the process by, and rate at which, 
changes in prices in one market are filtered to the other markets or levels; and, 
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(iii) asymmetry of response, implying upward and downward movements in the price in one 
market is symmetrically or asymmetrically transmitted to the other, in which the extent 
of completeness and the speed of the adjustment can be asymmetric.  
The recent literature on international price transmission is mostly carried out using dynamic 
time series analysis techniques because of widely available of time series price data of commodi-
ties. The application of these techniques is obviously in light of the dynamic nature of interregional 
commodity trade and arbitrage activities (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). The major techniques to 
analyse price transmission are co-integration, causality, error correction and symmetry (Rapso-
manikis, Hallam and Conforti, 2004). These methods focus on the distinct aspects of the spatial 
price linkages and shed light on dynamic nature of the time series. A brief review of these methods 
follows. 
Cointegration is a concept for modelling equilibrium or long-run relations of economic vari-
ables and one way to formalize the idea of comovements among the prices of a same commodity in 
different countries. Granger (1981) developed the concept of cointegration and its applications. 
However, comprehensive framework for estimating and testing the long-run equilibrium relation-
ships between non stationary integrated variables was provided by Engle and Granger (1987) and 
Johansen (1988, 1991, and 1995). This testing framework can be described with the simple case of 
two time series AtP  and 
B
tP  (prices of two spatially separated markets) which are assumed to be in-
tegrated of order one [e.g. I(1), implying that the process contains a unit root] in which AtP  and BtP  
are said to be cointegrated if: 
(4.3)  BtAt PP βµ −=  
 is a stationary process. 
 The cointegrating vector [1, - β ] that measures the long-run equilibrium relationship be-
tween two variables, is often interpreted as the “elasticity of price transmission” when prices are 
converted into logarithms, only if the price of one market (e.g., world market) is considered as ex-
ogenous and assuming that the price of the local market does not affect to the price of world market. 
This model can also be estimated and cointegration can be tested utilizing either Ordinary Least 
Squares (Engle and Granger, 1987) or a Full Information Maximum Likelihood method (e.g., 
Johansen, 1988, 1991). In a cointegrated system, the residuals are necessarily stationary which is 
tested either by unit root test of µˆ (Engle and Granger) or by the distribution of two test statistics 
(Johansen).   
 Despite the prevalent tool for analysing time series econometrics, cointegration is not be-
yond criticism. For instance, Rapsomanikis, Hallam and Conforti (2004) mention that cointegration 
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is a statistical concept and thus “atheoretical” in which the parameters estimated in cointegration 
may not have economic interpretation as in case of structural models. Some authors show their 
doubt considering the estimated parameters as the completeness of transmission (Balcombe and 
Morrison, 2002; Barret and Li, 2002). Mastroyiannis and Pippenger (1993) mention that cointegra-
tion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the analysis of the LOP. The existence of coin-
tegration between price variables does not imply that the LOP holds by taking into account the 
transaction costs. For this, the cointegrating vector needs to be shown to be equal to [1,-1] between 
world and domestic prices. In the presence of unit roots and cointegration of two series, OLS re-
gression will be consistent. Barret (1996) argues that cointegration is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient condition for market integration. Cointegration between two price series may not be consistent 
if the transaction costs are nonstationary. In addition, market integration often suggests positive cor-
relation, but cointegration can be consistent in negative correlation between two market prices. The 
author further mentioned that the magnitude of the cointegration coefficient is informative about the 
relative rates of change, and many reported coefficients have magnitudes implausibly far from 
unity. A potential shortcoming in testing for market integration is the implicit assumption that trans-
fer costs are stationary (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001; Barret and Li, 2002). 
 Nevertheless, cointegration is an appropriate statistical technique that has an important im-
plication, postulated by the Granger Representation Theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987). This theo-
rem forms the basis of many empirical applications on time series in the presence of unit root non-
stationary process (Ogaki, 1998).The theorem shows that in a multivariate time series, if both 
variables are unit root [I(1)] then both variables are cointegrated if and only if there exist the error 
correction model (ECM). ECM enables us to combine the long-run cointegrating relationship be-
tween the levels variables and the short-run relationship between the first differences of the vari-
ables. In other words, this model allows direct estimation of the long-run, steady-state equilibrium 
condition implied by theory along with the short-run dynamic adjustments based on nonstationary 
properties of data (Kesavan et al., 1992). A vector error correction model (VECM) for two spatially 
separated markets when both prices are I(1) and cointegated (Engle and Granger, 1987; Rapso-
manikis, Hallam and Conforti, 2004) is as follow: 
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where the terms  A1ν  and B1ν are independently and identitically distributed (i.i.d) disturbances with 
zero mean and constant variance and ∆ is the first difference, showing that the data are stationary in 
first difference.  
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 The parameters 
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α
α
 are often called as error correction coefficients that are usually be-
tween zero and one27 ( 2,1,1||0 =<< iiα ). These coefficients assess how much of the difference be-
tween the two spatial market prices [ AtP (i.e. local) and BtP (i.e. world)] in the previous period would 
affect price changes to current period. The term β is the cointegrating parameter that shows the 
long-run equilibrium relationship between two prices, while the parameters contained in matrices 
kAA ,......,2 , show short-term adjustment, that is how much of the price change in  ‘B’(world) mar-
ket price series ( BtP∆ ) is transmitted to the price change in ‘A’(local) market price series ( AtP∆ ). 
The short term adjustment parameters can be interpreted as a measure of the speed of price trans-
mission, while the long-run multiplier can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of price trans-
mission of one price to other (Prakash, 1999).  
In the price transmission and the market integration literature, ECM often consider as the 
most useful tool as it provides a stylized picture of the relationship between two prices (ibid). ECM 
allows us to estimate additional confirmation of the presence or absence of cointegration. If the 
variables are not cointegrated, a valid ECM will not exist between the variables. ECM estimates be-
tween the variables are only possible if both variables are I (1) and cointegrated.  
Despite a number of caveats relating to cointegration analysis, the model is also applicable 
for the causality effects between the two prices (e.g., Granger causality), in which there will be at 
least one direction between two markets (Granger, 1988). The analysis of causality effect seems to 
be necessary because cointegration on itself cannot be applied to make inferences about the direc-
tion of causation between two variables (Rapsomanikis, Hallam and Conforti, 2004). 
Granger (1969) proposed a technique for determining whether one time series is useful in 
forecasting another, widely known as Granger causality test. The simple interpretation of the test for 
the causality between two time series AtP  and 
B
tP is as follows: 
(i) Granger Causality: BtP  is Granger causal to AtP  if and only if the application of an opti-
mal linear prediction function leads to )|()|( 1212 AttBttBt PIPIP −< ++ σσ , where  (.)2σ  is 
the variance of the corresponding forecast error and AtP  be the set of all current and past 
values of AtP   i.e. { },....,....,, 1 AktAtAtAt PPPP −−=  and analogously to BtP , while tI refers as all 
                                                 
27
 The value of α close to one shows the speed with which market returns to its equilibrium, in which short-run adjust-
ments are directed by, and consistent with, the long run equilibrium relationship, allowing the relationship between the 
two prices to be consistent with the speed of adjustment. On other hand, if the value of α is close to zero, then we can 
assess the extent to which policies, transaction costs and other distortions delay full adjustment to the long run equilib-
rium (see, Rapsomanikis, Hallam and Conforti, 2004). 
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information available at time t which is normally considered only the current and lagged 
values of the two time series AtP and
B
tP  (i.e. ,....),....,,,....,,....,,( 11 BktBtBtAktAtAtt PPPPPPI −−−−=     
The interpretation is that future values of BtP  can be predicted better with a smaller fore-
cast error variance, if current and past values of AtP  are used.                                                                                                
(ii) Instantaneous Granger Causality: BtP is instantaneously Granger causal to AtP iff the ap-
plication of an optimal linear prediction function leads to )|(),|( 12112 tBtAttBt IPPIP +++ < σσ , 
implying that the future value of Bt
B
t PP 1, + can be interpreted better with a smaller forecast 
variance, if the future value of At
A
t PP 1, + is used in addition to the current and past values 
of AtP . 
(iii)  Feedback: there exists feedback between BtP  and AtP , if BtP is causal to AtP  and AtP  is 
causal to AtP . For this, there needs to have some additional information and assump-
tions. For instance, AtP and 
B
tP are independent, with or without instantaneous causality 
(both), feedback with or without instantaneous causality.  
Granger causality is normally tested in the context of Vector Autoregression (VAR) frame-
work (details about VAR with Granger causality are given in the next section). In other words, 
VAR models provide a natural framework to test the Granger causality. A variable BtP  Granger-
causes AtP , if 
B
tP  can be better predicted using the histories of both 
A
tP and
B
tP  than it can using the 
history of AtP . The idea of Granger causality has several components which are as follows: 
• temporality: it deals with only past values of BtP  can “cause” 
A
tP ; 
• strong exogeneity: a necessary condition for BtP  to be exogenous of 
A
tP  is that 
B
tP  fails to 
Granger-cause AtP  (see, Handry and Richard, 1983); and 
• independence: variables BtP  and 
A
tP  are only independent if both fail to Granger-cause the 
other. 
VAR models are generally estimated after conducting various tests on statistical properties 
of time series data. The procedures to determine the order to integration are augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP). The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) is based on the follow-
ing regression: ( tBtBtBtBtBt PPlagsPPP ωδλ +−++=− −−− )( 111 , where BtP is the series under considera-
tion. According to this procedure, a negative and significant value of δ indicates that BtP is I (0). 
Likewise, PP test is also similar to ADF, but their difference lies on the treatment of any nuisance 
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serial correlation aside from that generated by the hypothesized unit root. Both ADF and PP the null  
H0: BtP is not I (0) against  H1: BtP is I (0) to identify the presence of one unit root. Finally, the test 
of trend stationary is often done by including time as an explanatory variable in the model (see, 
Baffes and Gardner, 2003; Stock and Watson, 2007). 
Though there are some controversies about Granger-causality because of its focus on the 
causation over time rather than instantaneous causality (Pagan, 1989), Granger causality provides 
some indications as to whether, and in which direction, price transmission is taking place between 
two price series.   
Granger (1988) further developed a test for long run Granger causality within the frame-
work of the error correction representation of a cointegrated system of variables. The presence and 
direction of Granger causality in the long-run can be assessed by testing the null hypothesis that the 
error correction coefficients in the VECM (4.4) are equal to zero and this test can also show the 
weak exogeneity in the econometric sense. For examples, if 0,1 21 ≠= αα , then 
B
tP Granger-causes 
A
tP  in the long-run, if 0,0 12 ≠= αα , then 
A
tP Granger-causes 
B
tP in the long-run, and if 
0,0 21 ≠≠ αα , both series Granger-cause each other in the long run, which is often called as bidi-
rectional causality. Some noted studies on Granger causality tests are Uri et al. (1993), Alexander 
and Wyeth (1994), and Mendoza and Rosegrant (1995). 
Traditionally, Granger causality tests within an error correction representation is based on 
linear regression modelling of stochastic process that allows reciprocal relationship between rises 
and falls of prices. However, recent literature examining whether prices rise faster than prices fall 
has distinguished the price dynamics into symmetric and asymmetric processes, revealing that the 
price transmission may differ in the case of increasing or decreasing prices (i.e asymmetric price 
transmission). In the economic literature, such asymmetric price transmission may occur due to 
presence of imperfect competition and monopoly markets which often assume that price should re-
spond symmetrically to increase and decrease of costs. There is also a convention that asymmetric 
price transmission points out the gaps in the economic theory and is also important for welfare and 
thereby policy implications (von Cramon-Taubadel and Meyer, 2004). It is more simple to measure 
the economic welfare under symmetry, because asymmetric price transmission alters the timing 
and/or the size of the welfare changes associated with price changes. It is therefore a suspicion that 
linear (or symmetric) form of cointegration and Granger causality tests might overlook a significant 
non-linear relationship between two market prices.  Nonlinear dynamics may be more relevant in 
the case of relaxing the components (e.g., exogeneity or independence). To address this issue, 
Granger and Lee (1989) proposed an asymmetric ECM (AECM). This method assumes that the 
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speed of adjustment of the endogenous variable depends on whether the deviation from the long run 
equilibrium is positive or negative.  The single asymmetric ECM is presented as follows: 
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where ( )+
−−
−
B
t
A
t PP 11 β and ( )−−− − BtAt PP 11 β  are the positive and negative changes disequilibria respec-
tively, ,, 11
+αµ and −1α  are the parameters and t is the current period. Long run asymmetry is tested 
by determining whether −+ = 11 αα , assuming that asymmetric transmission occurs, if
−+ ≠ 11 αα . On 
the other hand, the short run asymmetry can be captured by decomposing the first differences into 
price rises and price falls, and testing for equality of the corresponding short run coefficients. In ad-
dition to AECM, there are also other models based on cointegration such as the threshold ECM28. 
 A large body of literature can be found on spatial market integration and price transmission 
in the developing world. Some examples are Sharma (2002), Baffes and Gardner (2003), Conforti 
(2004), Rapsomanikis, Hallam and Conforti (2004), and Imai, Gaiha and Thapa (2008). Likewise, 
studies on commodity price transmission applying econometric applications to test the LOP are Ra-
vallion (1986), Baffes (1991), Mundlak and Larson (1991), Gardner and Brooks (1994), Goletti and 
Babu (1994), Mohanty et al. (1998b), Yang et al.(2000) and Barrett (2001). Moreover, a significant 
number of studies have also analysed the various kinds of risks farmers face and their copping 
strategies (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Fafchamps, 2003; Dehn, Gilbert and Varangis, 2004; Gil-
bert, 2006; Dana and Gilbert, 2008).  Finally, the literature shows that the analysis of price trans-
mission has gradual shifted from the estimation of bivariate correlation coefficients and regression 
between prices to more recent techniques such as cointegration, error correction models by explor-
ing the dynamic relationships between non-stationary time series data of commodity prices (Hallam 
and Sarris, 2006).  
4.2.2 Commodity price fluctuations and household welfare  
 The impact of the world commodity price fluctuations on household welfare has been a 
topic of some interest and also a debate for many years, particularly after the implementation of 
market liberalization economic policies by many developing countries. The research on the com-
modity price volatility, trade liberalization and welfare both at the theoretical and at the analytical 
levels has been increased tremendously during the last couple of decades, where most of the studies 
were initiated after the  shift by many developing countries towards market economy during 1990s. 
                                                 
28
 Threshold autoregressions were initially introduced by Tong (1983). In this method, it is possible to consider an intui-
tively appealing type of ECM in which deviation from the long run equilibrium between two spatial markets will lead to 
a price response in these markets exceed a specific threshold level.   
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In the part, few studies were initiated to analyze the effects of price instability on welfare in a 
closed economy (e.g., Waugh, 1944). Waugh’s seminal paper entitled “Does the consumer benefit 
from price instability?” is often considered as milestone in the literature that laid the groundwork 
for the early theoretical work on price instability. In this paper, Waugh (1944) examined the effect 
of price instability on consumers and concluded that consumers preferred instability to stability in 
the prices. The author assumes that consumers as price takers and under the given price, may prefer 
instability if they can take advantages from instability by gaining more from a price decline than 
loosing from an equal price rise. This theoretical approach is based on the concept of consumers’ 
surplus. Following Waugh’s approach, Oi (1961) analyzed the effects of price instability on pro-
ducers, where the results were in line with Waugh (1944), revealing that producers preferred insta-
bility to stability. The basic idea of this analysis is that producers can adjust instantaneously to price 
changes.  Both Waugh (1944) and Oi (1961) assume that price variations may be caused by random 
variation in demand and supply respectively. 
 Although these studies provide some idea about the analysis of price stabilization, the ques-
tion is that if these results are correct, then why do policy makers need to introduce price stabiliza-
tion policies? Massel (1969) who disagreed with the way of analyzing the effect of instability on 
consumers and on producers separately, felt the need to integrate both consumers and producers to 
analyze the gains from price instability through economic surplus. This approach is now widely 
known as the Waugh-Oi-Massel approach that assumes linear demand and supply schedules, instan-
taneous reaction of supply and demand to changes in the market prices, additive stochastic distur-
bances and price stabilization at the mean of the prices which would have prevailed in an unstabi-
lized market (World Bank, 1977; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). The general idea of Waugh-Oi-
Massel is that society benefits by stabilizing prices of storable commodities through a reserve pol-
icy. 
The Waugh-Oi-Massel model, despite simple to understand, is mostly unsatisfactory within 
the context of stabilizing prices, particularly in agricultural commodities. For instance, additive dis-
turbances imply that bad weather has the same absolute impact on supply regardless of the acreage 
of the crop planted, while a more natural specification would make disturbances proportional to po-
tential yields (Hazell and Scandizzo, 1975). Likewise, the linearity assumption which implies that 
price stabilization is possible at mean that indicates no change in average supply seems to be unsat-
isfactory. Demand and supply schedules are more likely to be non-linear, making price stabilization 
infeasible (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979). The model may no longer be optimal to pursue complete 
price stabilization, if there are positive storage costs. In addition, this analysis is based on the as-
sumption of perfectly competitive markets, but many studies show the results in a closed economy 
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model where imperfectly competitive markets are pervasive. The model also does not incorporate 
farmers’ attitude towards risk. Price stabilization may affect differently farmers depending on their 
attitudes towards risk. It may affect both average incomes and their riskiness, possibly in different 
directions.  
 More recent studies on the effects of commodity price instability in developing countries are 
mostly classified into two major groups. The first type of study concentrates on the behaviour of 
producers confronted by risk at the micro level (e.g., Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Deaton, 1989; 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995; Sarris, 2002; Nicita, 2004; Rap-
somanikis and Sarris, 2005, 2008), while the second type of research focuses on macroeconomic 
perspective, mostly applying Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models29 (e.g., Ravallion and 
Lokshin, 2004; Bourguignon, Lambert and Suwa-Eisenmann, 2004; Taylor et al., 2009).  
 The theoretical approach for the analysis of commodity price stabilization is explained in the 
widely cited book entitled “The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization” of Newbery and Stiglitz 
(1981), in which the authors incorporated a number of issues such as risk and uncertainty, market 
imperfections, nonlinearity and multiplicative disturbances. This approach is further extended by 
Sarris (2002) and Raspomanikis and Sarris (2005 and 2008) giving more focus on the context of 
developing countries, where the theoretical framework is mostly based on the concept of farm 
household model developed by Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986).  Because, in the economic litera-
ture, the farm household model is considered as the building block of analysis to capture the effect 
of any policy on household’s welfare, particularly in the context of farm household’s dual role as 
consumers and as producers of goods. The problem of the household income cycle in the presence 
of risk in mathematical framework is routinely captured in the standard intertemporal stochastic 
models. However, the purpose of this section is to show how domestic and world price shocks af-
fect household income variance, where household welfare is captured by expected indirect utility. 
This specification is made under the assumptions of steady state condition, in which the house-
hold’s portfolio activities and other risk copping strategies are considered stable. 
Let V be the value of expected indirect utility at time t+1, given the information and includ-
ing time t tΩ , ( ){ }ttt IPVE Ω++ /, 11 , where P is a price vector and I is the expenditure of household30. 
The conditioning notation and time subscripts will be omitted in what follows. Because price vari-
ability is considered as conditional and the farmer’s decisions are based on conditional expectations 
                                                 
29
 CGE models that allow simulation and calibration to capture economy-wide impacts on markets, are widely applied 
techniques both at macro and micro (e.g., village economy CGE) levels. CGE models can be static and dynamic equi-
librium. However, this study does not cover about CGE model which is beyond the analytical framework of this study. 
This part concentrates more on micro impact of world price fluctuations. 
30
 The use of expected indirect utility is more convenient in the context of attitude towards income variability at fixed 
prices and attitude towards price variability at fixed incomes (for details see Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981, pages 116 and 
129-130). 
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of prices and production in the period ahead, this allows to utilize conditional distributions to meas-
uring welfare. 
Using the procedure developed by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) and further elaborated by 
Rapsomanikis and Sarris (2005 and 2008), the expected values of random variables, P and I under 
the second order approximation of V can be written as follows. 
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where a bar above a random variable denotes the conditional mean or expected value. The two first 
order terms after the constant on the right hand side of equation (4.6) disappear after taking ex-
pected values, while the term in the bracket containing the variances of prices and income, as well 
as the covariance between prices and expenditure, remains. 
 Let
iP
V , IV , ji PPV , iIPV , IIV be the first and second order derivatives of indirect utility with re-
spect to prices and expenditure which can be expressed as follows: 
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where iβ  is the household’s budget share for good i and ijε are the cross-price elasticities of demand 
for product i with respect to the price of product j. The elasticity of demand becomes own price 
elasticity in case when i = j (
ji
ij
ij Pq
qP
∂
∂
=ε ), and iη denotes as the expenditure elasticity of demand for 
product i. ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and a positive scalar in (4.9). If the household 
is assumed to be risk averse,  then IIV  will be negative. 
 If the formulas displayed in (4.7) to (4.9) apply in (4.6) by normalizing the welfare, and di-
viding both by mean expenditure and by the marginal utility of expenditure, the equation for the 
welfare of the household from its exposure to risk which is considered as a share of average expen-
diture can be presented as follows:  
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in this expression, the terms Cov and CV denote the covariance and the coefficient of variation re-
spectively. All terms in the above expression are unit-free, and all variances and covariances are 
conditional on information as of time t. It is not possible to infer the direction of a mean preserving 
change in the distribution of the random variables facing households a priori from equation (4.10). 
This impact will depend on household demand and risk parameters, as well as the variance and co-
variance of prices and income.  
Equation (4.10) reveals that the household welfare depends on both demand and risk charac-
teristics. As the main purpose of the study is to calculate the coefficients of variation of expenditure, 
equation (4.10) assumes that an increase in the CV of expenditure will reduce the household wel-
fare, and also reduce the proportional to the coefficient of relative risk aversion, if prices of the dif-
ferent expenditure categories are not strongly correlated with each other. According to Newbery and 
Stiglitz (1981), this approximation also holds under a number of restrictive conditions.  
The welfare measures in the presence of risk depend on the signs of square brackets in equa-
tion (4.10). The first square bracketed term reflects the direct effect of price variability on expected 
utility, in which the welfare effect is determined by the extent of curvature of indirect utility func-
tion that further depends on the sign of expression ( )jjiji ηρβεβ −+ . The second square bracket re-
flects the covariance between two commodity prices i and j by the product of their expected values. 
Likewise, the third square bracket reflects the covariation between prices and expenditure, weighted 
by the extent to which price variations influence the marginal utility of income [i.e. from this ex-
pression ( )ii ηρβ − ]. The last square bracket reflects income variability weighted by the extent to 
which households are risk averse. This framework (4.10) is widely considered as pragmatic ap-
proach in order to capture various theoretical and mathematical issues.  
 Existing studies on commodity price fluctuations show that the impact of rises in food prices 
on poverty are likely to be diverse, depending upon the reasons for the price change and on the 
structure of the economy (Ravallion and Lokhsin, 2004; Hertel and Winters, 2006). The differences 
among countries or regions in the world price transmission to domestic markets may be due to a 
number of factors: differences in food commodities that comprise the food price index; tradability 
of a country’s main staple; whether a country is a net importer or net exporter of food; and whether 
a country is landlocked or not (World Bank, 2008a). Moreover, the effects of world price fluctua-
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tions are not clear cut, because a rise in the world price may have opposite effects for producers and 
for consumers. For example, producers may gain from increased world prices, if they are net sellers, 
while lose as consumers when prices fall. However, the impact of price rises may vary depending 
on: (i) the evolution of the costs of production; (ii) cash available to buy the inputs and tools for ad-
ditional cropping; and (iii) the organization of cooperative efforts to store and market products until 
selling is opportune (IFAD, 2009). 
 The number of studies on the impact of world price instability on household welfare in the 
developing world has increased, particularly after the implementation of liberalized market econ-
omy and their main focus is on the issue of the impact of world price fluctuations on household wel-
fare and poverty reduction.  For instance, Leyaro (2009) explores that an increase in commodity 
prices worsens the welfare of most consumers in Tanzania during the 1990s to 2000s. Cudjoe et al. 
(2008) also show similar results, where the world prices pass through Ghanaian commodity prices 
at different levels in different regions. They show that an increase in food prices has a negative ef-
fect on urban poor and north of Ghana. Likewise, Barret and Dorosh (1996) observe negative ef-
fects on welfare from an increase in the mean and variance of rice prices of poor farmers in Mada-
gascar. Fafchamps et al. (2003) reveal that world coffee prices are reflected in domestic prices  paid 
by exporters and larger traders in Uganda and Bussolo et al. (2006) also explore the effect of world 
price fluctuations in domestic coffee markets in Uganda. The world coffee prices pass through the 
farm-gate level partially, but their results do not show any substantial change of the rise in world 
coffee prices to the coffee farmers’ income. However, Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) show small 
impacts on mean consumption and inequality in the aggregate with the rural poor are worse off on 
average after trade reform scenarios called de-protecting in Morocco.  Chen and Ravallion (2004) 
examine welfare impacts of changes in goods and factor prices after China’s access to the World 
Trade Organization and show negligible impacts on inequality and poverty in the aggregate but 
their results show diverse impact across household types and regions. Minot and Golleti (2002) 
conducted a study in Vietnam and they found slightly a positive effect on rural income with an in-
crease in rice prices. Another study carried out by Nicita (2004) examined the impact of trade liber-
alization on household welfare in Mexico. The author shows different levels of impact of trade lib-
eralization on domestic prices and labour income across income groups and geographical regions. 
4.2.3 Commodity price volatility in Nepal: present studies and research gaps 
 Nepal initiated a number of economic liberalization programmes during mid-1980s after a 
long period of adopting protectionist economic policies. The country also became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004.  Nepal is one of the South Asian countries which has 
most extensively liberalized trade on both domestic and external fronts with very low tariffs (Pya-
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kuryal, Thapa and Roy, 2005) with trade reforms taking place rapidly, targeting the phasing out of 
all duties and charges other than custom duties by 2010 (Sanogo, 2008). There is therefore a grow-
ing interest among economists and policy makers regarding the impact of economic liberalization 
on agriculture and household welfare in Nepal. There is a major concern at policy level whether ag-
ricultural trade liberalization helps to reduce poverty level in low income countries. In the Nepalese 
context, as the country is land-locked  and surrounded by India in the east, west, and south and it is 
likely that the market access to the world is limited, particularly in agricultural commodities.  
 There are a number of studies on the impact of market liberalization in Nepal, most of which 
were carried out during the last decade. These studies are mostly focused on the macroeconomic 
impact of trade liberalization in Nepal (Sharma, 1994; Upadhaya, 2000; Sapkota, 2000; Cockburn, 
2000; Sharma, Jayasuriya and Oczkowski, 2000; Chapagain, 2002; ANZDEC, 2002; Pyukuryal, 
Thapa and Roy, 2005; Sharma, 2005; Acharya and Cohen, 2008; and Sapkota and Cockburn, 2008).  
However, there are limited studies conducted to analyse the impact of agricultural commodity price 
fluctuations on household welfare at micro level, applying price transmission coefficients in Nepal. 
Pan, Fang and Rejesus (2009) examine the grain output uncertainties on farm income and on calorie 
intake in rural Nepal, using both time series output price data from various districts of Nepal and 
Delhi, India, along with the cross-section data of the Nepal Living Standard Survey. Their results 
show a reduction in crop production income with an increase in output price uncertainty (especially 
rice and wheat) that further decreases the calorie intake of rural households. Karmacharya (2006) 
examines the impact of OECD countries’ agricultural liberalization on household welfare in Nepal, 
applying world price transmission coefficients and shows declining trend in household welfare both 
in the short-run and in the long run. He concludes that declining trend in household welfare is pri-
marily due to Nepal being a food deficit country.   
Karmacharya (2008) further analyses the impact of multilateral trade liberalization on 
household welfare in Nepal. This study first estimated the extent of price transmission from Indian 
prices to markets of agro-ecological regions (e.g., mountain, hills and Terai, the southern plain) of 
Nepal for selected agricultural commodities (e.g., paddy rice/milled rice, maize, wheat) using error 
correction method. In the second step, the author examined the impact of local commodity prices on 
wages in agro-ecological regions applying earning equations and simulated the impact of changes in 
border (i.e. Indian) prices on household welfare by applying indirect utility function taking into ac-
count the second-order effects for consumption (both for the adjustment in the expenditure basket, 
as well as the changes in income of the households) and for production (substitution effects) in the 
third step. 
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This study shows that Indian prices are transmitted differently to agro-ecological regions 
where transmission coefficients are high in the southern region adjacent to Indian border and low in 
mountains. Household welfare for rice seems to decline both in short and long run due to rise in In-
dian rice prices. But for wheat and maize, the author shows improvement in household welfare in 
the long run because of the domination of positive supply side effects over negative demand side 
effects. Poor households were relatively less favourable of welfare change as a result of change in 
world prices of rice and maize but not of wheat. Finally the author obtains a mixed result of the im-
pact of agricultural liberalization, with household welfare largely depending on domestic price 
transmission and the extent of the commodity deficit.  
Despite a comprehensive analysis for the impact of agricultural trade liberalization on 
household welfare, the study does not pay much attention to the impact of Indian border prices in 
adjacent cities of Nepal. The transmission of border prices may vary among Indian and Nepalese 
adjacent cities and the effect of price change on household welfare may be different among the re-
gions of adjacent cities.  The study therefore ignores intra-market characteristics of Nepal, because 
in some regions, Nepalese people often cross Indian border in order to travel from one place to an-
other place in Nepal.  
Recently, Sanogo (2009) has analyzed the spatial integration of rice market in the Far and 
the Mid-Western regions with regional market (i.e. Nepaljung) of Nepal, as well as with Indian bor-
der markets. The author assessed price transmission across different locations within region and the 
role of Indian border cities adjacent to Nepal in the rice supply. A number of quantitative tech-
niques (e.g, correlation, error correction model, regression) were applied to explore the spatial mar-
ket efficiency of rice in Nepal.  
The results reveal a poorly integrated regional rice market, particularly with the main re-
gional market (i.e. Nepalgunj) in the Far-Western and the Mid-Western regions of Nepal, in which 
large price differentials are primarily due to poor road infrastructure within the regions, but where 
Nepalese-Indian border price fluctuations are transmitted both in the short and medium run. The re-
sults from the impact of isolation (through road distance and availability) both on price correlation 
and the price convergence show that high transaction costs can make arbitrage unprofitable for trad-
ers and that markets are isolated primarily due to poor road network and infrastructure. These re-
sults are also supported by the positive relationship between price differentials, road distance and 
transport costs.  
 The study on spatial market integration in one of the remote areas of Nepal is an important 
contribution in the literature to assess the food markets in the region, particularly in food deficit re-
gion of Nepal. However, this study would be better to analyse the market integration of these hilly 
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districts with the region specific market centre. For instance, the main market centre for hilly dis-
tricts located in Far-Western region is Dhangadi, Kailali and these districts have limited trade with 
regional centre of the Mid-Western region (i.e. Nepaljung) and thereby may provide misleading re-
sults for price transmission. Likewise, Jogbani city of India lies in the eastern region of Nepal and 
the trade relation of Jogbani city with the mid-western region of Nepal may be nil. It is worthless to 
include Jogbani in the analysis of spatial market integration. Moreover, the study may give better 
insights, if other food crops such as wheat and maize (staple food of the study areas) include in the 
analysis. 
 There are still only limited studies on the analysis of spatial market integration within the 
country and with the world and neighbouring countries, India in particular. In Nepal, price volatility 
of agricultural commodities has become an important issue in the context of agricultural trade liber-
alization. One of major concerns for this is to understand how the international prices transmit to 
the domestic markets. For this, there needs to be a detailed empirical analysis of agricultural price 
volatility in international and domestic markets.  
4.3 Trade policy regimes and Nepalese agriculture 
 Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world. Approximately 31 percent of people are 
still below poverty line, with the majority of these from rural areas. The agricultural sector accounts 
more than 70 percent of employment and contributes 39.5 percent of total Gross Domestic Product 
(World Bank, 2007).  More than 75 percent of farm households have less than one hectare of farm-
land, and the average farm size is 0.8 hectares (CBS, 2002). The overall Human Development Index 
(0.49) ranks Nepal at 138th among 177 countries in the world. The country is heavily dependent on 
aid, tends to have a persistent trade deficit and is dominated by subsistence smallholder agriculture. 
The major staple food crops are rice, maize, and wheat and the agricultural sector accounts the ma-
jor share of foreign trade. However, the trade deficit of Nepal has increased consistently during the 
last decade partly due to the low productivity in the agricultural sector. This is mainly the result of 
more than a decade of internal political conflict between the government and rebel groups which 
has severely affected the growth rate of both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and hence 
the trade balance. As a result, Nepal has been acutely facing problems of both exchange rate fluc-
tuations and international price volatility. 
 The issue of both domestic and international market integration and trade policies can also 
play a crucial role in reducing price volatility and thereby income instability. It is due to the fact 
that most primary commodity prices are extremely volatile over short term and these prices rise at a 
slower rate than manufactured goods and services (Brown and Gibson, 2006). Because the fluctua-
tions of primary commodity prices in response to changes in demand and supply are larger than 
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those in other prices, they increase the cost to producers of holding stocks or working capital (Page 
and Hewitt, 2001). A standard argument is that by pooling shocks, trade may reduce volatility. 
However, this depends on the volatility between world or regional and local prices and the level of 
infrastructure. For instance, if world price or regional prices are more variable than local prices, 
trade may increase volatility (Gilbert, 2009). Keeping the view of the importance of regional market 
(i.e. India) and the level of infrastructure, this study intends to shed light on how Nepalese markets 
in different regions are exposed to Indian markets of adjacent regions. The analysis of the impact of 
Indian price transmission adjacent to Nepalese markets may give better insights on domestic price 
volatility in the respective region as compared with the single market. 
As in many low income countries, Nepal initiated economic stabilization and structural re-
forms during mid-1980s, giving a greater emphasis on use of the price mechanism and reducing the 
government intervention. Major reforms included an economic stabilization plan for the period 
1985/86-1986/87, Structural Adjustment Programmes during 1987/88-1989/90, and Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) during 1992/93-1994/95. The economic reforms came 
into full operation after the implementation of a liberalized trade policy in 1992 giving greater em-
phasis to the private sector.  
Table 4.1: Trade status of major crops in Nepal (in 1000US$) 
Year 1969-70 1979-80 1989-90 1999-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Rice                   
Import na na 998 844 2145.92 4421.76 8854.31 5321.39 32220.16 
Export 40300 24957 na 6874 naa 145.54 675 na 669 
Maize                   
Import na na 74 2000 13 223 2685 1294 2323 
Export na 633 89 21 23 na na 3 3 
Wheat                   
Import 259 633 89 21 600 1700 2497 3676 535 
Export 9 11400 2065 5277 219 na 38 22 na 
Potatoes                   
Import 161 na 2550 3584 700 1354 5215 4262 3967 
Export 101 90 34 654 Nab na 131 na na 
Mustard oil                 
Import na na 460 126 2135 6736 3950 14010 6900 
Export na 3600 1566 2 85 520 na na na 
Chicken meat                 
Import na na na 5 na 34 34 49 49 
Export na na na 206 na na na na na 
Source: FAOSTAT. a data of rice products since 2001 are taken as aggregate of milled rice, husk rice and paddy rice. b data of mustard oil 
from 2001 are taken as aggregate of both mustard oil and mustard seeds. 
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Agricultural products constitute the major part of foreign trade. In Nepal, trade on agricul-
tural commodities remains sparse in particular because it is difficult to collect accurate data on trade 
with India due to open border. Table 4.1 shows the status of trade in major staple foods such as rice, 
wheat, maize, mustard oil/seed, potatoes and chicken meat. The data show that Nepal was a net ex-
porter of rice before 1980s, but that exports fell slightly from 1968 and that from 1980, the country 
has been a rice net importer. Table 4.1 also shows fluctuations in wheat imports and exports. Like-
wise, maize was largely imported after 1998, with lower levels of exports. Exports of mustard oil 
and seeds have decreased and the imports of chicken and mustard oil have increased during the last 
decade. Finally net imports potatoes have also increased since 1999.  
There have been several policy attempts to meet the food demand of the increasing popula-
tion in Nepal. Liberalization of domestic markets with world markets and implementation of long 
term agricultural plan such as Agriculture Perspective Plan31 are the most recent programmes un-
dertaken by the government. However, Nepal’s trade has faced many constraints such as transit dif-
ficulties due to being a land-locked country and these have particularly affected in food markets. 
Agricultural transformation from a traditional technology to modern and market-oriented technolo-
gies remains a top priority of the government because of the low growth rate and low productivity. 
Despite these efforts, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of the agricultural sector has 
not exceeded 2.3 percent on average during last decade. Due to higher population growth and low 
productivity in agriculture, Nepal has shifted from a food surplus to food deficit country since 
1980s. Since that time, exports of food grains have declined and on the contrary, imports of food 
grains have increased. 
Out of the total trade volume, India is the largest trade partner of Nepal and also the major 
transit providing country for Nepal. India’s share accounts about 70 percent of the total export and 
about 64 percent of the total import. Agricultural and semi-processed goods are the major items to 
trade with India (TPCN 2008). Nepal also depends heavily upon India for most of its essential 
foodgrain supplies such as rice, wheat, oilseeds, and other products like petroleum products, infra-
structure items and agricultural equipment. The country receives foodgrains from countries other 
than India mostly as a grant, most of which are under the food for work program  provided by donor 
countries and agencies (MOCS, 2007). Given the extent of trade with India, Nepal is indirectly in-
fluenced and protected by Indian trade policies (Samartunga, Karunagoda and Thibootuwawa, 
2006). It is therefore plausible to analyze the impact of Indian commodity price fluctuations on 
                                                 
31
 The Agriculture Perspective Plan is a 20 year plan implemented in the fiscal year of 1995/96 with an aim of increas-
ing per capita agricultural growth through technological innovation (APROSC and JMA. 1995). Its strategy was to ac-
celerate the agricultural growth rate sufficiently to obtain strong multiplier effects on growth and employment, in both 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.  
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Nepalese markets rather than that of the world markets, as India is a dominant neighbouring coun-
try. The unique feature of this study is that it also explores the price transmission from different 
market centres adjacent to both countries. It is because, the volume of trade and the level of com-
modity prices in adjacent cities of different regions between India and Nepal may be different, thus 
influencing the Nepali markets in different ways.  
Non-marketed risks that include production risks arising from the unpredictable nature of 
the weather, other natural disasters, and plant diseases across regions can also lead to the uncertain 
performance of crops. Variability in agricultural production systems is one way to measure non-
marketed risk. The variability of yield of major crops in Nepal over the last couples of decades  is 
shown graphically - see Appendix Figure 4.1. An increasing trend is evident with some fluctuations 
in paddy rice. Other crops such as maize and wheat have also shown fluctuations in yield. Wheat 
yield is increasing over time, while that of maize has not exceeded more than 2000 kilograms per 
hectare. On the other hand, cash crops such as potatoes show an increasing trend in yield per hec-
tare with some fluctuations. However, the production of mustard seeds and chicken meat seems 
more stable in terms of yield. Mustard seeds have more fluctuations in yield, while chicken meat 
has constant yield (in carcass weight) with little fluctuations.   
4.4 Analytical framework  
This study investigates the impact of commodity price and production variability on agricul-
tural income instability based on the theoretical idea discussed in the previous section. As price 
volatility is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, particularly to the farm households involving in vari-
ous income-earning activities in agriculture sector, farmers often face both ex ante and ex post risks 
and such risks can also influence income level of farm households. There are various ways to for-
malize these risks into a mathematical framework, depending on the data availability and the pur-
pose of the study.  
As the main purpose of this study is to explore the instability in agricultural income denoted 
by Ya, consider δ  as the share of agricultural income in total income and is is the average share of 
each agricultural product i in income and iq denotes the quantity of product i, which is normalized 
by dividing the amount Q produced in any period by the average value of production, and the nor-
malized price of product i by ip (this is the price P of the product in a period divided by its sample 
average). iP  and iQ  are mean values of the normalized price and quantity produced respectively. 
This calculation is made on the assumption that the quantities produced by the household in period t 
are independent of the prices faced by the household in the same period, and the normalized devia-
tion of total income from its mean is expressed as: 
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where ∆  is a difference operator indentifying the difference between the realization of the variable 
and its expected value normalized by the expected value, for instance, 
( ) ( )[ ]1,1,1, +++ −=∆ tititii PEPEPP  for price and ( ) ( )[ ]1,1,1, +++ −=∆ tititii qEqEqq  for quantity output. 
Given the above equation (4.11), the coefficient of variation in square form can be written 
as: 
(4.12)  [ ]))(()( 22 jjjjiiiiji
ji
qpqpqpqpEssYCV ∆+∆+∆∆∆+∆+∆∆= ∑∑δ ,   
where δ  is the share of agriculture in the total household income, is represents the average share of 
each agricultural product i in the agricultural income, and iq is the quantity of product i  produced 
by the agricultural household. 
(4.13)  [ ]jiijjijijijiji
ji
qqqpqpppqqppEssYCV ∆∆+∆∆+∆∆+∆∆+∆∆∆∆= ∑∑22 )( δ  
the coefficient of variation (CV) of income is simply the square root of (4.13), where the calculation 
of different components can be made as follows. 
 Consider now there exists a trade relationship between Nepal and India of various commodi-
ties. Let ditP and 
I
itP  be the prices of domestic and Indian commodities respectively. According to 
the Law of One Price (LOP), the model assumes that at all point of time with allowing transfer costs 
c, the relationship between the prices presents as follows; 
(4.14)  Iitdit PcP += , 
if the relationship between two prices in (4.14) held, then the markets are supposed to be fully inte-
grated. However, such model represents only a simple radial configuration of markets linking one mar-
ket directly with another market (Ravallion, 1986) and this market situation occurs very rarely in the 
short run, particularly in developing countries such as Nepal because of high transaction costs, which 
often drive a wedge between the prices of one market to the prices of another market, at least in the 
short run. On the other hand, if the probability distribution of two prices found to be independent, then 
one would assume at the conclusion that there is no market integration and no price transmission.  
Empirically, the impact of international price changes to domestic price is expressed in the 
following functional form:  
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(4.15)  ,itIitidit PP µβα ++=  
where ditP  is the monthly/yearly domestic food prices (e.g., rice, maize, wheat, potato, mustard oil 
and chicken) of selected cities of southern part of Nepal and IitP  is the monthly/yearly prices of the 
same commodities in selected Indian cities adjoining to southern part of Nepal, and itµ is an error 
term. Equation (4.15) implies that domestic food prices are determined by Indian  market prices at 
least in the long run.  
  The functional form in logarithms can be written as: 
(4.16)  ,loglog '' itItidt PP µβα ++=         
here, prices are converted in logarithms, then 'β  is interpreted as the elasticity of transmission of 
Indian prices to domestic prices, that is percentage change in domestic prices in response to one unit 
change in Indian prices. However, the interpretation of the parameter ( 'β ), and the extent of the re-
lationship between domestic and Indian prices depend on the application of statistical method for 
estimation rather than the underlying theoretical concept itself (Rapsomanikis, Hallam and Conforti, 
2004). In addition, it is also standard to include trend and seasonal dummy variables.  
 Let iσ be the coefficient of variation of production of the i
th
 crop produced by the house-
hold, and the correlation coefficient between the production of the ith crop and  jth crop produced by 
the household is denoted by ijκ . 
I
iν is the coefficient of variation of Indian price of the product i, and 
ijρ refers to the correlation of coefficients of Indian prices of the ith and  jth products (only in the 
case of both tradable). The coefficient of variation of the random component itu of the domestic 
prices is denoted by iυ for product i , and ijγ is the correlation coefficient between the random com-
ponents itu  of domestic prices of the i
th
 and  jth products.  
Under these notations, terms in equation (4.13) can be calculated as: 
(4.17) jiijjiijIjIiijjijiji qqppE σσκυυγννρββ )()( +=∆∆∆∆  
(4.18)  jiijIjIiijjiji ppE υυγννρββ +=∆∆ )(  
(4.19)  0)( =∆∆ ji qpE  
(4.20)  jiijji qqE σσκ=∆∆ )( . 
 The equation (4.19) assumes that the quantity produced by the household in period t are in-
dependent of the prices faced by the household in the same period, allowing the expected value 
equals to zero. The CV can be calculated or analyzed under different scenarios with transmission 
coefficients.  For instance, putting the transmission coefficient ( β ) equal to zero allows to interpret 
the factor influencing the agricultural income instability only due to domestic shocks such as pro-
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duction, but not due to Indian price shocks. On the other hand, setting β equal to 1 and at the same 
time, setting the variance of domestic error term equal to zero will simulate the situation when the 
domestic prices are equal to Indian prices. The result from this calculation then correspond to the 
case in which the agricultural household is faced only with Indian price variability, which is the 
case of perfect market integration between Nepalese and Indian prices. 
The functional forms (4.15) or (4.16) can be extended to a multivariate case or to a Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model, revealing that both domestic and international prices are stochastic in 
nature. VAR models developed by Sims (1980) have been much used in empirical studies of mac-
roeconomic issues. This may be seen as natural extension of the univariate autoregressive model to 
dynamic multivariate time series and is a n-equation, n-variable linear model in which each variable 
is in turn explained by its own lagged values, plus current and past values of the remaining n-1 vari-
ables.  The model is considered as a coherent and credible approach to data description, forecasting, 
structural, and policy analysis. VAR models can be estimated by Ordinary Least Squares without 
loss of efficiency. 
 A reduced (or standard) form VAR expresses each variable as a linear function of its own 
past values and the past values of all other variables being considered and a serially uncorrelated er-
ror term. VAR models are good at capturing co-movements of multiple time series. In theory, the 
VAR uses all available or relevant past values. The VAR (p) model of order p can be written as fol-
lows32: 
(4.21)  ,....11 tptptt uyAyAvy ++++= −−  
where )',...( 1 kttt yyy =  is a ( 1×k ) random vector, )',...,( 1 kt vvv = is a fixed ( 1×k ) vector of intercept 
terms allowing for the possibility of non-zero mean E(yt), and the Ai are fixed ( kk × ) coefficient 
matrices. Finally, )',...,( 1 kt uuu =  refers to K-dimensional white noise or innovation process, satisfy-
ing E( tu )=0, E( 'ttuu )= Ω , and E( 'stuu )= 0 for .ts ≠  The covariance matrix Ω is assumed to be non-
singular, if not otherwise stated (Lütkepohl, 1993). The Akaike (AIC) or Bayes (BIC) information 
criteria are used to test for the lag length p. 
For empirical estimation, this paper applies bivariate reduced VARs of the form  
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where, sb' are parameters and s'µ are contemporaneously correlated error terms.  
                                                 
32
 For more details, see Lütkepohl (1993). 
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 Equations (4.22)-(4.23) are the basis for estimating, forecasting, and computing mean and 
variances of the prices, conditional on the VAR relationships. The parameters ijb provide a basis for 
the estimation of h-step ahead forecast means and variances of the prices, under the assumption that 
economic agents behave according to the VAR relationships. In addition, these equations (4.22) and 
(4.23) provide the information of relative importance of shocks to the domestic and Indian prices 
and can also be analysed their overall impact on domestic prices.  
VARs can also be considered as means of conducting causality, more specifically Granger 
causality tests, meaning to what extent and direction causality between Indian and domestic prices. 
In causality test, the innovation of the first price, say IitP , is assumed to be independent and the part 
of domestic shock in ditP is due to the volatility of
I
itP , but not necessarily vice versa. The relation-
ship between innovations can be written in the following way: 
(4.24)  itIitdit uu ϑβ += , 
where itϑ refers to shocks or innovations in the domestic price, but not due to the innovations in In-
dian prices – see Rapsomanikis and Sarris (2005)33. The parameter β is the elasticity of the domes-
tic price in the short run with respect to Indian price as in the equations (4.15 or 4.16). This frame-
work is also useful to decompose variation in the system into component that are due to variation in 
the innovations. 
 For the estimation of the coefficient of variation for yield, the paper assumes that yields fol-
low a linear deterministic trend processes, which are given as follows: 
(4.25)  ,itiiit TQ ςξφ ++=  where ), iid(0,~ iςσς it  
where itQ  is yield per hectare of crop i at time t and T is time trend.  The simple autoregressive 
models will apply after unit root tests and then calculated the coefficient of variations and correla-
tion coefficients for yields from the k-step ahead conditional expectation and the corresponding 
forecast error variances. 
 Based on the conceptual framework mentioned above,  the model is implemented in differ-
ent stages, depending on the statistical properties and their process to apply for the particular statis-
tical property in the model. At the first stage, the model first proceeds by various tests on statistical 
properties of time series data34. If both price series are stationary with internationally traded, the 
                                                 
33
 The authors mention that shocks ditµ  and witµ are likely to have correlation. So the variation in the system is not only 
determined by the variance of each of the innovations, but also by the covariance. 
34
 Two standard procedures to determine the order to integration are augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philips-
Perron (PP). The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) is based on the following regression: 
( tttttt xxlagsxxx ωδλ +−++=− −−− )( 111 , where tx is the series under consideration. According to the authors, a 
  
97 
model applies VAR and then tests Granger causality. The model further orders the system and esti-
mates conditional variance and covariances through variance decomposition by doing 12-month 
ahead forecast . If time series data are not stationary, then the model applies AR, depending on 
whether price series data are I (0) or I (1). The model estimates conditional variance and covari-
ances by 12-month ahead forecast.  
 After the calculation of conditional variances and covariances of commodity prices and 
yields, as well as transmission coefficients, these estimates use for calculation of CV of income of 
the agricultural households under the assumptions discussed above. This study also estimates the 
impact of price volatility on agricultural income instability under different scenarios as made by 
Rapsomanikis and Sarris (2005): 
• the estimation of household income variances assuming that households are exposed to both 
domestic and Indian market prices, taking into account the estimated transmission coeffi-
cients of agricultural commodity prices; 
• estimation of household income variances assuming that households are exposed to domes-
tic price volatility only, and 
• estimation of household income variances is also made under the scenario of complete ex-
posure to Indian markets as an assumption of perfect market integration, implying that the 
prices to which farmers are exposed to Indian markets, are measured in foreign currency and 
converted into domestic currency by a fixed exchange rate, thus excluding the variability of 
exchange rate variations. 
4.5 Data and descriptive statistics 
 The data for the analysis of this study comprise monthly prices of Nepalese and adjacent In-
dian markets of various food crops such as rice, wheat, maize, potato, mustard oil and chicken meat. 
Analysis of world price transmission without considering Indian price transmission would be in-
adequate due to Nepal’s de facto economic integration with India. Nepal is a landlocked country 
with poor transport links to the sea, combined with a long open border and preferential trade agree-
ment with India. Moreover, there is also heterogeneity in access to Indian markets from different 
regions and belts of Nepal, in which people often use Indian territory to travel from one place to an-
other place in Nepal. Indian commodity prices of different cities adjacent to Nepalese borders are 
therefore more relevant than world prices in order to analyze price volatility due to a stronger de-
                                                                                                                                                                  
negative and significant value of δ indicates that tx is I (0). Likewise, PP test is also similar to ADF, but their differ-
ence lies on the treatment of any nuisance serial correlation aside from that generated by the hypothesized unit root.  
Detailed information has been given in Chapter 2 (See Baffes and Gardner 2003; Stock and Watson 2007). 
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gree of integration with Indian prices in different administrative regions and ecological belts of Ne-
pal. Prices of these commodities collected from four Indian cities: Bahraich, Gorakhpur, Muzaffar-
pur, and Purnia and four Nepalese cities: Nepalgunj, Bhairahawa, Birgunj, and Biratnagar respec-
tively.  The data extend from the August 2003 to November 2007 providing a total of 58 
observations for each crop35. The analysis of the price data uses both average monthly prices of four 
cities and prices of single city having close links in terms of distance and traditional trade relations 
between Nepal and India. Price transmission coefficients are also estimated for the closest cities of 
two countries, specifically the pairs Bahraich-Nepalgunj, Gorakhpur-Bhairahawa, Muzaffarpur-
Birgunj and Purnia-Biratnagar. The selection criteria for these city pairs were based on geographical 
location as well as traditional trade relation between these cities.  
 Information on the share of agricultural income in the total household income and the share 
of major crops in agricultural income in the household was obtained from the Nepal Living Stan-
dard Survey (NLSS 2003/04). NLSS is the national survey of Nepal conducted by the Central Bu-
reau of Statistics with technical and financial cooperation from the World Bank. The survey is the 
second nationally random cross-section sample of 4,008 households from six explicit strata of the 
population. The sample covers most of the regions including mountain regions (408 households); 
hilly regions (1,968 households); and Terai, the southern plain area (1,632 households). 
Table 4.2:  Average share of income by major crops in different ecological belt (percent) 
Ecological belt Mountain Hill Terai (southern plain) 
 Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Rice 17.90 15.60 13.10 11.30 18.20 17.30 
Maize 12.80 10.10 15.00 5.20 1.80 1.30 
Wheat 4.90 4.30 3.70 2.00 4.40 3.60 
Potato 3.40 3.50 2.11 0.98 0.89 0.69 
Mustard Oil 1.52 1.74 2.07 1.90 2.83 2.15 
Chicken 1.52 1.11 1.96 3.14 2.18 2.49 
Source: NLSS 2004 (calculated by author) 
 The NLSS sample households are divided into poor and non-poor on the basis of the poverty 
index36. The share of various crops such as rice, maize, wheat, potatoes, mustard oil and chicken 
meat in agricultural income are calculated based on the information provided in the sample. Table 
4.2 shows the share of each commodity in the total agricultural income, where rice covers the high-
                                                 
35
 The data sources for Indian prices adjoining to southern border of Nepal were obtained from Nepal Rastra Bank (Na-
tional/Central Bank of Nepal), while price data for domestic markets were obtained from the Agricultural Marketing 
and Information Bulletin, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Government of Nepal.  These price data have been 
deflated utilizing the IMF consumer price index of Nepal, which is equal to the values of year 2000.  
 
36
 Headcount ratio is broadly applied to find the poverty index. Headcount ratio is the proportion of the national popula-
tion whose incomes are below the official threshold set by the national government. Generally, national poverty lines 
are set for households of various compositions to allow for different family size. If the household is below the official 
poverty lines, then the household is defined poor, if above poverty line, then the household is non-poor. This method is 
commonly applied by the World Bank. 
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est share in the agricultural income, followed by wheat and maize. In cash crops, potatoes constitute 
a higher share in agriculture in mountain regions, but not in hills and Terai. The share of mustard oil 
and chicken meat in the total agricultural income is higher in southern region of Nepal in compared 
to mountain region. 
 Nepal is divided into five development administrative regions: Eastern, Central, Western, 
Mid-western and Far-western. Table 4.3 gives the share of various crops in the agricultural income 
by administrative region. Rice occupies the highest share in agriculture income, followed by maize 
and wheat. Potatoes cover higher share in cash crop in total agricultural income, followed by mus-
tard oil. 
Table 4.3: Average share of income by major crops in different administrative regions (per-
cent) 
Administrative region Eastern Central Western Mid-far western 
Rice 17.90 14.60 12.30 13.20 
Maize 5.90 5.50 4.60 4.30 
Wheat 2.40 2.40 2.00 6.80 
Potato 3.24 2.10 2.83 3.03 
Mustard Oil 1.52 1.40 2.94 3.39 
Chicken 1.16 0.89 1.11 1.20 
Source: NLSS 2004 (calculated by author) 
The data for the calculation of the conditional measures on yield variability (given in Table 
4.4) of these commodities were obtained from FAOSTAT. The data for yield and trade cover from 
the year of 1961 to 2007. The yield data are measured in kilogram per hectare for cereal crops and 
carcass weight for chicken, while the amount for trade is measured in US dollar. 
The CVs of crop yield are give in Table 4.4 (see Appendix 4.1), estimating from 12-step 
ahead forecasts37. The CV of yield is found to be higher for rice and maize (0.22) followed by 
wheat (0.21) and potatoes (0.19), while mustard oil appears lowest CV of yield (0.06). 
4.6 Empirical analysis 
 Estimation of agricultural income CV follows a number of steps.   
a) I establish whether or not the time series are stationary by calculating Augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests. A summary of unit root tests are given in Table 4.4 to 4.8 and also in Appendix 
4.2.  The results (i.e. national average price data) show that most of price series are I (1) ex-
cept those for Nepalese maize, potatoes and chicken prices which are I (0). However, few 
city wise price series data are both  I(0) in different cities of different commodity prices, 
such as potatoes for Biratnagar, Nepal- Purnia, India (see, Table 4.5), maize and potatoes for 
                                                 
37
 This paper first carried out the stationary tests and applied simple autoregressive models, and calculated conditional 
means and variances form 12-month ahead forecasts.  
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Birgunj, Nepal-Muzaffarpur, India (see, Table 4.6), and chicken for Bhairahawa, Nepal – 
Gorakhpur, India (see Table 4.7) and for Nepalgunj, Nepal- Bahraich, India (see Table 4.8). 
b) I estimate a VAR for stationary price series of both countries and cities and test Granger 
causality. If Granger causality exists, then I estimate conditional expectation and the corre-
sponding error variances and use the residuals for both Nepalese and Indian border prices to 
run a regression from domestic price to Indian prices to obtain transmission coefficients. 
c) If both price series are not stationary, then I apply AR model, depending on whether price 
series data are I (0) or I (1). 
d) Finally, I conduct 12-step ahead forecasts to obtain variances and covariances to calculate 
the CVs of each commodity depending on their statistical properties. 
The results of VAR or AR estimation and the CVs of agricultural income are discussed in detail. 
 The results of time series analysis for market integration and commodity price and produc-
tion variability are given in  Table 4.4-4.8, in which most price series both at national and adjacent 
city levels are I (1). The price CVs calculated from 12-step ahead forecasts are found to be high in 
potatoes ranged from 0.38 to 0.71 in domestic prices and from 0.24 to 0.65 in Indian prices, indicat-
ing that the variation of potatoes prices seem to be high in domestic markets than in Indian markets. 
The CVs of mustard oil appear to be low ranged from 0.05 to 0.23 in domestic and from 0.06 to 
0.23 in Indian markets. The CVs of main staple food (i.e. rice) prices are ranged from 0.08 to 0.25 
in domestic and from 0.12 to 0.24 in Indian markets, while maize CVs are mainly between 0.15 to 
0.30 in both markets and wheat ranged from 0.10 to 0.20 in both markets. However, the CVs of 
chicken prices are ranged from 0.13 to 0.25 in domestic markets and from 0.16 to 0.40 in Indian 
markets. Finally, the CVs of commodity prices imply that the price variability of both markets 
shows similar characteristics with few exceptions. 
As discussed above, few price series data are I (0), allowing us to apply VAR and then test 
Granger causality38. The Granger causality tests (see Table 4.5-4.8) show that chicken price of 
Gorakhpur market of India Granger causes to Bhairahawa market of Nepal, and potatoes price of 
Purnia market of India also Granger causes to Biratnager market of Nepal. The study also intends to 
test Granger causality between Nepalese commodity prices with the world prices39 with an aim to 
whether Nepalese commodity prices are integrated with the world prices. But none of the price se-
ries of both domestic and world markets are I (0).   
                                                 
38
 In this analysis, Granger causality tests are done only after the estimation of VAR with those price series data which 
have similar statistical properties (i.e. I (0)) but not by using cointegating vector. 
39
 The selected markets for world prices are: rice from Bangkok, Thailand, wheat from United States Gulf, and maize 
from United States of America (source: IMF statistics) and yearly price of Nepalese rice, wheat and maize are collected 
from Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Nepal. This study could not test causality with other crops such as mus-
tard oil, potato, and chicken meat due to data unavailability.  
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Table 4.9 shows the CV of agricultural income which is the main interest of this study. This 
CV of agricultural income is calculated after the computation of all components (4.17-4.20), such as 
price CVs and correlation coefficients of prices for both Nepalese and Indian markets, CVs and cor-
relation coefficients of yield variability, and transmission coefficients of prices40. The CVs of agri-
cultural income presented in Table 4.9 are the conditional CVs. These calculations were undertaken 
under three scenarios:  
(i) actual exposure to Indian markets includes all components from equations (4.17) to 
(4.20) in the analytical framework;  
(ii) no market integration with India (isolation): CVs from domestic price and production 
shocks (i.e., 0=β , no exposure to Indian markets) account yield variability and domes-
tic price shocks (i.e., CVs and correlation coefficients of prices) by putting the variabil-
ity of international prices zero; and  
(iii) full market integration with India: simulated and production shocks (e.g., 1=β , full ex-
posure to Indian markets) measured in foreign currency and converted into domestic ex-
change rate by a fixed exchange rate.  
Since the CVs of agricultural income are estimated on the basis of partial agricultural in-
come that covers about 50 percent share of the total household agricultural income in Nepal 41, the 
conditional CVs of agricultural income may therefore underestimate the actual variability of income 
in this study. However, these CVs will give some indication on how domestic and Indian price 
volatility affects the agricultural income instability because these commodities (rice, wheat, maize, 
potatoes, mustard oil and chicken meat) are the major crops produced by the agricultural house-
holds for their livelihoods. 
Table 4.9: CVs of agricultural income by ecological belt (poor and nonpoor)  
Ecological belt Mountain Hill Terai (southern plain) 
 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
Actual CV’s  6.50 5.92 5.16 3.74 4.23 3.64 
CV’s in isolation (no market 
with India) 6.71 6.11 5.32 3.87 4.37 3.73 
CVs with full market integration 6.61 6.03 6.25 4.81 4.31 3.71 
  
The estimates of agricultural income variability show that the uncertainty the households 
face varies with the variation of production and the level of market integration. The agricultural in-
                                                 
40
 Only significant transmission coefficients and correlation coefficients are included for CV calculation as carried out 
by Sarris (2002).  
41
 NLSS data show more than 100 commodities produced by the agricultural households. So it is difficult to include all 
commodities in this analysis because of insignificant share (<1 percent) in agricultural income and no specific informa-
tion about prices both in domestic and international markets.  
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come CV ranged from 3.64 to 6.71 percent which is relatively small. However, these estimated CVs 
of Nepal are more closer with those CVs estimated in Ghana and Peru by Rapsomanikis and Sarris 
(2005) in terms of the effects by simulation of full exposure to International markets. The lower 
CVs of agricultural income in this study may be due to more integration of Nepalese markets with 
Indian markets. It may also be the fact that the exchange rate42 between Nepalese and Indian rupees 
is relatively low and stable than the exchange rates of Nepalese currency with US dollars, in which 
a small change in US dollars may give higher shocks in domestic markets than with Indian rupees. 
It may also be the fact that Nepalese markets are more integrated with Indian markets adjacent to 
Nepalese border than the world markets, because the CVs are found to be lower in Terai (the south-
ern belt adjacent to Indian borders) than in the mountain belts. 
The results further allow us to examine the view that the uncertainty of the agricultural 
household income slightly increases by the production variability (i.e. domestic shocks), followed 
by full market integration with India. However, differences in agricultural income CVs are smaller 
among different scenarios (e.g., actual, no market integration, and full market integration). But there 
is variation in the agricultural household income CVs among different ecological belts. For in-
stance, agricultural income CV is higher in the upper ecological belt of Nepal. It may be due to the 
geophysical structure of Nepal. For example, the southern part of Nepal is relatively developed in 
terms of infrastructure, agricultural innovation and commercialization than the northern part which 
may lead to the agricultural income being CV less volatile in the southern part. Moreover, Nepal is 
a landlocked country surrounded by Indian in the east, the south and the west and its international 
trade goes mostly through the India port, so domestic markets are obviously more sensitive with In-
dian markets than any other country in the world.   
The results also show that the agricultural household faces slightly higher income variability 
by domestic shocks than the full market integration and actual shocks, perhaps due to high depend-
ency on rainfed agriculture in Nepal. It may be due to the fact that some of the domestic price CVs 
such as maize and potatoes are higher than the CVs of respective Indian commodity prices. CVs 
appear to be relatively higher in poor than nonpoor households. The relatively higher variation of 
agricultural income in poor households seems to be reasonable because they are mostly small farm 
holders and price fluctuations of staple crops such as rice, wheat, maize, mustard oil, and chicken 
meats can have higher impact on their income. A small variation of staple crops seems more acute 
for poor farmers than rich farmers, so that their agricultural income will be more varied by the 
variation of staple crops for subsistence farmers. 
                                                 
42
 The exchange rate between Nepal and India is about 1 Nepalese Rupees= 1.60 Indian Rupees and this exchange rate 
is somehow more stable since a long time, but there is often fluctuation in buying and selling exchange rates. 
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The result of CVs under the scenario of actual markets shows that the present fact is less 
volatile than the isolation and full market integration with India. However, there is less variation be-
tween actual and full market integration. These results are from the average price of four adjacent 
cities bordering to Nepal and India. These results vary in different ecological belts, showing higher 
CVs in mountain belts, followed by hills and Terai. This is perhaps due to the share of these com-
modities in the total income and the geographical heterogeneity in which the transportation costs 
may influence market transaction. In Nepal, some of mountain districts do not link with road net-
works. 
Table 4.10: CVs of agricultural income by administrative region (poor and nonpoor)  
Administrative region* Eastern Central Western Mid-far western 
Actual CV’s  2.39 2.52 2.91 3.22 
CV’s in isolation (no market with 
India) 3.01 2.43 3.09 4.07 
CVs with full market integration 3.35 3.20 1.74 3.03 
 
    
Note: CVs are in percentages. * These CVs are calculated by four adjacent border markets of both countries separately. 
 
The CVs of agricultural income are also estimated on the basis of administrative regions with 
separate prices of adjacent markets of both countries. As discussed above, the analysis consists of 
four market centres for both southern Nepal and northern India. The estimation is done separately 
for each administrative region, but two regions in western Nepal (e.g., mid-western and far-western 
regions) are merged into one centre (e.g., Nepalgunj) because of only one market centre for price 
data available in these two regions. However, the data on yield variability are the same as used in 
ecological belt. Household data from NLSS are separated on the basis of administrative develop-
ment regions, which were done by ecological belts in the first CV estimation of the agricultural in-
come. In the first part of CV estimation, ecological belt divides the country vertically, while admin-
istrative region divides the country horizontally.  
The results of agricultural income CV on the basis of administrative region ranged from 2.52 
to 3.22 for actual, from 2.43 to 4.07 for no market integration, and from 1.74 to 3.35 for full market 
integration with India are found to be different as well as smaller than the CVs calculated in the 
ecological belts. The percentages of CVs are found to be low among all administrative regions. 
However, the impact of different scenarios varies among different regions. For instance, CVs of ag-
ricultural income are found to be high due to domestic shocks in the far-mid western and the west-
ern regions, while higher variability of CVs due to full market integration with India is found to be 
high in the eastern and the central regions of Nepal. These results are perhaps due to the region spe-
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cific characteristics and the volume of trade with Indian markets in different regions. It may be due 
to the share of particular commodity in the specific region. Because the variability of CVs in differ-
ent scenarios in different regions is relatively low. This difference may be due to higher Indian price 
CVs appearing more influential in the respective market of the region. For instance, the higher CVs 
of Indian chicken, maize and potatoes prices of Indian markets may have influential role to increase 
the CVs due to full market integration in the eastern region, while domestic price CVs may be more 
acute in the variability of agricultural income in the far-mid western region of Nepal.  
The CVs are further estimated based on the share of agricultural income in the total household 
income by dividing into three categories (e.g., greater than 65 percent, 30-65 percent, and less than 
30 percent) both by ecological belts and by administrative regions with an aim to explore the impact 
of price volatility on household with different income composition. The results are found to be rela-
tively high variability due to domestic shocks as before. Higher instability in household income is 
found in households having more than 65 percent share of agricultural income which ranged from 
11.22 to 13.08 in ecological belts and 7.60 to 12.93 in administrative regions. The CVs are rela-
tively high in hilly and mountain regions than in Terai, the southern part of Nepal, perhaps due to 
higher share of these commodities in the total income compared to Terai belt. In addition to this, the 
CVs between 30 to 65 percentage shares of agricultural income vary from 6.34 to 9.91 in ecological 
belts and from 6.21 to 7.83 in administrative regions, while the CVs are less than 2 for below 30 
percent agricultural income share households both in ecological belts and in administrative regions. 
The domestic price and production shocks are found to be high in all ecological belts, as well as far-
mid and western regions and full market integration is found to be high in the central and the east-
ern regions. This is perhaps due to open border between Nepal and India, which often reduces in-
stability than restricted trade and closed border (Chapoto and Jayne 2006). 
The overall result indicates that domestic shocks have higher influences in agricultural income 
instability combined with the higher share of agricultural income in the total household income. 
Northern part of Nepal (e.g., mountain and hills) is relatively more affected by the price and pro-
duction variability perhaps due to higher dependency on rainfed agriculture and less market integra-
tion with India because of limited transportation linkages. The simulation result shows that higher 
integration of agricultural markets with India would reduce the income uncertainty of farmers in the 
far-mid western and the western regions, but increase in the central and the eastern regions, widely 
supporting geographical heterogeneity that differs the degree of integration with domestic, as well 
as Indian prices in different ecological belts and administrative regions. 
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4.7 Conclusions  
Commodity price risks and instability are perennial issues that have been received consider-
able attention by many policy makers and economists for decades. An important question is 
whether increased exposure to Indian markets reduces the domestic price volatility and thereby im-
proves the welfare of agricultural households. Evidence on this issue can have a profound impact on 
policy implications to the countries adopting market liberalization policies of the type initiated dur-
ing the 1990’s.  
This paper attempts to examine the impact of price volatility in the agricultural household 
income instability in Nepal, applying a recent analytical framework developed by Rapsomanikis 
and Sarris (2005) that allows both price and yield variations to calculate the agricultural household 
income variance by extending the analysis of market integration with regional partners, as well as 
with the world markets. Indeed, India is the largest trade partner and has a dominant role in Nepal-
ese trade, so that the study on Nepalese market integration with India seems to be more important 
than with the world markets. Moreover, this study further extended this research by looking the im-
pact of market integration on producers’ income instability across different regions of Nepal that are 
adjacent to cities in India separately.  The analysis of market integration between Nepal and India as 
well as across adjacent cities between two countries can provide better insights of market integra-
tion within the region.  
The study calculates the Coefficient of Variation (CV) of agricultural income based on the 
price transmission coefficients by time series price and yield data using VAR and autoregressive 
models (depending on whether the particular commodity is internationally traded) and the share of 
agricultural income in the total household income, as well as the share of major crops in the agricul-
tural income using cross-section data from the Nepal Living Standard Survey 2003/04. This study 
estimates the agricultural income instability under three scenarios: no exposure, actual exposure, 
and full exposure to Indian markets, that allow exploration of the extent of impact of price shocks 
on agricultural income variability in different ecological belts, as well as administrative regions at 
different levels of agricultural production shares in total income of farm households. 
Nepalese agricultural income instability appears to increase with domestic shocks rather 
than full exposure to Indian markets. The extent of these shocks is relatively higher in less devel-
oped regions where geographical heterogeneity is more pervasive. However, the results from VAR 
models, specifically the estimated price transmission coefficients, show that Nepalese commodity 
prices such as chicken and potatoes in the eastern region and chicken in the western region follow 
the prices of the respective region of Indian markets. Agricultural income variability is found to be 
higher in those households which have higher share of agricultural products (more than 65 percent) 
  106 
in the total income, followed by the households sharing 30 to 65 percent of agricultural products in 
total income. On the other hand,  poor households have slightly higher  CVs, but the difference with 
non poor is low perhaps due to low variation of these commodities in the share in the total house-
hold income.  High variation of CVs among ecological belts may be perhaps due to higher share of 
agricultural products in the total household income.  
The estimated CVs of agricultural income ranged from 3.64 to 6.71 percent in ecological 
belts and from 1.74 to 4.07 in administrative regions among the poor and the non-poor households, 
while the CVs vary from 11.22 to 13.08 and from 7.60 to 12.93 among households with higher 
share of agricultural products in total household incomes in the ecological belts and in the adminis-
trative regions respectively. However, the variation of CV declines with the lower share of agricul-
tural products in the total income.  The CVs are found to be relatively high due to domestic shocks, 
followed by full exposure and actual exposure to Indian markets. In general, agricultural income in-
stability is slightly higher in poor than in non-poor households, probably due to the larger share of 
agricultural production in the total household income. 
The results can have significant implications for government in formulating risk coping 
strategies for rural agricultural households in Nepal. Since income instability seems to be influenced 
more by production shocks to the households combined with higher share of agricultural products in 
the total household income, policies should be taken into account on how rural farm households 
cope with such risks. For a country such as Nepal where spatial market integration is a challenging 
task, focus should be on the integration of both domestic and international markets through the re-
duction of trade imbalance and the investment in transportation, irrigation, and other infrastructures 
that can reduce the extent of price and production variability. Higher integration of domestic market 
through investment on infrastructure would further enhance farmers’ access to resources and lead to 
higher integration with regional and world markets, and thereby reduce income instability.  Market 
integration is important to make goods (e.g., foodgrain) available and to keep price stable, because 
well-integrated markets assume that prices of comparable goods do not behave independently. 
Moreover, in well-integrated markets, price changes in one location are consistently related to price 
changes in other locations, in which market agents are able to interact among different markets.  
The study concentrates more on the staple food crops in order to analyse the impact of price 
volatility on agricultural income instability. Further studies would be interesting to analyse income 
instability for cash crops (e.g., tea, tobacco and other high value and cash crops) depending house-
holds. Such studies would help understanding of whether domestic markets follow the world mar-
kets, particularly in context of more commercialization farming.    
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APPENDIX-4.1 
 
Figure 4. 1: Crop yield variability  
 
15
00
20
00
25
00
30
00
R
ice
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
Rice yield
14
00
16
00
18
00
20
00
22
00
M
a
ize
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
Maize yield
 
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
W
he
a
t
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
Wheat yield
40
00
60
00
80
00
10
00
0
12
00
0
14
00
0
Po
ta
to
es
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
Potato yield
40
00
50
00
60
00
70
00
80
00
M
u
st
a
rd
 
se
e
d
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
Mustard  yield
75
00
80
00
85
00
Ch
ic
ke
n
 
m
e
at
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
Chicken meat  yield/carcass weight
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  108 
 
Figure 4.2: Nepalese and Indian price variability 
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Table 4.4: Time series analysis for market integration and commodity price variability of Nepal and India 
  Rice Maize Wheat 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (1)  I (1)  I (0)  I (1)  I (1)  I (1)  
Market integration: causality*  na na na 
Coefficient of variation of domestic prices  0.08 0.20 0.08 
Coefficient of variation of Indian prices  0.12 0.13 0.10 
Coefficient of variation of yields§ 0.22 0.22 0.21 
  Potato Mustard Oil  Chicken 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (0)  I (1)  I (1)  I (1)  I (0)  I (1)  
Market integration: causality*  na na na 
Coefficient of variation of domestic prices 0.61 0.05 0.13 
Coefficient of variation of Indian prices 0.42 0.06 0.23 
Coefficient of variation of yields 0.19 0.18 0.06 
Note: All coefficients of variation of Indian prices are estimated by means of AR models; § coefficients of variation of yields are same for all; na: not applicable; * estimated only from bivariate VAR models 
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Table 4.5: Time series analysis for market integration and commodity price variability of Biratnagar, Nepal-Purnia, India 
  Rice Maize Wheat 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (1)  I (1)  I (0)  I (0)  I (1)  I (1)  
Market integration: causality*  na PI  does not Granger cause Pd na 
Coefficient of variation of domestic (Biratnagar) prices  0.25 0.26 0.12 
Coefficient of variation of Purnia (India)  prices  0.18 0.35 0.13 
  Potato Mustard Oil  Chicken 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (0)  I(0)  I (1)  I (1)  I (0)  I (1)  
Market integration: causality* PI  Granger cause Pd na na 
Coefficient of variation of domestic (Biratnagar)  prices 0.27 0.12 0.26 
Coefficient of variation of Purnia (India) prices 0.54 0.16 0.40 
Note: All coefficients of variation of Indian prices are estimated by means of AR models; § coefficients of variations of yields are same for all; na: not applicable; * estimated only from bivariate VAR models 
 
 
Table 4.6: Time series analysis for market integration and commodity price variability of Birgunj, Nepal-Muzaffarpur, India 
  Rice Maize Wheat 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (1)  I (1)  I (0)  I (0)  I (1)  I (1)  
Market integration: causality*  na PI  does not Granger cause Pd na 
Coefficient of variation of domestic (Birgunj) prices  0.25 0.23 0.15 
Coefficient of variation of Muzaffarpur (India) prices  0.24 0.23 0.14 
  Potato Mustard Oil  Chicken 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (0)  I (0)  I (1)  I (1)  I (0)  I (1)  
Market integration: causality* PI  does not Granger cause Pd na na 
Coefficient of variation of domestic (Birgunj) prices 0.71 0.09 0.17 
Coefficient of variation of Muzaffarpur (India) prices 0.65 0.12 0.35 
Note: All coefficients of variation of Indian prices are estimated by means of AR models; § coefficients of variations of yields are same for all; na: not applicable; * estimated only from bivariate VAR models 
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Table 4.7: Time series analysis for market integration and commodity price variability of Bhairahawa, Nepal-Gorakhpur, India 
  Rice Maize Wheat 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (1)  I (1)  I (0)  I (1)  I (1)  I (1)  
Market integration: causality*  na na na 
Coefficient of variation of domestic (Bhairahawa) prices  0.17 0.18 0.13 
Coefficient of variation of Gorakhpur (India) prices 0.18 0.24 0.20 
  Potato Mustard Oil  Chicken 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (1)  I (1)  I (1)  I (1)  I (0)  I (0)  
Market integration: causality* na na PI  Granger cause Pd 
Coefficient of variation of domestic (Bhairahawa) prices 0.38 0.09 0.25 
Coefficient of variation of Gorakhpur (India) prices 0.50 0.17 0.39 
Note: All coefficients of variation of Indian prices are estimated by means of AR models; § coefficients of variation of yields are same for all; na: not applicable; * estimated only from bivariate VAR models 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8: Time series analysis for market integration and commodity price variability of Nepalgunj, Nepal-Bahraich, India 
  Rice Maize Wheat 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (1)  I (1)  I (1)  I (1)  I (1)  I (1)  
Market integration: causality*  na na na 
Coefficient of variation of domestic(Nepalgunj) prices  0.21 0.17 0.16 
Coefficient of variation of Bahraich (Indian) prices  0.19 0.20 0.12 
  Potato Mustard Oil  Chicken 
  Pd PI Pd PI Pd PI 
Statistical properties I (1)  I (0)  I (1)  I (0)  I (0)  I (0)  
Market integration: causality*  na na PI  does not Granger cause Pd 
Coefficient of variation of domestic(Nepalgunj) prices 0.60 0.12 0.25 
Coefficient of variation of Bahraich (Indian) prices 0.62 0.23 0.16 
Note: All coefficients of variation of Indian prices are estimated by means of AR models; § coefficients of variation of yields are same for all; na: not applicable¸* estimated only from bivariate VAR models 
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Table 4.11: Coefficient Variations (CVs) of agricultural income by ecological belt (in different income composition) 
Ecological belt Mountain Hill Terai (southern plain) 
Share of agriculture in total 
household income  
>65% 30-65% <30% >65% 30-65% <30% >65% 30-65% <30% 
Actual CV’s  12.39 7.04 1.86 12.67 7.58 1.75 11.22 6.21 1.23 
CV’s in isolation (no mar-
ket with India) 12.79 7.27 1.92 13.08 7.83 1.81 11.59 6.41 1.27 
CVs with full market inte-
gration 
12.61 7.17 1.89 12.90 7.71 1.78 11.42 6.32 1.26 
Note: CVs are in percentages 
 
 
Table 12: Coefficient Variations (CVs) of agricultural income by administrative region (in different income composition) 
Administrative region* Eastern Central Western Mid-far western 
Share of agriculture in total 
household income >65% 30-65% <30% >65% 30-65% <30% >65% 30-65% <30% >65% 30-65% <30% 
Actual CV’s  
7.60 4.49 0.94 10.18 5.66 1.22 12.10 7.21 1.22 9.94 5.60 1.44 
CV’s in isolation (no market 
with India) 9.57 5.45 1.18 9.81 5.45 1.17 12.74 7.65 1.69 12.55 7.08 1.47 
CVs with full market inte-
gration 10.66 6.29 1.32 12.93 7.18 1.54 7.18 4.31 0.95 9.37 5.28 1.42 
Note: CVs are in percentages; * these CVs are calculated from  the prices of adjacent cities.  
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APPENDIX-4.2 
 
4.2A: Variance Decomposition 
This section deals with the process of computing variance decomposition which de-
termines how much of the forecast error variance of each of the variable can be explained by 
exogenous shocks to the other variables. 
Let IitP  denotes Indian price and 
d
itp  denotes the domestic price for a commodity i 
collected in an ( )2 1×  vector )',( ditIitit PPP = . Suppose that Vector Autorergression (VAR) of 
order k consists of a system and each price in the system is regressed on a constant term and k 
of its own lagged terms, as well as the lagged terms of the other price43: 
(4.1A)  itkitkititit PAAPAcP ε+++++= −−− ........211  
where c denotes an ( )2 1×  of constants and Aj an ( )2 2×  matrix of autoregressive coefficients 
for j=1,2,...k. itε is an ( )2 1×  vector of random errors, or VAR innovations which are defined 
as the  difference between itP and its linear projection can be written as: 
 ,....),/(ˆ 21 −−−= ititititit PPPEPε  
 and, 
(4.2A) 
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where Σ  is positive definite, in general, this will not be diagonal with the elements of itε ,
I
itε   
and ditε , being contemporaneously correlated. Using lag operator, VAR can expressed as: 
(4.3A)  [ ] ititKk cPLALALAI ε+=++−− )(.....)()( 2212  
If VAR is considered as a vector generalisation of modelling a single time series, say  
it
dP  in term of an autoregression. In a like approach to autoregressions which have moving 
average representation, then VARs can be presented as Vector Moving Average (VMA): 
(4.4A)  ∑
∞
=
−
Φ+=
0j
jitjitP εµ  
                                                 
43
 Methodology, mathematical notations and interpretations are heavily drawn from Rapsomanikis and Sarris 
(2005). 
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where jΦ  denotes a )22( × matrix of moving average coefficients j=1, 2,….., ∞  and these 
can be calculated recursively as: 
(4.5A)  
∑
=
−
Φ=Φ
=Φ
i
j
jjii A
I
1
21
 
From (4.1A) and (4.2A) systems described above, the assumption is that k lags are sufficient 
to show all the dynamic relationships between the elements itP , i.e. 
d
itp  and Pit,  
The system described by (4.1A) and (4.2A) is based on the assumption that k lags are 
sufficient to summarise all the dynamic relationships between the elements itP , that is pit
d
 and 
pit, whereas the VMA (∞) is described by (4.4A), suggesting  that the fundamental innovation 
for itP  is itε . In detail, the matrix sΦ can be described as: 
(4.6A)  s
t
stp Φ=
∂
∂ +
ε
 
with row i and column j of sΦ  reflecting the impact of an one unit increase in the innovation 
of the jth  variable has on the value of the ith variable at time t+s and holds the innovation of 
the ith  variable constant.  
The h-step forecast error can be shown by: 
(4.7A)  ∑∑
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−+
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and the forecast variance can be calculated by: 
(4.8A)  .))(ˆ()|var(
1
0
'2 ∑
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h
j
jjhithitithit PEPEPP  
Under the condition of equation (4.8A), it is possible to estimate forecast variance de-
composition to individual components that relate to the part of the variance which is attrib-
uted to the VAR innovations ditε  and
I
itε . However, if the innovations are contemporaneously 
correlated, then this decomposition is not meaningful. In this case, there needs to be a de-
composition which is based on orthoganalized shocks that can imply ordering of both vari-
ables ditε and
I
itε  that contained in itP . For this, the contemporaneous value of 
d
itp  does not 
have a contemporaneous effects on IitP . 
This type of problem is often achieved by orthogonalisation of the innovation through 
the Cholecki decomposition of the Σmatrix. This system shows that any real symmetric posi-
tive define matrix, there exists a unique lower triangular matrix C along its principal diagonal 
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and a unique diagonal matrix D with positive entries along its principal diagonal which is 
usually an identity matrix. This can be shown as: 
(4.9A)  'CDC=Σ  
Using C, a vector of innovation can be constructed as: 
(4.10A) itit C εµ 1−=  
These innovations are orthogonal since the covariance matrix is diagonal such as: 
(4.11A) DCCE itit =Σ= −−
'11)'( µµ  
Based on this equation, the VMA (∞) representation in equation (4.4A) can be expressed as: 
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based on this interpretation, the forecast variance can be calculated as in the equation (4.8A): 
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where 'jjΘΘ positive definite (for detail see, Rapsomanikis and Sarris, 2005). 
From this expression, the h-step ahead forecast variance for each of element of pit can be 
written as:  
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 The h-step ahead forecast variance of the domestic price pitd that is attributable to 
shocks in the Indian price is given by 
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and the h-step ahead forecast variance of the domestic price pitd that is attributable to shocks 
in the domestic price itself is given by 
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4.2B: Removing trends and system variation 
If the time series data are not stationary, then the process of the h-step ahead forecast 
may depend on the statistical properties of the particular price series. Because, non stationary 
properties may contain different stochastic or deterministic trends. Statistical properties of 
price series data are normally indentified be testing Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phil-
lips and Perron test. If the test results show that the series are stationary [or I(0)], then the 
data generating process for stationary series is assumed to follow an Autoregressive(AR) 
process, as follows: 
(4.1B)  ∑
=
−
++=
n
j
itnitnit PP
1
0 µαα  
where ( )20t iid µµ σ~ ,  
Estimation of AR(1) or AR(2)] may depend on whether data fit for the  particular model. Af-
ter fitting data for AR(1) or AR(2), the conditional variance of the process for j steps ahead is 
calculated as follows:   
(4.2B)        )...1()( )1(216141210 −+ +++++= jjtPVar ααααα  
For the conditional mean, the process of j steps ahead is calculated by forward itera-
tion and given by the value of the forecasts function of the AR(1) process is followed by: 
(4.3B)  tjjjtt yPE 1112110 )...1()( ααααα ++++++= −+ , 
on the other hand, if the price series is non stationary and unit root, then the data generation 
process is assumed to follow a random walk with a drift, as follows: 
(4.4B)  ttt PP ηα ++= −10  
where ( )20t iid ηη σ~ , . 
For this, the conditional variance of the process for j steps ahead is calculated by: 
(4.5B)  ( ) 2t t jVar p j ησ+ = ,         
while in the case of the conditional mean, the random walk process for j steps ahead is calcu-
lated by forward iteration, as follows: 
(4.6B)  ( ) 0t t j tE p y jα+ = +          
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Estimation of Autoregressive models both Nepalese and Indian commodity 
prices: 
 
Lprice_ind: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2    -0.5958       0.97189  0.04685     -1.381  0.1741    -6.044 
  1     -1.134       0.94931  0.04731      1.748  0.0872    -6.043  0.1741 
  0    -0.7079       0.96868  0.04833                       -6.019  0.0925 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling DLprice_ind by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 3 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLprice_ind_1        0.212023     0.1430     1.48   0.145   0.0438 
Constant           0.00387947   0.006791    0.571   0.570   0.0068 
 
sigma               0.0475694  RSS               0.108616919 
R^2                 0.0438178  F(1,48) =         2.2 [0.145] 
log-likelihood        82.3519  DW                       1.86 
no. of observations        50  no. of parameters           2 
mean(DLprice_ind)     0.005254  var(DLprice_ind)   0.00227189 
 
12-step forecasts for DLprice_ind (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53   -0.00634234    0.04757 
        54    0.00253475    0.04863 
        55    0.00441690    0.04867 
        56    0.00481596    0.04868 
        57    0.00490057    0.04868 
        58    0.00491851    0.04868 
        59    0.00492231    0.04868 
        60    0.00492312    0.04868 
        61    0.00492329    0.04868 
        62    0.00492332    0.04868 
        63    0.00492333    0.04868 
        64    0.00492333    0.04868 
 
Lmaize_ind: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -2.129       0.81856  0.05318    0.05618  0.9554    -5.790 
  1     -2.275       0.82023  0.05261      1.313  0.1956    -5.831  0.9554 
  0     -1.982       0.84786  0.05301                       -5.835  0.4362 
 
EQ( 4) Modelling DLmaize_ind by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLmaize_ind_1        0.102016     0.1450    0.704   0.485   0.0104 
Constant           0.00272143   0.007857    0.346   0.731   0.0025 
 
sigma               0.0548919  RSS               0.141616833 
R^2                 0.0104214  F(1,47) =       0.495 [0.485] 
log-likelihood          73.71  DW                       1.96 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           2 
mean(DLmaize_ind)   0.00307164  var(DLmaize_ind)   0.00292058 
 
12-step forecasts for DLmaize_ind (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53    0.00271440    0.05489 
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        54    0.00299834    0.05518 
        55    0.00302731    0.05518 
        56    0.00303027    0.05518 
        57    0.00303057    0.05518 
        58    0.00303060    0.05518 
        59    0.00303060    0.05518 
        60    0.00303060    0.05518 
        61    0.00303060    0.05518 
        62    0.00303060    0.05518 
        63    0.00303060    0.05518 
        64    0.00303060    0.05518 
 
Lwheat_ind: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -1.877       0.87774  0.03944     0.3739  0.7103    -6.388 
  1     -1.864       0.88451  0.03907      1.835  0.0729    -6.425  0.7103 
  0     -1.469       0.90891  0.04005                       -6.395  0.1902 
 
EQ( 2) Modelling DLwheat_ind by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLwheat_ind_1        0.210073     0.1482     1.42   0.163   0.0419 
DLwheat_ind_2      -0.0222504     0.1483   -0.150   0.881   0.0005 
Constant           0.00334408   0.005820    0.575   0.568   0.0071 
 
sigma               0.0405127  RSS              0.0754987054 
R^2                 0.0422971  F(2,46) =       1.016 [0.370] 
log-likelihood        89.1208  DW                          2 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           3 
mean(DLwheat_ind)   0.00394589  var(DLwheat_ind)   0.00160884 
 
12-step forecasts for DLwheat_ind (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53     0.0100086    0.04051 
        54    0.00475528    0.04140 
        55    0.00412034    0.04141 
        56    0.00410384    0.04141 
        57    0.00411450    0.04141 
        58    0.00411711    0.04141 
        59    0.00411742    0.04141 
        60    0.00411743    0.04141 
        61    0.00411742    0.04141 
        62    0.00411742    0.04141 
        63    0.00411742    0.04141 
        64    0.00411742    0.04141 
 
Lpotat_ind: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -3.248*      0.67292   0.1449    -0.1686  0.8668    -3.785 
  1     -3.941**     0.66412   0.1434      4.027  0.0002    -3.825  0.8668 
  0     -2.360       0.78293   0.1650                       -3.564  0.0011 
 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling Lpotat_ind by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                 Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
Lpotat_ind_1          1.17911     0.1268     9.30   0.000   0.6528 
Lpotat_ind_2        -0.514989     0.1279    -4.03   0.000   0.2606 
Constant             0.712108     0.1805     3.94   0.000   0.2527 
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sigma                0.143376  RSS               0.945608605 
R^2                  0.709064  F(2,46) =     56.06 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        27.1918  DW                       1.96 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           3 
mean(Lpotat_ind)      2.11894  var(Lpotat_ind)     0.0663312 
 
EQ(2) Modelling DLpotat_ind by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLpotat_ind_1        0.435334     0.1417     3.07   0.004   0.1703 
DLpotat_ind_2       -0.278838     0.1416    -1.97   0.055   0.0778 
Constant           0.00668036    0.02281    0.293   0.771   0.0019 
 
sigma                0.159249  RSS                1.16657481 
R^2                  0.184486  F(2,46) =     5.203 [0.009]** 
log-likelihood        22.0468  DW                       2.09 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           3 
mean(DLpotat_ind)   0.00868351  var(DLpotat_ind)    0.0291934 
 
12-step forecasts for DLpotat_ind (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53    -0.0212166     0.1592 
        54     0.0106669     0.1737 
        55     0.0172400     0.1743 
        56     0.0112112     0.1761 
        57    0.00675381     0.1763 
        58    0.00649442     0.1763 
        59    0.00762439     0.1764 
        60    0.00818863     0.1764 
        61    0.00811918     0.1764 
        62    0.00793162     0.1764 
        63    0.00786933     0.1764 
        64    0.00789451     0.1764 
 
 
Lchicken_in: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -1.846       0.81536  0.08844     -1.575  0.1223    -4.773 
  1     -2.611       0.75495  0.08985      1.387  0.1721    -4.760  0.1223 
  0     -2.255       0.79860  0.09073                       -4.760  0.1190 
 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling DLchicken_in by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLchicken_in_1      0.0997690     0.1388    0.719   0.476   0.0111 
DLchicken_in_2      -0.334202     0.1387    -2.41   0.020   0.1120 
Constant           0.00511519    0.01298    0.394   0.695   0.0034 
 
sigma               0.0907206  RSS               0.378590077 
R^2                  0.116979  F(2,46) =       3.047 [0.057] 
log-likelihood        49.6185  DW                       2.01 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           3 
mean(DLchicken_in)   0.00435856  var(DLchicken_in)   0.00874988 
 
12-step forecasts for DLchicken_in (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53    0.00531048    0.09072 
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        54    0.00404373    0.09117 
        55    0.00374386    0.09580 
        56    0.00413729    0.09598 
        57    0.00427676    0.09643 
        58    0.00415919    0.09647 
        59    0.00410085    0.09651 
        60    0.00413432    0.09652 
        61    0.00415716    0.09652 
        62    0.00414825    0.09652 
        63    0.00413973    0.09653 
        64    0.00414186    0.09653 
 
Loil_in: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -1.423       0.93398  0.02670    -0.9382  0.3532    -7.168 
  1     -1.520       0.92989  0.02667     0.9275  0.3585    -7.189  0.3532 
  0     -1.430       0.93453  0.02663                       -7.211  0.4263 
 
EQ( 2) Modelling DLoil_in by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 3 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLoil_in_1           0.119710     0.1427    0.839   0.406   0.0144 
Constant          -0.00203979   0.003826   -0.533   0.596   0.0059 
 
sigma               0.0267907  RSS              0.0344516212 
R^2                   0.01444  F(1,48) =      0.7033 [0.406] 
log-likelihood        111.059  DW                       1.95 
no. of observations        50  no. of parameters           2 
mean(DLoil_in)     -0.0024862  var(DLoil_in)     0.000699128 
 
12-step forecasts for DLoil_in (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53    0.00105054    0.02679 
        54   -0.00191403    0.02698 
        55   -0.00226892    0.02698 
        56   -0.00231141    0.02698 
        57   -0.00231649    0.02698 
        58   -0.00231710    0.02698 
        59   -0.00231717    0.02698 
        60   -0.00231718    0.02698 
        61   -0.00231718    0.02698 
        62   -0.00231718    0.02698 
        63   -0.00231718    0.02698 
        64   -0.00231718    0.02698 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  
EQ(11) Modelling Lrice_np by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
Lrice_np_1            1.26322     0.1387     9.11   0.000   0.6433 
Lrice_np_2          -0.363257     0.1395    -2.60   0.012   0.1285 
Constant             0.287935     0.1592     1.81   0.077   0.0664 
 
sigma               0.0292265  RSS              0.0392927601 
R^2                  0.867434  F(2,46) =     150.5 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        105.121  DW                       1.99 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           3 
mean(Lrice_np)        2.86717  var(Lrice_np)      0.00604899 
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EQ(12) Modelling DLrice_np by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLrice_np_1          0.336149     0.1454     2.31   0.025   0.1062 
DLrice_np_2          0.106724     0.1508    0.708   0.483   0.0110 
Constant             0.322894     0.1675     1.93   0.060   0.0763 
Lrice_np_1          -0.112266    0.05846    -1.92   0.061   0.0758 
 
sigma               0.0293865  RSS              0.0388604705 
R^2                  0.163885  F(3,45) =       2.94 [0.043]* 
log-likelihood        105.392  DW                       1.95 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           4 
mean(DLrice_np)    0.00165513  var(DLrice_np)    0.000948518 
 
EQ(13) Modelling DLrice_np by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLrice_np_1          0.303086     0.1485     2.04   0.047   0.0830 
DLrice_np_2         0.0210958     0.1483    0.142   0.887   0.0004 
Constant           0.00130968   0.004323    0.303   0.763   0.0020 
 
sigma               0.0302331  RSS              0.0420457437 
R^2                 0.0953507  F(2,46) =       2.424 [0.100] 
log-likelihood        103.462  DW                       1.93 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           3 
mean(DLrice_np)    0.00165513  var(DLrice_np)    0.000948518 
 
12-step forecasts for DLrice_np (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53    0.00843580    0.03023 
        54    0.00437201    0.03159 
        55    0.00281274    0.03178 
        56    0.00225441    0.03180 
        57    0.00205230    0.03180 
        58    0.00197926    0.03180 
        59    0.00195286    0.03180 
        60    0.00194332    0.03180 
        61    0.00193987    0.03180 
        62    0.00193862    0.03180 
        63    0.00193817    0.03180 
        64    0.00193801    0.03180 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling Lmaize_np by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
Lmaize_np_1          0.986864     0.1485     6.65   0.000   0.4955 
Lmaize_np_2         -0.172644     0.2080   -0.830   0.411   0.0151 
Lmaize_np_3        -0.0845022     0.1503   -0.562   0.577   0.0070 
Constant             0.575714     0.2087     2.76   0.008   0.1447 
 
sigma               0.0537805  RSS               0.130155275 
R^2                  0.669128  F(3,45) =     30.33 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        75.7778  DW                          2 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           4 
mean(Lmaize_np)       2.13031  var(Lmaize_np)     0.00802797 
 
12-step forecasts for Lmaize_np (SE based on error variance only) 
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   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53       2.13390    0.05378 
        54       2.13015    0.07556 
        55       2.12837    0.08698 
        56       2.12805    0.09163 
        57       2.12835    0.09311 
        58       2.12887    0.09343 
        59       2.12934    0.09345 
        60       2.12970    0.09346 
        61       2.12993    0.09347 
        62       2.13005    0.09348 
        63       2.13010    0.09349 
        64       2.13011    0.09349 
 
Lwheat_np: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2    -0.9836       0.96033  0.03249     0.6100  0.5450    -6.776 
  1    -0.8891       0.96505  0.03226      1.039  0.3044    -6.808  0.5450 
  0    -0.7318       0.97158  0.03229                       -6.826  0.4932 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling DLwheat_np by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLwheat_np_1         0.123322     0.1471    0.838   0.406   0.0151 
DLwheat_np_2        0.0632658     0.1473    0.430   0.670   0.0040 
Constant           0.00488304   0.004800     1.02   0.314   0.0220 
 
sigma                0.032475  RSS              0.0485126842 
R^2                 0.0212474  F(2,46) =      0.4993 [0.610] 
log-likelihood        99.9569  DW                       1.96 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           3 
mean(DLwheat_np)    0.0060613  var(DLwheat_np)    0.00101155 
 
12-step forecasts for DLwheat_np (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53    0.00489000    0.03247 
        54    0.00568304    0.03272 
        55    0.00589325    0.03282 
        56    0.00596935    0.03282 
        57    0.00599203    0.03283 
        58    0.00599965    0.03283 
        59    0.00600202    0.03283 
        60    0.00600279    0.03283 
        61    0.00600304    0.03283 
        62    0.00600312    0.03283 
        63    0.00600314    0.03283 
        64    0.00600315    0.03283 
 
Lpotat_np: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -3.531*      0.67148   0.1431     0.4367  0.6644    -3.810 
  1     -4.004**     0.69424   0.1419      4.763  0.0000    -3.847  0.6644 
  0     -2.108       0.81673   0.1715                       -3.486  0.0001 
 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling Lpotat_np by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 3 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
Lpotat_np_1           1.27842     0.1195     10.7   0.000   0.7088 
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Lpotat_np_2         -0.582379     0.1214    -4.80   0.000   0.3287 
Constant             0.706989     0.1758     4.02   0.000   0.2561 
 
sigma                0.140598  RSS               0.929081628 
R^2                  0.767356  F(2,47) =     77.51 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        28.6926  DW                       2.05 
no. of observations        50  no. of parameters           3 
mean(Lpotat_np)       2.32485  var(Lpotat_np)      0.0798714 
 
12-step forecasts for Lpotat_np (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53       2.52458     0.1406 
        54       2.39641     0.2282 
        55       2.30035     0.2719 
        56       2.25219     0.2847 
        57       2.24657     0.2856 
        58       2.26742     0.2864 
        59       2.29736     0.2891 
        60       2.32349     0.2917 
        61       2.33946     0.2929 
        62       2.34465     0.2931 
        63       2.34200     0.2931 
        64       2.33557     0.2932 
 
Loil_np: ADF tests (T=49, Constant; 5%=-2.92 1%=-3.57) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -1.319       0.94224  0.01977    -0.3754  0.7092    -7.769 
  1     -1.380       0.94048  0.01959     0.5039  0.6168    -7.807  0.7092 
  0     -1.337       0.94325  0.01943                       -7.842  0.8235 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling DLoil_np by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 4 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLoil_np_1          0.0523943     0.1476    0.355   0.724   0.0027 
DLoil_np_2         -0.0767700     0.1489   -0.516   0.609   0.0057 
Constant          -0.00259920   0.002894   -0.898   0.374   0.0172 
 
sigma               0.0199289  RSS              0.0182694606 
R^2                0.00800902  F(2,46) =      0.1857 [0.831] 
log-likelihood        123.883  DW                       1.98 
no. of observations        49  no. of parameters           3 
mean(DLoil_np)     -0.0025499  var(DLoil_np)     0.000375856 
 
12-step forecasts for DLoil_np (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53  -0.000169156    0.01993 
        54   -0.00352250    0.01996 
        55   -0.00277078    0.02001 
        56   -0.00247395    0.02001 
        57   -0.00251611    0.02001 
        58   -0.00254111    0.02001 
        59   -0.00253918    0.02001 
        60   -0.00253716    0.02001 
        61   -0.00253720    0.02001 
        62   -0.00253736    0.02001 
        63   -0.00253737    0.02001 
        64   -0.00253735    0.02001 
 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -3.090*      0.59181  0.03919     -1.574  0.1225    -6.400 
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  1     -4.441**     0.48638  0.03982      2.894  0.0058    -6.388  0.1225 
  0     -3.295*      0.62935  0.04283                       -6.261  0.0069 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling Lchicken_np by OLS (using final price.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 3 to 52 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
Lchicken_np_1        0.883910     0.1352     6.54   0.000   0.4762 
Lchicken_np_2       -0.374477     0.1343    -2.79   0.008   0.1419 
Constant              2.25415     0.5222     4.32   0.000   0.2839 
 
sigma               0.0398561  RSS              0.0746598284 
R^2                  0.495701  F(2,47) =      23.1 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood         91.724  DW                       1.82 
no. of observations        50  no. of parameters           3 
mean(Lchicken_np)      4.59486  var(Lchicken_np)   0.00296094 
 
12-step forecasts for Lchicken_np (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
        53       4.62160    0.03986 
        54       4.59801    0.05319 
        55       4.58769    0.05561 
        56       4.58741    0.05562 
        57       4.59102    0.05585 
        58       4.59432    0.05607 
        59       4.59589    0.05612 
        60       4.59603    0.05612 
        61       4.59558    0.05612 
        62       4.59512    0.05613 
        63       4.59489    0.05613 
        64       4.59485    0.05613 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
   
Unit-root tests (using yield.in7) 
The sample is 1964 - 2007 
 
Lrice: ADF tests (T=44, Constant; 5%=-2.93 1%=-3.58) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2    -0.5070       0.95180  0.08801     -1.839  0.0734    -4.774 
  1     -1.053       0.90136  0.09053     -2.976  0.0049    -4.738  0.0734 
  0     -2.094       0.80083  0.09863                       -4.588  0.0040 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling Lrice by OLS (using yield.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 1963 to 2007 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
Lrice_1              0.284610     0.1492     1.91   0.063   0.0815 
Lrice_2              0.279794     0.1468     1.91   0.064   0.0814 
Constant              3.23158      1.158     2.79   0.008   0.1596 
Trend              0.00454395   0.001741     2.61   0.013   0.1424 
 
sigma                0.083877  RSS               0.288449588 
R^2                  0.739611  F(3,41) =     38.82 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        49.7705  DW                       2.12 
no. of observations        45  no. of parameters           4 
mean(Lrice)           7.66668  var(Lrice)           0.024617 
 
12-step forecasts for Lrice (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
      2008       7.89526    0.08388 
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      2009       7.89672    0.08721 
      2010       7.91531    0.09231 
      2011       7.92555    0.09357 
      2012       7.93821    0.09444 
      2013       7.94922    0.09477 
      2014       7.96044    0.09495 
      2015       7.97126    0.09503 
      2016       7.98202    0.09507 
      2017       7.99265    0.09509 
      2018       8.00324    0.09510 
      2019       8.01377    0.09510 
 
Lmaize: ADF tests (T=44, Constant; 5%=-2.93 1%=-3.58) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2    -0.9146       0.90563  0.06953    -0.8437  0.4039    -5.245 
  1     -1.169       0.88370  0.06929     -2.518  0.0158    -5.273  0.4039 
  0     -2.075       0.79501  0.07356                       -5.175  0.0396 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling Lmaize by OLS (using yield.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 1963 to 2007 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
Lmaize_1             0.483502     0.1420     3.41   0.001   0.2205 
Lmaize_2             0.425817     0.1456     2.92   0.006   0.1726 
Constant             0.642243     0.7093    0.906   0.370   0.0196 
Trend              0.00137092  0.0007848     1.75   0.088   0.0693 
 
sigma               0.0668859  RSS               0.183422928 
R^2                  0.692781  F(3,41) =     30.82 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        59.9568  DW                        2.2 
no. of observations        45  no. of parameters           4 
mean(Lmaize)          7.44092  var(Lmaize)         0.0132676 
 
12-step forecasts for Lmaize (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
      2008       7.64924    0.06689 
      2009       7.66336    0.07429 
      2010       7.67322    0.08641 
      2011       7.68537    0.09326 
      2012       7.69681    0.09988 
      2013       7.70889     0.1050 
      2014       7.72097     0.1094 
      2015       7.73333     0.1131 
      2016       7.74582     0.1162 
      2017       7.75849     0.1189 
      2018       7.77130     0.1213 
      2019       7.78427     0.1233 
 
Lwheat: ADF tests (T=44, Constant; 5%=-2.93 1%=-3.58) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     0.8935        1.0600  0.08277     -2.873  0.0065    -4.897 
  1    -0.1200       0.99182  0.08979     -1.268  0.2118    -4.755  0.0065 
  0    -0.5574       0.96379  0.09044                       -4.762  0.0109 
 
EQ( 3) Modelling DLwheat by OLS (using yield.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 1964 to 2007 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLwheat_1           -0.354291     0.1405    -2.52   0.016   0.1371 
DLwheat_2           -0.461358     0.1414    -3.26   0.002   0.2102 
Constant           -0.0307846    0.02705    -1.14   0.262   0.0314 
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Trend              0.00210084  0.0009752     2.15   0.037   0.1040 
 
sigma                0.079128  RSS                0.25044969 
R^2                  0.276354  F(3,40) =     5.092 [0.004]** 
log-likelihood        51.2778  DW                        1.9 
no. of observations        44  no. of parameters           4 
mean(DLwheat)        0.012789  var(DLwheat)       0.00786577 
 
12-step forecasts for DLwheat (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
      2008     0.0694815    0.07913 
      2009     0.0297188    0.08395 
      2010     0.0316724    0.08805 
      2011     0.0514259    0.09085 
      2012     0.0456270    0.09095 
      2013     0.0406689    0.09172 
      2014     0.0472017    0.09174 
      2015     0.0492755    0.09186 
      2016     0.0476276    0.09190 
      2017     0.0493555    0.09191 
      2018     0.0516044    0.09193 
      2019     0.0521113    0.09193 
 
Lpotatoes: ADF tests (T=44, Constant; 5%=-2.93 1%=-3.58) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     0.1682        1.0089  0.08197    -0.9385  0.3536    -4.916 
  1    -0.1181       0.99407  0.08185     0.2322  0.8176    -4.940  0.3536 
  0   -0.04418       0.99793  0.08092                       -4.984  0.6301 
 
EQ(1) Modelling DLpotatoes by OLS (using yield.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 1964 to 2007 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLpotatoes_1       0.00360332     0.1573   0.0229   0.982   0.0000 
DLpotatoes_2        -0.177965     0.1583    -1.12   0.267   0.0306 
Constant          -0.00947574    0.02732   -0.347   0.731   0.0030 
Trend              0.00119621  0.0009861     1.21   0.232   0.0355 
 
sigma               0.0805304  RSS               0.259405915 
R^2                 0.0568806  F(3,40) =      0.8041 [0.499] 
log-likelihood        50.5048  DW                       2.02 
no. of observations        44  no. of parameters           4 
mean(DLpotatoes)    0.0180736  var(DLpotatoes)    0.00625116 
 
12-step forecasts for DLpotatoes (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
      2008     0.0300522    0.08053 
      2009     0.0552305    0.08053 
      2010     0.0451854    0.08180 
      2011     0.0418645    0.08180 
      2012     0.0448365    0.08184 
      2013     0.0466344    0.08184 
      2014     0.0473082    0.08184 
      2015     0.0481868    0.08184 
      2016     0.0492663    0.08184 
      2017     0.0503100    0.08184 
      2018     0.0513179    0.08184 
      2019     0.0523320    0.08184 
 
 
Lchickenmeat: ADF tests (T=43, Constant; 5%=-2.93 1%=-3.59) 
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D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -1.796       0.77802  0.02319    -0.1802  0.8579    -7.440 
  1     -1.960       0.77144  0.02290     -1.517  0.1371    -7.486  0.8579 
  0     -2.718       0.70303  0.02326                       -7.476  0.3306 
 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling DLchickenmeat by OLS (using yield.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 1963 to 2007 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLchickenmeat_1     -0.371734     0.1551    -2.40   0.021   0.1203 
Constant           0.00191374   0.007638    0.251   0.803   0.0015 
Trend           -5.53904e-005  0.0002714   -0.204   0.839   0.0010 
 
sigma               0.0236182  RSS              0.0234283644 
R^2                  0.122069  F(2,42) =        2.92 [0.065] 
log-likelihood        106.258  DW                       1.97 
no. of observations        45  no. of parameters           3 
mean(DLchickenmeat)            0  var(DLchickenmeat)   0.00059302 
 
EQ( 2) Modelling DLchickenmeat by OLS (using yield.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 1964 to 2007 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLchickenmeat_1     -0.416439     0.1680    -2.48   0.017   0.1332 
DLchickenmeat_2     -0.126051     0.1684   -0.749   0.458   0.0138 
Constant           0.00128216   0.008124    0.158   0.875   0.0006 
Trend           -2.78790e-005  0.0002858  -0.0976   0.923   0.0002 
 
sigma                0.024015  RSS              0.0230688462 
R^2                  0.134589  F(3,40) =       2.074 [0.119] 
log-likelihood        103.743  DW                       1.86 
no. of observations        44  no. of parameters           4 
mean(DLchickenmeat) -0.000121832  var(DLchickenmeat)   0.00060583 
 
12-step forecasts for DLchickenmeat (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
      2008     0.0223677    0.02402 
      2009   -0.00205386    0.02601 
      2010   -0.00207594    0.02604 
      2011   0.000983725    0.02605 
      2012  -0.000315535    0.02606 
      2013  -0.000188025    0.02606 
      2014  -0.000105231    0.02606 
      2015  -0.000183661    0.02606 
      2016  -0.000189315    0.02606 
      2017  -0.000204954    0.02606 
      2018  -0.000225607    0.02606 
      2019  -0.000242914    0.02606 
 
 
Lmustardseed: ADF tests (T=44, Constant; 5%=-2.93 1%=-3.58) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2    -0.5318       0.92596  0.07736     -2.437  0.0194    -5.032 
  1     -1.635       0.78183  0.08188     -1.424  0.1621    -4.939  0.0194 
  0     -2.568       0.69323  0.08288                       -4.936  0.0239 
 
 
EQ( 1) Modelling Lmustardseed by OLS (using yield.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 1963 to 2007 
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                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
Lmustardseed_1       0.307181     0.1551     1.98   0.054   0.0873 
Lmustardseed_2      0.0290760     0.1543    0.188   0.851   0.0009 
Constant              5.68129      1.534     3.70   0.001   0.2506 
Trend              0.00421024   0.001265     3.33   0.002   0.2126 
 
sigma               0.0726836  RSS               0.216599214 
R^2                  0.584267  F(3,41) =     19.21 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        56.2161  DW                       2.03 
no. of observations        45  no. of parameters           4 
mean(Lmustardseed)      8.71523  var(Lmustardseed)    0.0115779 
 
EQ( 2) Modelling DLmustardseed by OLS (using yield.in7) 
       The estimation sample is: 1963 to 2007 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
DLmustardseed_1     -0.358468     0.1441    -2.49   0.017   0.1284 
Constant           -0.0103034    0.02687   -0.384   0.703   0.0035 
Trend             0.000689182  0.0009558    0.721   0.475   0.0122 
 
sigma               0.0829953  RSS               0.289304894 
R^2                  0.133316  F(2,42) =       3.23 [0.050]* 
log-likelihood        49.7038  DW                       2.31 
no. of observations        45  no. of parameters           3 
mean(DLmustardseed)   0.00513462  var(DLmustardseed)   0.00741793 
 
12-step forecasts for DLmustardseed (SE based on error variance only) 
   Horizon      Forecast       (SE) 
      2008     0.0428875    0.07630 
      2009     0.0129428    0.08593 
      2010     0.0113178    0.08696 
      2011     0.0265141    0.09033 
      2012     0.0204465    0.09058 
      2013     0.0179430    0.09087 
      2014     0.0230147    0.09113 
      2015     0.0225822    0.09113 
      2016     0.0216451    0.09117 
      2017     0.0234083    0.09119 
      2018     0.0239960    0.09119 
      2019     0.0239962    0.09119 
--------------------------------------------------------------------  
Correlation coefficients of yields (P values are in parentheses and are conditional). 
pwcorr rico mais what patate chikhat mustard, sig 
 
  ricehat   maizhat  whethat potathat chikhat oilhat 
    
ricehat 1.0000  
              
              
maizhat 0.6384   1.0000  
  (0.0000) 
              
Whethat 0.4812   0.6187   1.0000  
  (0.0006) (0.0000) 
              
potathat 0.6057   0.7670   0.6939   1.0000  
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
              
chikhat 0.2960   0.4713   0.2219   0.4455 1.0000  
   (0.0434) (0.0008) (0.1338) 0.0017) 
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oilhat 0.0362   0.1015   0.4847   0.2005 -0.0660 1.0000  
       (0.8090) (0.4973) (0.0006) (0.1765) (0.6593) 
 
 
Conditional correlation coefficients of Nepalese commodity prices (P values are in parenthe-
ses). 
 
pwcorr rice_rnp maz_rnp wheat_rnp  potat_rnp chick_rnp oil_rnp, sig 
 
rice_rnp maz_rnp    whea~rnp  pota~rnp  chick_~p   oil_rnp 
  
rice_rnp    1.0000  
              
              
maz_rnp     0.2656  1.0000  
0.0623 
              
wheat_rnp   0.6674  0.6483   1.0000  
(0.000)  (0.000) 
              
potat_rnp   0.4724 -0.2046   0.0862   1.0000  
(0.0005) (0.1542)  (0.5518) 
              
chick_rnp   -0.1037 -0.3071  -0.0729  -0.1366   1.0000  
(0.4737) (0.0300) (0.6150)  (0.3442) 
              
oil_rnp     -0.6667    -0.3191   -0.6187  -0.3936   0.3499   1.0000  
      (0.000) (0.0239)  (0.000) (0.0047) (0.0127) 
              
 
Conditional correlation coefficients of Indian commodity prices (P values are in parentheses). 
 
pwcorr  rice_rin maz_rin wheat_rin potat_rin chick_rin oil_rin, sig 
 
rice_rin maz_rin  wheat_~n potat_~n chick_~n  oil_rin 
  
rice_rin    1.0000  
              
              
maz_rin    0.5594  1.0000  
(0.000) 
              
wheat_rin   0.5567 0.7759   1.0000  
(0.000) (0.000) 
              
potat_rin    0.4493 -0.0590  -0.0306   1.0000  
 (0.0011) (0.6842)  (0.8327) 
              
chick_rin    0.4040 0.2082  -0.0404   0.1687   1.0000  
(0.0036) (0.0681) (0.7803) (0.2415) 
              
oil_rin    -0.5038  -0.1754  -0.3960  -0.3384  -0.1899   1.0000  
       (0.0002)   (0.2231) (0.0044) (0.0162) (0.1865) 
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Unit root tests of world prices and Nepalese prices (yearly data) 
 
Unit-root tests (using price_data.in7) 
The sample is 1971 - 1999 
 
Lrice_n: ADF tests (T=29, Constant; 5%=-2.97 1%=-3.68) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2    -0.8549       0.91496  0.07953     -3.396  0.0023    -4.936 
  1     -1.276       0.85214  0.09428    -0.7671  0.4499    -4.625  0.0023 
  0     -1.428       0.83792  0.09355                       -4.672  0.0066 
 
Lwheat_n: ADF tests (T=29, Constant; 5%=-2.97 1%=-3.68) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2    -0.9204       0.91326   0.1132     -1.219  0.2343    -4.229 
  1     -1.137       0.89344   0.1143    -0.6451  0.5245    -4.241  0.2343 
  0     -1.313       0.88093   0.1130                       -4.294  0.3986 
 
Lmaize_n: ADF tests (T=29, Constant; 5%=-2.97 1%=-3.68) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2    -0.8951       0.90933  0.08719     -1.905  0.0683    -4.752 
  1     -1.187       0.87577  0.09149     -1.609  0.1197    -4.685  0.0683 
  0     -1.577       0.83515  0.09414                       -4.659  0.0561 
 
Lrice_w: ADF tests (T=29, Constant; 5%=-2.97 1%=-3.68) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -1.880       0.70196   0.2078    -0.8805  0.3870    -3.015 
  1     -2.613       0.63619   0.2069      1.732  0.0950    -3.053  0.3870 
  0     -2.043       0.72678   0.2145                       -3.013  0.1742 
 
Lwheat_w: ADF tests (T=29, Constant; 5%=-2.97 1%=-3.68) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -3.157*      0.39835   0.1705     0.4510  0.6559    -3.411 
  1     -3.469*      0.44280   0.1679      1.891  0.0699    -3.471  0.6559 
  0     -2.805       0.57682   0.1757                       -3.412  0.1806 
 
Lmaize_w: ADF tests (T=29, Constant; 5%=-2.97 1%=-3.68) 
D-lag    t-adf      beta Y_1    sigma   t-DY_lag  t-prob       AIC  F-prob 
  2     -2.347       0.50562   0.1785    0.04994  0.9606    -3.319 
  1     -2.696       0.51064   0.1750      1.066  0.2964    -3.388  0.9606 
  0     -2.479       0.60047   0.1755                       -3.414  0.5853 
 
 
VAR Models and Granger causality tests 
 
var  lpot_brt lpot_purni 
 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample:  2003m9  2007m10                           No. of obs      =        50 
Log likelihood =  42.04557                         AIC             = -1.281823 
FPE            =  .0009527                         HQIC            = -1.136201 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0006377                         SBIC            =  -.899418 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lpot_brt              5     .216671   0.7412   143.2201   0.0000 
lpot_purni            5     .175342   0.6738   103.2802   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
lpot_brt     | 
  131 
    lpot_brt | 
         L1. |    .885604   .1804738     4.91   0.000     .5318819    1.239326 
         L2. |  -.2104381   .1694707    -1.24   0.214    -.5425946    .1217184 
  lpot_purni | 
         L1. |   .5176788    .223237     2.32   0.020     .0801424    .9552152 
         L2. |  -.5256516   .2272512    -2.31   0.021    -.9710557   -.0802475 
       _cons |   .7554861   .2453305     3.08   0.002     .2746472    1.236325 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lpot_purni   | 
    lpot_brt | 
         L1. |   .2925827    .146049     2.00   0.045      .006332    .5788335 
         L2. |  -.0242675   .1371447    -0.18   0.860    -.2930662    .2445312 
  lpot_purni | 
         L1. |   .8031545   .1806552     4.45   0.000     .4490768    1.157232 
         L2. |  -.5949238   .1839037    -3.23   0.001    -.9553685   -.2344791 
       _cons |   1.065431   .1985345     5.37   0.000     .6763109    1.454552 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. vargranger 
 
   Granger causality Wald tests 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |          Equation           Excluded |   chi2     df Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |          lpot_brt         lpot_purni |  7.7286     2    0.021    | 
  |          lpot_brt                ALL |  7.7286     2    0.021    | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |        lpot_purni           lpot_brt |  4.9136     2    0.086    | 
  |        lpot_purni                ALL |  4.9136     2    0.086    | 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+  
 
 
fcast compute potato, step(12) 
 
. irf ctable (potato lpot_brt lpot_purni fevd, ci stderror) (potato lpot_purni lpot_brt fevd, ci stderror), 
step(12) 
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
(1)         (1)         (1)         (1)        (2)         (2)         (2)         (2)     
step     fevd       Lower       Upper        S.E.       fevd       Lower       Upper        S.E.     
--------+-----------------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
0        0           0           0           0          0           0           0           0          
1        .454507     .250637     .658377     .104017    0           0           0           0          
2        .585952     .373224     .79868      .108537    .038917     -.029375    .107209     .034844    
3        .659787     .443608     .875966     .110298    .04164      -.054245    .137526     .048922    
4        .66666      .452157     .881164     .109443    .040281     -.039101    .119663     .040502    
5        .651803     .431649     .871957     .112326    .055383     -.027607    .138373     .042343    
6        .648506     .427438     .869574     .112792    .068612     -.032478    .169703     .051578    
7        .652904     .431242     .874565     .113095    .071351     -.032982    .175684     .053232    
8        .655372     .431615     .879129     .114164    .07068      -.032532    .173893     .05266     
9        .65505      .429923     .880177     .114863    .071161     -.033499    .17582      .053399    
10       .654448     .429351     .879546     .114848    .072207     -.034811    .179226     .054602    
11       .65449      .429623     .879357     .11473     .072707     -.035192    .180607     .055052    
12       .654727     .429687     .879766     .114818    .072735     -.035074    .180545     .055006    
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+  
 
var  lmaz_brj lmaz_mujf 
 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample:  2003m9  2007m10   No. of obs      = 50 
Log likelihood =   142.513  AIC             = -5.30052 
FPE            =  .0000171  HQIC            = -5.154899 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000115  SBIC            = -4.918116 
 
Equation           Parms RMSE R-sq chi2     P>chi2 
    
lmaz_brj              5 .073215 0.5483 60.68858   0.0000 
lmaz_mujf             5 .075674 0.5194 54.03084   0.0000 
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Coef. Std. Err. z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
     
lmaz_brj      
lmaz_brj  
L1.    .8143354 .2024836 4.02 0.000     .4174748 1.211196 
L2.   -.1663968 .2072056 -0.80 0.422    -.5725123 .2397188 
lmaz_mujf  
L1.    .0756055 .1969697 0.38 0.701    -.3104479 .461659 
L2.   -.0722391 .192646 -0.37 0.708    -.4498184 .3053401 
_cons    .7431571 .2188234 3.40 0.001      .314271 1.172043 
     
lmaz_mujf     
lmaz_brj  
L1.    .5204523 .2092849 2.49 0.013     .1102614 .9306432 
L2.   -.2469707 .2141655 -1.15 0.249    -.6667274 .1727861 
lmaz_mujf  
L1.     .411996 .2035858 2.02 0.043     .0129752 .8110168 
L2.   -.0519567 .1991169 -0.26 0.794    -.4422186 .3383053 
_cons    .7172456 .2261736 3.17 0.002     .2739536 1.160538 
 
var  lpot_brj lpot_mujf 
 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample:  2003m9  2007m10                           No. of obs      =        50 
Log likelihood =  32.71775                         AIC             = -.9087101 
FPE            =  .0013835                         HQIC            = -.7630883 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0009262                         SBIC            = -.5263055 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
 
lpot_brj              5     .210373   0.5643    64.7548   0.0000 
lpot_mujf             5     .177603   0.6632   98.44087   0.0000 
 
 
Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
lpot_brj      
lpot_brj  
L1.    .7301616   .1529524     4.77   0.000     .4303803    1.029943 
L2.   -.2631568   .1696237    -1.55   0.121    -.5956132    .0692996 
lpot_mujf  
L1.    .3592998   .1770517     2.03   0.042     .0122848    .7063149 
L2.   -.1681558   .1587433    -1.06   0.289     -.479287    .1429754 
_cons    .8077114   .2515611     3.21   0.001     .3146606    1.300762 
 
lpot_mujf     
lpot_brj  
L1.    .5424633   .1291265     4.20   0.000       .28938    .7955466 
L2.   -.3229974   .1432009    -2.26   0.024     -.603666   -.0423289 
lpot_mujf  
L1.    .5886261   .1494718     3.94   0.000     .2956668    .8815855 
L2.   -.0662017   .1340153    -0.49   0.621     -.328867    .1964635 
_cons    .5662877   .2123746     2.67   0.008     .1500411    .9825342 
 
. vargranger 
Granger causality Wald tests 
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Equation           Excluded    chi2     df Prob > chi2  
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
lpot_brj          lpot_mujf   4.1878     2    0.123     
lpot_brj                ALL   4.1878     2    0.123     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
lpot_mujf           lpot_brj   18.384     2    0.000     
lpot_mujf                ALL   18.384     2    0.000     
+------------------------------------------------------------------+  
  133 
 
var  lchick_sidrt lchick_gorak 
 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample:  2003m9  2007m10                           No. of obs      =        50 
Log likelihood =  103.2431                         AIC             = -3.729725 
FPE            =  .0000824                         HQIC            = -3.584104 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000551                         SBIC            = -3.347321 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
 
lchick_sidrt          5     .061858   0.3940   32.50868   0.0000 
lchick_gorak          5     .142632   0.3026   21.69531   0.0002 
 
 
Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
lchick_sidrt  
lchick_sidrt  
L1.    .4061367   .1501154     2.71   0.007      .111916    .7003574 
L2.   -.0615828   .1351702    -0.46   0.649    -.3265116     .203346 
lchick_gorak  
L1.    .1705375   .0635002     2.69   0.007     .0460794    .2949955 
L2.   -.0182926   .0676767    -0.27   0.787    -.1509365    .1143513 
_cons    2.282347   .5615253     4.06   0.000     1.181778    3.382916 
 
lchick_gorak  
lchick_sidrt  
L1.    .1314815   .3461321     0.38   0.704     -.546925     .809888 
L2.   -.2250651   .3116721    -0.72   0.470    -.8359311    .3858008 
lchick_gorak  
L1.    .5947384   .1464171     4.06   0.000     .3077662    .8817106 
L2.   -.2273582   .1560472    -1.46   0.145    -.5332051    .0784887 
_cons    3.277287   1.294751     2.53   0.011     .7396223    5.814951 
 
 
. vargranger 
 
Granger causality Wald tests 
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Equation           Excluded    chi2     df Prob > chi2  
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
lchick_sidrt       lchick_gorak   7.8075     2    0.020     
lchick_sidrt                ALL   7.8075     2    0.020     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
lchick_gorak       lchick_sidrt   .52542     2    0.769     
lchick_gorak                ALL   .52542     2    0.769     
+------------------------------------------------------------------+  
 
irf ctable (lchick_sidrt lchick_gorak lchick_gorak fevd, ci stderror) 
(lchick_sidrt lchick_sidrt lchick_gorak fevd, ci stderror),
 individual step(12) 
Table 1  
 
+--------------------------------------------------------+ 
(1)         (1)         (1)         (1)     
step     fevd       Lower       Upper        S.E.     
--------+----------------------------------------------- 
0        0           0           0           0          
1        .874619     .702936     1.0463      .087595    
2        .857349     .654264     1.06043     .103617    
3        .859231     .656052     1.06241     .103665    
4        .854386     .65148      1.05729     .103526    
5        .851535     .645514     1.05756     .105115    
6        .851178     .644394     1.05796     .105504    
7        .851198     .644432     1.05796     .105495    
8        .85115      .644334     1.05797     .105521    
9        .851122     .644254     1.05799     .105547    
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10       .851118     .644239     1.058       .105552    
11       .851118     .64424      1.058       .105552    
12       .851117     .644238     1.058       .105552    
+--------------------------------------------------------+ 
95% lower and upper bounds reported 
(1) irfname = lchick_sidrt, impulse = lchick_gorak, and response = lchick_gorak 
 
. var   lchick_npg lchick_bah 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample:  2003m9  2007m10                           No. of obs      =        50 
Log likelihood =  137.8837                         AIC             = -5.115348 
FPE            =  .0000206                         HQIC            = -4.969726 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .0000138                         SBIC            = -4.732944 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
 
lchick_npg            5     .048562   0.3949   32.63668   0.0000 
lchick_bah            5     .085628   0.4032   33.78343   0.0000 
 
 
Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
lchick_npg    
lchick_npg  
L1.    .7039263   .1397543     5.04   0.000     .4300128    .9778397 
L2.   -.2007361   .1384705    -1.45   0.147    -.4721334    .0706611 
lchick_bah  
L1.     .062513   .0805345     0.78   0.438    -.0953317    .2203576 
L2.   -.0240422   .0817865    -0.29   0.769    -.1843409    .1362564 
_cons    2.110853   .5859647     3.60   0.000     .9623835    3.259323 
 
lchick_bah    
lchick_npg  
L1.    .0641319   .2464279     0.26   0.795    -.4188579    .5471217 
L2.   -.0869394   .2441642    -0.36   0.722    -.5654924    .3916136 
lchick_bah  
L1.    .6925058   .1420059     4.88   0.000     .4141794    .9708323 
L2.   -.0989965   .1442136    -0.69   0.492      -.38165    .1836571 
_cons    1.953052   1.033228     1.89   0.059    -.0720368    3.978141 
 
vargranger 
 
Granger causality Wald tests 
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Equation           Excluded    chi2     df Prob > chi2  
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
lchick_npg         lchick_bah   .65118     2    0.722     
lchick_npg                ALL   .65118     2    0.722     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
lchick_bah         lchick_npg   .13107     2    0.937     
lchick_bah                ALL   .13107     2    0.937     
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
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Transmission coefficients: 
 
varbasic chihat chihatg, lags(1/1) step(1) nograph 
 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample: 2003m10  2007m11                           No. of obs      =        50 
Log likelihood =  178.0489                         AIC             = -6.881957 
FPE            =  3.52e-06                         HQIC            = -6.794584 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.77e-06                         SBIC            = -6.652514 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
chihat                3     .039816   0.3186   23.37723   0.0000 
chihatg               3     .086673   0.1113   6.263325   0.0436 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
chihat       | 
      chihat | 
         L1. |   .2405351   .1708062     1.41   0.159    -.0942388    .5753091 
     chihatg | 
         L1. |    .189135   .0906783     2.09   0.037     .0114087    .3668612 
       _cons |    2.58711    .547266     4.73   0.000     1.514489    3.659732 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
chihatg      | 
      chihat | 
         L1. |  -.7117464   .3718196    -1.91   0.056    -1.440499    .0170067 
     chihatg | 
         L1. |    .493581   .1973933     2.50   0.012     .1066973    .8804647 
       _cons |    5.50815   1.191317     4.62   0.000     3.173212    7.843087 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Where chihat is predicted value of chiken price of Bhairahawa, Nepal and chihatg is 
the predicted value of chicken price of Gorakhpur, India.
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CHAPTER 5  
MIGRATION, REMITTANCES AND HOUSEHOLD LABOUR  
ALLOCATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Flows of international remittances have tremendously increased during the last decade ex-
ceeding all spending on development aid (Salimano, 2003). The data show that officially reported 
flows of remittances to developing countries have been approximately 20 percent higher than offi-
cial development assistance (ODA).  In 2005, the total amount of remittances received by all devel-
oping countries was US$ 188 billion-twice the amount of official assistance to developing coun-
tries44. Remittance accounts the second most source of external funding in developing countries, 
following by Foreign Direct Investment (Adams and Page, 2005).  The data further reveal that re-
mittances have been increasing on average by 15 percent annually in developing countries since 
2000.  Therefore, the impact of remittances on receiving countries is of great significance and has 
received considerable attention from many policy makers and development strategists in particular 
with regard to their impact on the economy of developing countries.   
Remittance income is also rapidly growing in Nepal with an increase in the rate of migration 
for foreign employment.  It has now become a major part of the economy and an important source 
of livelihoods for many people living in rural areas (Thieme, 2004).  The trend of migration from 
rural to urban areas and abroad has also intensified during the last decade due to the Maoist insur-
gency beginning from 1996, which cost the lives of over 13,000 people and displace internally more 
than 100 thousand people45.  Massive flows of rural and semi-urban people, escaping the internal 
conflict and seeking better opportunities, left for foreign countries to support their families in the 
home country. According to DLEP (2007), the number of Nepalese people migrating overseas for 
employment increased by 12.5 percent in the fiscal year of 2006/07.  International labour migration 
is a widespread livelihood strategy in many parts of rural Nepal (Thieme and Wyss, 2005).  As a re-
                                                 
44
 This inflow of remittance includes only from formal channels such as banks and international remittance transfer 
agencies (i.e. Western Union Money Transfers and Money gram International).  Remittances through informal chan-
nels could add at least 50 percent to the globally recorded flows (WB 2006).  
45
 Maoist insurgency had begun in February 1996 with an aim to establish communist state in Nepal, and accorded 
peace deal with government in May 2006. 
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sult, international remittances have exceeded the combined shares of tourism, foreign aid and export 
in national income.  An understanding of the impact of remittance on the economy and other mar-
kets will be critical for policy implications in Nepal. 
 It is widely recognized that international remittances can be more stable than other external 
flows, and can play a vital role in the economic development of low income countries.  They are 
also considered as an alternative source of non-farm income that could enhance welfare and reduce 
the poverty level in many low-income countries.  Adams and Page (2005) state that international 
migration and remittance can significantly reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in the 
developing world.  For instance, in Nepal, despite the stagnation in agricultural and industrial sec-
tors during the last decade due to political instability and civil wars, the poverty level has declined 
from 42 percent in 1996 to 31.1 percent in 2004, primarily due to the sharp increase in international 
remittances (CBS, 2004).  In addition, international remittances have also resulted in an improve-
ment in the balance of payments up to US$138.4615 million and foreign currency reserves up to 
US$1.2 billion (World Bank 2005).  At present, Nepal ranks 14th in 2006 among the top 20 remit-
tance recipient countries in terms of the percentage share of Gross Domestic Product (IMF, 2007). 
  Remittance income can affect the receiving country’s economy in many spheres both at the 
macro and micro levels.  At the macro level, the flow of remittances can influence the determination 
of inflation, exchange, and interest rates, as well as the growth rate of the country.  At the micro 
level, an increase in the flow of remittances can contribute to reducing liquidity constraints of the 
household, which often prevail in most developing countries, particularly in rural areas.  Relaxation 
of such liquidity constraints can facilitate the commercialization and modernization of agriculture 
through the adoption of capital intensive technologies and innovation.  It has been suggested in the 
literature that remittance recipient households may increase both the consumption of leisure and in-
vestment in human capital of their children (Acosta, 2006).  In relation to the labour supply deci-
sions of the recipient households, as a source of non-labour income, remittances may ease budget 
constraints, raise reservation wages, and, through an income effect, reduce the employment likeli-
hood and hours worked by remittance receiving individuals46.  However, the existence of incom-
plete labour markets in most developing countries, where there is often presume imperfect substi-
tutability between family and hired labour, may complicate the application of traditional labour 
                                                 
46
 This concept is based on the neo-classical model of labour and leisure choice, and is drawn form the popular book 
(Labour Supply) of Killingworth (1983). 
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economic theory.  Such incomplete labour markets can change the composition of household labour 
supply, because migrants usually come from productive and working age members of the remit-
tance-receiving households.  Consequently, this can create labour shortage in the rural areas, if mi-
gration is affordable to households from all income levels.  In this context, members from remit-
tance-receiving households may increase their work hours to compensate for or satisfy the labour 
requirements given the absent of their migrant members.  For those reasons, the relationship be-
tween remittance income and the work hours of remittance-receiving households is ambiguous in 
labour supply models.  
The effects of remittances on the economy of receiving countries can be both direct and in-
direct.  For example, it can directly promote investment and job creation, and indirectly via its long-
term positive effects on economic growth.  More specifically, resources provided by remittances 
can subsequently support consumption, housing, education, and small business formation (IMF, 
2005b).  Empirical findings on remittances and their impact on receiving households, particularly 
the allocation decisions of household labour would be helpful to get a better understanding of this 
nexus. 
At the same time, there are a number of controversies on the impact of remittances as a flow 
of resources in developing countries.  The literature suggests that as remittance income is mostly 
used for consumption smoothing, an increase in the flow of remittances could lead to a culture of 
dependency and possibly idleness (Kapur, 2003). A 1992 review of the findings of thirty seven 
community studies regarding the impact of remittance income were “remarkably unanimous in con-
demning international migration as a palliative that improves the well-being of particular families, 
but does not lead to sustained economic growth within sending communities” (Duran and Massey, 
1992).  It has also been stated in the literature that labour migration is neither a short cut to devel-
opment nor a panacea for the sending countries’ economic ills (Ghosh, 1996).  However, the impact 
of remittances and labour migration cannot simply be written of an account of a few negative im-
pacts in the receiving country’s economy.  Its impact may depend on how the receiving household 
utilizes the flow of remittances received from labour migration. 
 The study of the migration decision and the impact of remittances on recipient households is 
growing during the recent decade. However, there is still limited number of studies estimating la-
bour allocation decisions of remittance-receiving households (see next section for detail literature 
review). In Nepal, the study of migration and remittances is still in the initial stage and is increasing 
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with an increase in the volume of remittances in the GDP.  However, most studies are descriptive in 
nature (for example: Chhetry, 1999; Sheddon, Adhikari and Gurung, 2000; and Kumar, 2003 etc.), 
where their focus is primarily on socio-economic composition, particularly dealing with the condi-
tion and the process of migration, the flow of remittance income and problems faced by migrant 
workers both in the country of origin and abroad.  Few studies have also analysed the impact of re-
mittance income on poverty reduction (Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovski and Glinskaya, 2007) and the 
effect of male labour migration on the female employment patterns (Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2008).  
There is still a gap in the literature, especially the impact of remittances on labour allocation deci-
sions of receiving households in Nepal.   
This study, thus, intends to fill this gap by examining the effect of remittances on recipient 
households’’ labour allocation in different sectors such as on-farm, off-farm, and self-employment 
activities. This study has many novelties, particularly in the Nepalese context. First, it applies more 
recent theoretical framework which enables to capture the household and region specific character-
istics in the model. Second it uses panel data.  The use of panel data which is not so often in the 
studies of migration and remittances is also a significant contribution, because study using panel 
data can enable to solve the problems of endogeneity and selection bias to some extent and provide 
more robust results.     
The chapter is structured as follows.  The literature review of migration and remittances and 
their impact on household welfare is presented in 5.2.  An overview of migration and remittances in 
Nepal is given in Section 5.3. This mainly focuses on the historical development of migration and 
the status of remittance flows in Nepal.  Section 5.4 provides the theoretical framework dealing 
with the farm household model developed by Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) and further extended 
by de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) under missing and incomplete factor markets. De-
scription and sources of data are provided in Section 5.5 with some descriptive statistics focusing on 
the limitations of data.  Section 5.6 presents the econometric models used for the analysis of data, 
particularly the zero inflated Poisson model and the Tobit model.  Empirical evidences from the 
various equations are given in Section 5.7, while Section 5.8 provides the discussion of results in 
relation to the theory.  Concluding remarks of the study and further studies are given in Section 5.9. 
5.2 Literature on migration and remittances 
 The research on the migration process and the role of remittances has been spurred during 
the past couple of decades due to the massive flow of migration from developing to developed 
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countries, as well as from rural to urban areas. The study on migration and remittances is due to the 
fact that the scale, scope, and complexity of international migration have grown considerably, invit-
ing states and other stakeholders to take greater notice of the challenges and opportunities presented 
by human mobility today (GCIM, 2005). Moreover, migration has become an essential, inevitable 
and potentially beneficial component of the economic and social life for many low-income coun-
tries. It is obviously a matter of concern for policy makers and economists regarding the social and 
economic consequences from migration and remittances both in the country of destination and in 
the country of origin.  
In general, there are various forms of human migration both voluntary (e.g., usually under-
taken in search of better life) and involuntary (e.g., slave trade, trafficking in human beings, and 
ethnic cleansing) migration from one place to another, where labour migration constitutes the major 
part of it. Migrant labour represents roughly 200 million people, which cover about 3 percent of the 
world population (IMO, 2008). In addition, the flow of remittances into developing countries 
amounted to $265 billion in 2007, exceeding more than double the amount of official assistance de-
veloping counties received47. These remittances are considered more stable than volatile capital 
flows as portfolio investment and international bank credit (Solimano, 2003). Remittances to devel-
oping countries have increased on an average by 15 percent annually since 2000. Several studies 
explain that the countries receiving higher amount of remittances have grown more rapidly than the 
average for developing countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the East Asia and Pacific re-
gions (Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, 2007).  Hence, the migration out of rural areas or developing 
world is accelerating, making internal and international migration potentially, one of the most im-
portant development and policy issues of the start of the twenty-first century (Taylor and Martin, 
2001). This section, therefore, attempts to shed light in the literature on the determinants of migra-
tion, the impact of remittances on household economy and the growing literature in agricultural and 
development economics, and examines the theoretical models analysing the effect of migration and 
remittances on household welfare.  
A number of studies on migration have been proposed to explain its extent, to define its 
dominant characteristics, and particularly to evaluate its contribution to the economic development 
(see, Sjaastad, 1962; Arnold and Shah, 1986; Stahl, 1986a; Hugo and Singhanetra-Renard, 1987; 
Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Ghatak, Levine and Wheatley Price, 1996; Taylor, 1999; Taylor and 
Martin, 2001). There is also a shift in the analytical approach for the research on labour migration. 
                                                 
47
 Information on remittance transfer is based on the International Monetary Fund. This amount includes only the mi-
grant transfer series from the IMF Balance of Payments database. 
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For instance, the neoclassical approach concentrates more on differentials in wages and employ-
ment conditions between countries, as well as on migration costs, as the migration decision is an in-
dividual decision of income maximization. On the other hand, the “new economics of labour migra-
tion” assumes that the migration decision is not an individual decision, but rather a collective 
decision of both migrant and non-migrant family members in order to maximize income of the 
households, minimize risk and loosen liquidity constraints created by various inadequacies of mar-
kets, including incomplete or missing factor markets. The different models have different research 
objectives and characteristics; however there are some similarities in dealing with migration deci-
sions and its impact on local economy. The remainder of this section sets out the different economic 
models for labour migration and remittances, the neoclassical approach and the new economic ap-
proach of labour migration in particular.  
5.2.1 The neoclassical approach to labour migration 
Lewis’s (1954) seminal paper on development economics with unlimited supplies of labour 
is often considered as pioneering work in migration related research and analysis, where the author 
presents a structural change model on how labour transfers in a dual economy. This model concen-
trates more on the assumption that many developing countries have a dual economic structure con-
sisting of both traditional agricultural sector and modern industrial sector in which labour is surplus 
in traditional agriculture and this surplus labour can be shifted into modern industrial sector. Migra-
tion from rural to urban or industrialized sector is caused by geographic differences in the supply of 
and demand for labour. It is also a transfer process of the surplus labour from low productivity agri-
culture to a high productivity modern sector, while the source of capital in the industrial sector is 
profits from the low wages paid to an unlimited supply of surplus labour from traditional agricul-
ture. However, Lewis did not suggest an explicit migration model, rather provided a description of a 
technologically advanced, expanding modern industrial sector (Williamson, 1988).  
Ranis and Fei (1961) subsequently formalized and modified the Lewis model in a two-sector 
analysis. Ranis and Fei’s model adds the micro-foundations to the Lewis model, considering the 
case when surplus labour comes to an end and also provides a link back to neoclassical growth the-
ory. The model develops the hypothesis that part of the savings required for growth, as well as ‘sur-
plus labour’, is supplied by agriculture. The model shows that the modern sector can continue to 
pay the transferred workers subsistence wage because of the unlimited supply of labour from tradi-
tional agriculture sector in which the process will continue until the surplus labour in the traditional 
sector is used up. In this situation, the workers in the traditional sector would also be paid in accor-
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dance with their marginal product rather than a subsistence wage. The basic idea of the model is 
that migration leads to an optimal spatial allocation of labour and eventually wage rates will be 
equalized across regional markets. Despite its popularity for some modelling purposes, the model is 
criticized in several ways. Taylor and Martin (2001) explain that the wage driven neoclassical 
analysis of rural out migration has largely been discredited. Todaro (1969) puts the view that the 
urban formal-sector wages are fixed and migration tends to persist and even accelerates in the face 
of high and rising urban employment in the Least Developed Countries. Rosenzweig (1978) also 
documented his view on the model as persistent differences in wage rates for comparable agricul-
tural tasks across geographical areas. Hong (2000) raised the question of silence towards the impli-
cation of a passive role for agriculture such as ignoring the role of agricultural modernization on na-
tional economy and labour markets. 
The Harris and Todaro (HT) model initially proposed by Todaro (1969) and further restated 
by Harris and Todaro (1970) is an alternative neoclassical migration model developed with some 
refinements of Lewis and Ranis-Fei models. This model has become an important element in re-
gional and labour economic analysis of migration flows (Greenwood et al., 1991). The model re-
veals that the perspective migrants’ decision whether or not to move depends on an expected-
income maximization objective. The HT model is the classical framework for analysing migration 
and labour-market equilibrium, where the model comprises a developed urban or industrial sector 
and an undeveloped rural sector and where a migration equilibrium is achieved through unemploy-
ment in the developed urban sector (Ghatak, Levine and Wheatley Price, 1996). The equilibrium 
occurs when the actual wage in the traditional agricultural sector equals the expected wage in the 
modern sector. The major assumptions of the model which is based on neoclassical theory48 are as 
follows (as in Bardhan and Udry, 1999): 
1) There is a competitive rural labour market. 
2) Modern firms can hire labour in urban sector and the wage paid to hired labour is fixed 
above the market-clearing level, either by restrictive union activity or by government policy 
on wages. 
3) Urban residents are eligible to apply for jobs in modern firms and jobs will be allocated on 
lottery basis in case of more applicants than the number of posts required. 
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 Though the model is based on neoclassical assumptions, but in the case of micro sense, the model is slightly depar-
ture from the neoclassical assumption of the existence of full employment situation and wage differentials between 
urban and rural sectors.  However, the HT model assumes individual independence for migration which is based on 
rational behaviour. 
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4) There is also an ‘informal sector’ in which urban residents can use their labour time for sub-
sistence in case of not being employed in formal sector.   
Let uw  and rw be the wages in urban and rural sectors respectively. Let uL be the urban em-
ployment and uu LL = refers the condition of no migration. Let nL be the total urban labour force and 
then nLM .  is the number of equilibrium with migrants, where M is the migration rate. If the number 
of migrants as a proportion of the initial rural population, rL  , then .. run LMLL += The HT two-
sector general equilibrium model is based on the future expected income from migration, which is 
written as49: 
(5.1)  [ ] [ ] CwppwCdtewppw utu −−+=−−+ −∞∫ piδpi δ )1(
1)1(
0
, 
where p is the probability of urban employment and piw denotes urban earnings if unemployed or 
employed in informal sector. C is migration cost, and δ is the discount rate. If the migrant were to 
remain in the rural sector, then future income of the migrant in comparison to (5.1) would be: 
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the migrant’s decision to go urban or modern sector depends on the difference between expected 
benefits from employment prospects  and the migration costs, if  p=1, i.e.  
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then the probability of employment is given by 
(5.4)  
ru
u
n
u
LML
L
L
Lp
.+
== , 
showing that migrants compete with incumbent urban employed population on equal terms. So 
when M rises, p falls and migration can take places until the expected income from migration 
equals the cost of migration, i.e. 
(5.5)  Cwwppw ru δpi =−−+ )1(  
If we substitute p, the migration rate (M) is given by 
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this equation shows that Cww r δpi <−  for M >0, otherwise there is no incentive to migrate from ru-
ral areas for urban unemployment. 
                                                 
49
 The basic idea and procedure for this model are drawn from Ghatak, Levine and Wheatley Price (1996). 
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Comparative analysis of the equation (5.6) gives also the following outcomes: 
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the desire relations reveal that the marginal increase in urban wage or decrease in rural wage will 
increase migration rate. Likewise, an increase in urban employment will also increase migration, 
while an increase in the cost of migration may reduce migration rate.  
 The HT model that remains the most simple and powerful model and explains a number of 
aspects of structural transformation in at least some low income countries (Bardhan and Udry, 
1999), gives some paradoxes. For instance, the policy to increase employment in industrial or urban 
sector will increase the migration rate and then may raise urban unemployment.  In addition to this, 
any decrease in migration costs may also enhance the rate of migration. According to Ghatak et al. 
(1996), a policy implication of the HT model is that reduction of migration flow needs to raise the 
opportunity cost of migration (i.e. Cwr δ+ ). 
 Many authors put their views on the validity of the HT model. Allen (2001) considers the 
HT model as an innovative but not a revolutionary one. Petrov (2007) believes that the HT model 
may have universal applications, if conditions and factors of labour migration are similar to those 
assumed in the model. However, many critics oppose a number of restrict assumptions in the model. 
Taylor and Martin (2001) emphasize on the role of investment in the job search and reject the lot-
tery mechanism of the job allocation rules embedded in the Todaro model. Gallup (1997) mentions 
that the assumption of fixed wage and fixed migrants’ future earning is implausible, because wage 
rates and earnings are dynamic process. Raimondos (2003) comments the creation of new jobs in 
the urban sector imminently leads to urban unemployment and even reduced national product 
(known as the Todaro Paradox). From the empirical point of view, Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994) estimated the wage curve from numerous countries in order to test the HT model’s assump-
tion of positive relationship between regional wages and regional unemployment and found nega-
tive relationship between wages and unemployment. 
 It is discussed in the literature that the question of migration selectivity in the neoclassical 
and Todaro worlds is analysed by merging migration theories with human capital theory (Taylor 
and Martin, 2001), arising from the early contributions of Mincer (1974) and Becker (1975) on ur-
ban-rural wage (or expected earnings) differentials. For instance, higher wage differentials com-
bined with lower migration costs may increase migration rates. In perfect neoclassical models for 
the human-capital (e.g., Sjaastad, 1962), wages of prospective migrant origins and destinations are 
assumed to be a function of individuals’ skills that affect their productivity in the two sectors, and 
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also in a Todaro model, human capital characteristics of individuals can have influence on both 
their wages and their likelihood of obtaining a job in the destination. Moreover, migration decisions 
may take place where human capital can be acquired more efficiently, and where the return to hu-
man capital is highest (Dustmann Fadlon and Weiss, 2009). The human capital model is dynamic 
and provides the migration theories presented above with a micro grounding, permitting tests of a 
far richer set of migration determinants and impacts (Taylor and Martin, 2001). The inclusion of 
human capital formation in the migration models allows the economist to offer a human capital ex-
planation of migrants-natives difference in labour market outcomes, which depend on future earn-
ings, expectation with respect to unemployment and human capital investment (Jellal and Wolff, 
2003). 
5.2.2 New economics of labour migration 
  The “new economics of labour migration” (NELM) developed by Stark and Bloom (1985) 
and further elaborated by Stark (1991) have emerged as an alternative approach to analyse the la-
bour migration theories and the model has challenged many assumptions and conclusions of neo-
classical theory. The NELM theory asserts that migration decisions are not only made by individual 
actors but also by both migrant and non-migrant members of the household. A key insight of 
NELM is that migration decisions are made by larger units of related people – typically families or 
households-in which people act collectively not only to maximize expected income, but also to 
minimize risks and to loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures, apart from 
those in the labour market (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark, 1984; Katz and Stark, 1986; Stark, 
1991, Massey et al, 1993; Taylor, 1999; Taylor et al., 2003). This new approach seems to be more 
subtle view of migration and development, linking causes and consequences of migration more ex-
plicitly, and in which both positive and negative development responses are possible (Hass, 2007). 
 Moreover, the NELM is an attempt to shift away from the neoclassical assumption of indi-
vidual decision of migration as a response to the urban-rural differential in wages (or future earn-
ings) towards the collective decisions related to income smoothing strategies of the household. This 
idea came at the time when there is widespread thinking on the academic arena regarding the joint 
household model instead of individual model of migration due to continuous interaction between 
migrants and rural households (Taylor and Martin, 2001). Stark (1991) revitalized this academic 
thinking on migration from the developing world by placing the behaviour of individual migrants 
within a wider social context and considering the household rather than the individual as the most 
appropriate decision making unit (Taylor, 1999). Th
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explanatory power as compared with the neoclassical model by focusing on a household’s decision 
to send migrants in a context where migration serves to mitigate the impact of insurance and market 
imperfections on emitting households. Stark (1991) has discussed the new economics of labour mi-
gration in terms of three major premises. 
 First, Stark (1991) explains that migration is not the outcome of individual optimizing be-
haviour, but rather of the rational behaviour of a group of persons, such as a family, focusing on 
migration research from individual independence to mutual interdependence. Remittances are not 
unintended by-products, but the result of both implicit and explicit intra-family exchanges. Stark 
also opposes the standard human capital theory that posits, regarding the demand for labour, that the 
performance of individual migrant in the destination labour market is a result of skill levels and en-
dowments. He suggests instead that the preferences and constraints of the sending households are 
the important factors for the determination of destination labour market performance. Therefore, 
migration is not an individual but a family decision in which the family arrangement is made for 
migration and remittances so that familial considerations of “intra-familial trade in risk, coinsurance 
arrangements, devices to handle principal agent problems, moral hazard problems, and contract en-
forcement” all influence the migrant’s performance in the destination labour market. 
 Secondly, Stark argues that migration is not merely a response of wage differentials, but 
rather an assessment of relative wealth within a given reference group, and people may induce to 
take migration decision if they are worse off than their groups. The NELM implies that income un-
certainty and relative deprivation (as in the relative deprivation theory) will be major factors in mi-
gration decision (Stark and Taylor, 1991; Stark, 1991). Therefore the model incorporates the possi-
bility that families pool risks across migrant and non-migrant family members.  The returns from 
migrant children and the size and composition of human capital investments in children are also in-
corporated as associated phenomena for migration analysis. A number of studies tested the relative 
deprivation hypothesis in Mexico and found some evidence in favour of the hypothesis where rela-
tive deprivation is an important factor in international migration between Mexico and U.S. (Stark 
and Taylor, 1989 and 1991). 
 Finally, the NELM posits that migration normally occurs due to incomplete or missing mar-
kets in the given area, particularly in low income countries. People in low income countries may not 
be able to invest, diversify, and benefit from the process of industrialization due to pervasive market 
  147 
failures that constrained rural households from accessing to resources and markets50. Therefore mi-
gration from rural to urban or industrialized sector is the way to get benefits from industrialization.  
 The study on the role of migrant’s remittances in receiving households’ welfare and produc-
tion is relatively new topic in the migration and remittances literature, particularly applying the 
theoretical basis of the NELM. Previous studies of migration mostly dealt with migrants in isolation 
of the family and community contexts from which they come, and how remittances influence the 
expenditure of remittance receiving households (Taylor, 1999). There are limited studies on how 
migrant remittances affect investment and consumption expenditures by migrant sending house-
holds.   The theoretical approach51 of NELM which considers the family or household as the unit of 
analysis and family members are assumed to act collectively to maximize expected income and also 
to loosen constraints associated with missing markets, insurance, and other markets, fits neatly with 
the literature on agricultural household models,  both neoclassical (e.g., Barnum and Square, 1979; 
Singh et al., 1986)  and in the context of incomplete or missing markets (e.g., Strauss, 1986; de Jan-
vry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991). Moreover, the nonseparable agricultural household model for 
the NELM approach seems to be a useful means under the assumption of risks and market imper-
fections (Taylor and Martin, 2001). Few studies test the NELM hypothesis, exploring the extent to 
which participation of migration loosens the risk constraints on household-farm investments (e.g., 
Taylor, 1992; Taylor and Wyatt, 1996; Benjamin and Brandt, 1998). 
 There is substantial amount of literature on migration and the impact of remittances on re-
ceiving countries (see, review papers Massey et al., 1993; Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Taylor, 1999; 
Hass, 2007). However, there are limited studies on the impact of remittances on household labour 
allocation of remittance-receiving households. The empirical evidence on the relationship between 
remittance income and labour supply decisions of remittance-receiving households is a compara-
tively new area of studies in economics.  Stark and Bloom52 (1985) were the first who examined the 
impact of labour migration and raised several theoretical issues for empirical examination.  How-
ever, credit goes to Funkhauser (1992) for the first empirical examination between remittance and 
                                                 
50
 In regard to missing markets, Stark (1991) provides an example of a rural family living in Maine, the United States, 
where an individual can have access to benefit of the industrialization process of California’s Silicon Valley by buying 
shares on the New York Stock Exchange. This access may not be possible in low income countries due to the existence 
of incomplete and missing markets. 
51
 The theoretical framework of agricultural household model (AHM) has already described in the first section of this 
Chapter (i.e. Chapter 2) as a general form and detailed AHM for labour allocation decision of remittance-receiving 
households has elaborated in the theoretical framework. Hence this section does not explain about the AHM, but rather 
deals with the literature using AHM in relation to remittances and household labour allocation.  
52
 The seminal paper of New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) was pioneered by Stark (1982), where the author 
had explained a lot of methodological and theoretical ideas before NELM. The author claimed that the outcome was the 
result of over 12 years intensive research in this area. 
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household labour supply. The author estimated the impact of migrant’s remittances on participation 
in the wage labour force and self-employment for male and female non-migrants by applying a pro-
bit model.  His empirical findings show that the relationship of remittances with wage labour force 
participation is negative, while it is positive for self-employment.  Likewise, another study under-
taken by Airola (2005) in Mexico relating weekly hours of the household head to remittance income 
shows a negative sign for labour hours.  More recently, Acosta (2006) has examined the economic 
effects of international remittance on household spending decisions on human capital, child and 
adults both male and female labour allocation.  The results show a positive impact of remittance on 
investing in the human capital of children.  However, it has negative impact on adult female labour 
supply, but positive with male labour supply.  With respect to the impact of remittances on labour 
supply, Kim (2007) observed some impact of remittances on labour force participation in Jamaica.  
The findings show a higher reservation wages of household with remittance income, implying that 
remittance-receiving households are moving out of labour force, or being less enthusiastic about 
finding jobs. 
5.2.3 Labour migration and remittances in Nepal: present status and research gaps 
 Despite a long history of labour migration in Nepal53, the studies on migration and remit-
tances have hitherto been conducted by sociologists, demographers, and geographers and not by 
economists. Their focus was more concentrated on the socioeconomic patterns, trends and con-
straints faced by the migrants. These studies have shown various reasons of migration including op-
pressive land and labour policies, and debt due to demand for compulsory and unpaid labour, par-
ticular in the 19th century (Krengel, 1997; Hoffmann, 2001) and internal conflict in Nepal, 
especially after 1995 (e.g., NIDS, 2003b). Some studies show the reason for migration to India as a 
historical continuation54 (Thieme and Wyss, 2005); to Gulf countries as wage differential between 
South Asia and Gulf countries (Graner and Gurung, 2003); and to Japan as a culture of migration 
and remittance economy  among Tibeto-Burman ethnic groups (Yamanaka, 2000 and 2001). More-
over, the results of household level multivariate analysis show that the probability of outward mi-
gration is found to be high among less educated households and more internal migration to urban 
areas among educated households (World Bank, 2006).  
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 For detailed information about migration history in Nepal, see Section 3. 
54
 Historically, India is the main destination for Nepalese workers. It is primarily due to 1950 treaty between Nepal and 
India that allows people from both countries travel
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There are other studies examining the role of remittances in household economy and some 
studies show remittances as a part of livelihood strategy in Nepal (Von Furer-Haimendorf, 1995; 
Cameron et al., 1998; Blaikie et al., 2002; Soliva et al., 2003). Likewise, a number of studies carried 
out to identify the amount of remittance flows received from informal sources in Nepal show much 
higher amount of remittances received from undocumented channels in Nepal (Subedi, 1991; von 
der Heide and Hoffmann, 2001; Gurung, 2001 and 2003; Sheddon et al., 2001 and 2002; Graner and 
Gurung, 2003). Most of these studies also conclude that an increase in illegal and unofficial Nepal-
ese migrant workers abroad will increase the undocumented flow of remittances. There are also 
some case studies analysing the status of Nepalese migrant workers on particular destination from 
Nepal to Japan (Yamanaka, 2000 and 2001), in the United States (Dhungel, 1999), in India (Upreti, 
2002).  Several studies have been conducted to analyse the migration process at individual and 
household levels either in Nepal (e.g., Hoffmann, 2001; Regmi and Tisdel, 2002; Wyss, 2004; 
Thieme and Wyss, 2005) or in India (e.g., Thieme and Muller-Boker, 2004; Thieme et al., 2003), or 
both in India and Nepal (e.g., Pfaff, 1995; Thieme, 2003, 2006). 
Few papers in the literature employ econometric models, let alone discuss problems of en-
dogeneity and selection biases which are often prevalent in migration and remittance literature. For 
instance, Milligan and Bohora (2007) examined the impact of remittances on child labour and child 
education in Nepal, using the Heckman’s two-step analysis. They found positive contribution of 
remittances on child welfare but not much more than equal amount of income from other sources. 
Likewise, Lokshin et al. (2007) examined the impact of remittance income on poverty reduction us-
ing NLSS I &II data. They found a positive impact of remittance income on living standards of the 
households with a migrant member. Recently, Lokshin and Glinskaya (2008) examine the effect of 
male labour migration for work on female employment patterns and their results show a negative 
impact on the level of market work participation by the women left behind. In Nepal, there seems to 
be a research gap, particularly focusing on the theory of NELM and using various econometric 
models that address the problems of endogeneity and selection biases, where panel data are often 
useful to minimize such problems in the analysis. This study to some extent will help to fill this gap 
in economic literature that applies a number of econometric models to examine the labour allocation 
decisions of remittance-receiving households in Nepal.  
This study thus intends to shed light on how remittance-receiving households allocate their 
resources in different household activities, focusing particularly on labour hour allocation. I use 
panel data from the NLSSs conducted in 1995/96 and 2003/04.  I examine which effect (i.e. tradi-
tional labour economic theory through an income effect or incomplete factor markets) is stronger in 
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the allocation of household labour in remittance receiving household in Nepal through the applica-
tion of a number of econometric models. 
5.3 Migration and remittances in Nepal  
 Nepal has more than 200 years of history of international labour migration, over which Nep-
alese have sought work abroad to improve their livelihoods.  In the early nineteenth century, the 
first Nepalese men, especially people from hilly regions, migrated to Lahore (in today’s Pakistan) to 
join the army of the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh (Thieme and Wyss, 2005), and this trend has given the 
nickname “Lahure”55 for all those employed in foreign armies.  Nevertheless, the history of modern 
Nepal came only after Gurkha56 rulers conquered the previous small tiny states and created the pre-
sent united Nepal, then after the establishment of united Nepal, the rulers tried to increase the size 
of country through invading Tibet and the nearby present Indian Territory.  During the process of 
expanding and strengthening the country, the Gurkhas had wars with the British India Company, 
popularly known as Anglo-Nepal war of 1814 to 1816.  During that war, the British India rulers 
were impressed with brevity and skill of Nepalese soldiers, and then the treaty of 1816 empowered 
the British ruler to set up three Gurkha regiments in their army (Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung, 
2001).  Since then, Gurkha regiments have been part of the regular British and Indian armies even 
after independence of India from Britain. The British army remains the most reliable source of re-
mittances in Nepal, and Gurkha regiments provide lucrative jobs for many young Nepalese.  
 Apart from joining Gurkha regiments, Nepalese workers also went to work in tea planta-
tions, construction, coal mining and land reclamation in the different regions of India such as As-
sam, Bengal, Darjeeling, Garhwal and Kumaon (Hoffmann 2001). This migration process occurred 
due to an existence of feudal systems in Nepal, where labour exploitation was extremely high dur-
ing that period.  So, oppressed people went to nearby area of Nepal for better livelihoods, which 
came to be known at present as Indian Nepalese.  Presently there are a large number of Nepali ori-
gin people settled permanently in Darjeeling, Assam, Meghalaya, and Sikkim of east India and 
Uttarakhand and Simala states of North West India, and Bhutan.  In addition, the trend of seeking 
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 Initially the nickname of “Lahure” became after going to Lahore, Pakistan (one who goes to Lahore) to join in the 
Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh army, but now “Lahure” is commonly used to those persons who are going abroad for work 
both in civilian or in government jobs like British and Indian Gurkha regiments.  
56
 Nepal was divided into several tiny states (called as 22 and 24 states) and Gurkha was one of them.  Gurkha ruler 
(ancestor of the present king of Nepal) started to expand the territories conquering all small states during the 18th cen-
tury and established a modern Nepal. So Gurkha is also used sometimes as synonymous to Nepal because the Gurkha 
rulers created a modern Nepal.  
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job opportunities in other countries has further increased in Nepal due to poor employment oppor-
tunities and low wage rates within the country.  Migration to Gulf countries and South-East Asian 
countries intensified after political change in 1990 when the government provided travel documents 
and passports more easily than had the previous autocratic regime.  The flow of migrants has in-
creased rapidly during past decade due to political conflict and civil wars that have limited the em-
ployment opportunities in the country. 
 The data from the 2001 Population census show that 3.3 percent (762,181) of the total popu-
lation was absent from Nepal, the majority of them being male (89 percent).  Of these, more than 
77.6 percent  are living in the South Asian region, especially in India, while the Middle East is the 
second most largest population living outside Nepal (14.5 percent), followed by East and South-
East Asia (4.5 percent), where a significant number of Nepalese are living in Hong Kong Special 
Region of China under the legal provisions known as Identity (ID) card holders for which applies to 
those people born during their parent’s service in Hong Kong as part of the Gurkha army  at the 
time of British rule (before 1997). 57  The remaining Nepalese emigrants are to be found in the rest 
of the world. 
 Several studies suggest that the number of Nepalese living abroad is approximately 1.5 per-
cent higher than official data (see, Kollmair et al., 2006), because of the exclusion of large number 
of illegal immigrants in the surveys.  The report from NLSS II (CBS, 2004) shows that 4.6 percent 
of total sample population is abroad, which is higher than in the population census 2001.  In addi-
tion, the reports from individual case studies show 4.7 percent of total population abroad in Nepal 
(Kollmair et al., 2006).  This could be due to increasing number of migrant workers in Nepal, where 
the official data show the flow of migrant workers is increased by an average 10 percent annually 
during last decade.  
The flow of international remittances to Nepal has consistently increased from US$3 million 
in 1993 to US$ 1,211 million in 2005,  but the sharp increase in remittance inflows started only in 
200158(IMF, 2006).  Moreover, there is widespread speculation that remittances inflow from the in-
formal sector is much higher (50 percent) than the flow from the formal sector.  Remittances inflow 
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 This provision was made between Chinese and British governments to provide permanent resident permits to those 
Nepalese who were born in Hong Kong during the time of British rule.  At that time, British Gurkha regiments were 
established in Hong Kong. Gurkha armies used to bring their families in Hong Kong during their service period and 
gave birth their children. 
58
 Detailed information on the flow of remittances and on the percentage share of remittances in the GDP is presented in 
graphs (see Figure 5.1 and 5.2 in appendix). 
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from India mostly comes from the informal sector due to small amounts of money and the inacces-
sibility of money transfer services in most rural areas of Nepal.  
5.4 Theoretical framework 
 The theoretical framework for this study draws from the insights of the New Economics of 
Labour Migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985) plus a couple of other studies (Stark, 1982; Vijvergberg, 
1992; Hoddinott, 1994; Damon, 2008).  These theoretical approaches assume that migration deci-
sions are made jointly by the migrant and by non migrants, particularly the remaining members in 
the households. Stark (1982), one of the pioneers in this area, mentioned migration decisions in 
farm households as a strategy to overcome constraints on production and investment activities as a 
result of missing or incomplete credit and insurance markets in rural areas. This part outlines the 
theoretical framework drawn upon to investigate the effect of migration and remittances on house-
hold labour allocation in different sectors such as on-farm, off-farm and self-employment, using ag-
ricultural household models developed by Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) and further extended by 
de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) under missing and incomplete markets and by Damon 
(2008) for migration and remittances. The central theme of the model is to illustrate the linkages be-
tween migration and household labour composition.  
To concentrate on the role of migration and remittances in household labour supply re-
sponses, this study assumes that the migration decision is taken by the migrant and some group of 
non-migrant members as an implicit contractual arrangement between the two parties who share 
both costs and returns59, the latter realised as migrants send remittances to non-migrant members in 
the country of origin.  To capture this logic in a standard utility maximization problem, we assume 
that both migrants and non-migrants household members60 jointly choose their consumption ( iC ), 
where i  refers non-migrants ( n ) and migrants ( m ), and their respective time endowment ( iT ) be-
tween on-farm work ( iF ), market work ( iX ), and leisure ( iL ). The time endowment of migrant is 
divided between wage labour ( iN ) and leisure. Time allocated to market work by non-migrant 
members yields the wage income. Moreover, the production decisions of the non-migrant’s farm 
                                                 
59
 Implicit contractual arrangement is regarded as part of a longer-term agreement between prospective migrant and 
non-migrant family members, where costs and benefits are to be shared (Hoddinott, 1992). The data from the Nepal 
Living Standard Surveys on remittances support this assumption that more than 93 percent of remittance-receiving 
individuals were the family members of migrants.   
60
 For simplicity, the model assumes two members (male and female) in the household, where adult male migrated from 
the home and adult female stayed at home. This assumption seems valid in the context that more than 95 percent mi-
grants are male in Nepal. However, this assumption is relaxed in the empirical analysis in which there could have 
adult male and children in the family (see Damon, 2008).  
  153 
household may also depend on a number of other factors such as )( YAww mn ,,, , where nw is do-
mestic wage rates, mw is the wage rates of the migrant’s working destination or country, A  is 
household initial endowment such as land and other farm equipments assumed to be fixed, and Y is 
the non-labour income such as pensions, allowances and other interest rates. The household maxi-
mizes its utility at period t  choosing from }{ RYHNXFC ,,,,,
,
, where H is hired labour hours 
and R is level of remittances. In this paper, the household is considered as a homogenous unit (i.e. 
unitary model) that does not allow any bargaining between migrant and non-migrant household 
members. However, this paper presents the household model under the assumptions of both perfect 
and imperfect markets.   Under these specifications, the maximization problem of farm household 
under perfect markets can be set as follows: 
(5.8)    }{ }{}{ RYHNXFC
LCULC U   Max    mmmnnn
,,,,,
,,           
,
+
 ,     
subject to the following constraints: 
(5.9)  RYLTwAHFfC nnnnn ++−+= )(),,( and      
(5.10)  RNwC mmm −= ,  
where mn  UU  and are utility functions of non-migrant and migrant members respectively, which are 
assumed to be additively separable, monotonically increasing and strictly concave. ),,( AHFf n  is 
the household production function. Household total income is the sum of agricultural products, fam-
ily wage income, minus cost of hired labour, plus non-labour income and remittances. Remittances 
(R) are assumed as a function of wage rates of migrant’s working destination, the number of mi-
grants from the particular household and other individual and household specific characteristics that 
determine the level of remittances. The price of consumption goods is normalized at unity. In addi-
tion to budget constraints, household also faces time constraints which are as follows: 
(5.11)  nnnn XFLT ++=  and        
(5.12)  mmm NLT += .  
These four equations (5.9 to 5.12) can be combined into one “full budget” constraint, which 
is expressed as: 
 (5.13)  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
n m n n n n m m n n
n n n n n n n m m m
n n n m m m
C C C f X H Y w N w N w H
f X H Y w T L X H w T L
f T L H Y w H w T L
= + = + + + + −
= + + + − − − + −
= − + + − + −
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where C is the total consumption of migrants and non-migrants members61 and nn NHH −= (i.e. 
net labour hired in). Since the model assumes perfect substitution between household and hired la-
bour, only the net amount matters. The expression (5.8) can be maximized subject to full budget 
constraints (5.13) using the Lagrange multiplier ( λ ): 
(5.14) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,n n n m m m n m n n n m m mU C L U C L C C f T L H Y w H w T L = + − λ + − − + − − − −   
The First Order Conditions (subscripts indicate derivatives) are: 
(5.15)  
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 These First Order Conditions (FOCs) can provide many insights. For instance, the first two 
equations equate marginal utilities of consumption across migrants and non-migrants, while the fi-
nal FOC shows that the marginal product of both household and hired labour is equal to the domes-
tic wage rate. Combining the last and third FOCs, marginal utility of non-migrant leisure equals the 
domestic wage rate, whereas the ratio of the marginal utilities of non-migrant leisure and consump-
tion (combining the first and third FOCs) is equal to the domestic wage rate. Similarly, combining 
the third and fourth FOCs, the marginal utilities of migrant and non-migrant leisure are equal to the 
ratio of the respective wage rates. 
  As the model is based on the assumption of perfect markets, the household will not face any 
labour or liquidity constraint due to migration of family members abroad or even in urban areas and 
an increase in income from remittances or any other sources should not affect production decisions. 
The model therefore generates separability between production and migration decisions. However, 
an increase in household income (e.g., remittance income) may increase the consumption of the 
household (e.g., leisure). This simple solution for the maximization problem yields the structural 
demand function for leisure. 
 (5.16)  }{ (.),,,* RYwwLL mni = .        
                                                 
61
 
i
tC is the sum of total household consumption (i.e. itCiP , where Pi is the price of commodities both market and non 
market) that should be equal to total household income. For simplicity, price is normalized by unity. 
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Equation (5.16) tells that the demand for leisure is the function of domestic wages, wage 
rates of migrants’ destination, non-labour income, household’s initial endowment (i.e. A ), and re-
mittance income. 
Labour supply equations for households’ on-farm, off-farm and hired labour derived from 
the same way as in the equation (5.16) are as follows: 
(5.17)  }{ (.),,* RYwFF nn = ,         
(5.18)  }{ (.),,* RYwXX nn = , and         
(5.19)  }{ (.),, RYwHH n* = .        
The labour supply response of non-migrant’s work hours will be affected by domestic wage 
rates, non-labour income, level of remittances, and household’s initial endowment (i.e. land in this 
case). In order to understand the relationship between work hours and remittances, we can analyse 
the comparative static by differentiating *nF , *nX  and *H with respect to migrants’ wage rate 
( mw ). 
 (5.20)  
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. 
The relationship between non-migrants’ work hours and remittances under the assumption 
of perfect markets depends on the type of goods (i.e. leisure). For instance, if leisure is a normal 
good, then 0<
∂
∂
R
F
and 0<
∂
∂
R
X (i.e. non-migrant family members will buy more leisure with an in-
crease in the level of remittances), while the level of remittances will increase with an increase in 
the wage rate of migrant members so that 0>
∂
∂
mw
R
. Furthermore, an increase in the wage rate of 
working destination will also increase the work hours of migrant members. On the other hand, if 
remittances increase the leisure of non-migrants’ members, then household will buy more hired la-
bour in order to compensate households’ leisure. The relationship between hired labour and remit-
tances would be positive (i.e. 0>
∂
∂
R
H ). 
The agricultural household model discussed above is based on the assumption of perfect 
markets (i.e. traditional neoclassical model), implying that production decisions are independent of 
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consumption decisions of a farm household.  Perfect factor markets are also assumed to exhibit zero 
transaction costs. Under this scenario, all markets exist for the household and all prices are deter-
mined exogenously in those markets and hence there is no independent role for unobserved shadow 
prices and incomes. 
A growing number of contributions to the literature claim that, in the developing country 
context, rural households are systematically exposed to market imperfections and constraints, re-
ferred to as “failures” and their behaviour cannot be understood without reference to the specificity 
of these failures (Thorbecke, 1993). Under the assumption of market imperfections, the agricultural 
household model becomes non-separable, implying that household’s decisions regarding production 
(e.g., use of inputs, choice of activities, desired production level) are affected by its consumption 
characteristics such as consumption preferences and demographic composition (de Janvry and Sa-
doulet, 2006). Indeed, households in many resources poor economies may face missing markets for 
some goods, resulting in a mixture of tradables and non-tradables at the household level (Taylor and 
Adlemen, 2003). In these circumstances, farmers often encounter constraints, in particular in rela-
tion to credit and labour, that limit their ability to capture the potential benefits from the farm sec-
tor. In the presence of missing and incomplete factor markets, wage and farm income are often con-
sidered as endogenous, especially for those households which do not participate or partially 
participate in the market. The behaviour of households hence needs specialization of the particular 
type of failure to which household is confronted (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006). To incorporate the 
missing markets into the agricultural household model, it is convenient to specify its linkages with 
factor markets. The agricultural household model is often modified by adding credit and labour 
constraints as a limited access to these markets due to incomplete and missing markets.   
Consider now the model given in (5.8) constraining by working capital in the following 
form: 
(5.23)   ( )n m m m m m m mw H K Y R K Y w N C K Y w T L C≤ + + = + + − = + + − − , 
 where K is the working capital available to the household. This equation reveals that net labour 
hired in is less or equal to the total capital (e.g., working capital available plus non-labour income, 
and remittance income) which is equal to migrant’ total income minus consumption. All notations 
expressed in (5.13) are the same here as well. However, the constraint included in the equation in-
volves only migrant but not non-migrant’ leisure and consumption. Including these additional con-
straints, the maximization problem then becomes: 
(5.24)  
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where, µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the total capital ( 0≥µ  according to whether or 
not the constraint). The FOCs are as follows: 
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the FOCs give many insights. From the first two FOCs, λ
µ
+= 1
n
c
m
c
U
U
 so if 0>µ , marginal utility is 
higher and consumption is lower for migrants than non-migrants. This is because,  migrants need to 
remit more (hence consume less) to provide additional working capital. The final FOC equates the 
marginal product of both household and hired labour to nw





+ λ
µ1 . If 0>µ , marginal product ex-
ceeds the wage rate. The household would like to hire more labour but is constrained by lack of 
capital. Combining the fifth and third FOCs, λ
µ
+=1
n
L
m
L
U
U
 so if 0>µ , marginal utility is higher  and 
leisure is lower for migrants than non-migrants. This is because migrants need more remit (and 
hence work more) to provide additional working capital. Likewise, combining the first and third 
FOCs, and the ratio of the marginal utilities of non-migrant leisure and consumption is equal to the 
domestic wage rate as previously and combining the third and fourth FOCs, the marginal utilities of 
migrant and non-migrant leisure are equal to the ratio of the respective wage rates as previously.   
Now suppose the constraint is H H≤ . Alternatively, if the constraint is on supplying la-
bour, then this becomes H H≥ . The maximization problem is: 
(5.26) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,n n n m m m n m n n n m m mU C L U C L C C f T L H Y w H w T L H H = + − λ + − − + − − − − − µ − 
 the FOCs are: 
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 from these equations, the final FOC implies ' nf w µ= +
λ
. If the household is constrained in hiring 
labour ( 0>µ ), marginal product will exceed the wage rate. If instead, it is constrained in supplying 
labour ( 0<µ ), marginal product will be lower than the wage rate.    
 The Lagrange function for maximization of the model by pooling capital and labour con-
straints can be written as: 
(5.28)   Max   [ ][ ].)()(
)(),(),(
HHCLTwYKHw
HLTfCCLCULCU
mmmmni
nnmnmmmnnn
−−+−−−−−
+−−+−+
µ
λ
 
The FOCs for marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption for non-
migrants show that *
/
/
ww
CU
LU in
nn
nn
=+=
∂∂
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λ
µ
, where λ  is the shadow value  associated with pro-
duction, and the Lagrange multiplier iµ is the shadow values of credit and labour. *w is called the 
shadow wage or opportunity cost of time which is market wage plus(or minus, depending on iµ )  
shadow values for binding constraints. 
 Prices of commodities and wage rates become endogenous in case of household facing the 
working capital or labour constraints of which can be seen from the equations (5.23) to (5.28). The 
total income of the household depends on the shadow value and therefore is converted into shadow 
income, referred as *Λ (= RKYTw +++)( **pi ). In this case, demand and supply satisfy the equilib-
rium through endogenous prices (i.e. shadow price or value). The demand for leisure from the equa-
tion62 (5.28) is: 
 (5.29)  }{ (.), *** Λ= wLL .        
                                                 
62
 Detailed analysis of household model has been given in Chapter 6 (141-175pp) of the book entitled “Quantitative 
Development Policy Analysis” by Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995). See also in Chapter 2. 
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Equation (5.29) tells that the demand for leisure is the function of shadow wage, shadow in-
come ( *Λ ) of household production that includes both labour and non-labour income, remittances, 
and working capital. Under the equation (5.29), labour supply can be defined as the total hours in 
productive activities, as opposed to market hours alone as founded in traditional labour supply 
model using the observed wages (Huffman, 1980; Rosenzweig, 1980). Labour supply equations 
where *nF , *nX , *nS  and *H  denote the total hours of works in on-farm, off-farm and self-
employment activities and hired labour respectively, derived from the same way as in equation 
(5.29) are as follows: 
(5.30)  }{ (.), *** Λ= wFF n ,         
(5.31)  }{ (.), *** Λ= wXX n , 
(5.32)  }{ (.), *** Λ= wSS n , and 
(5.33)  }{ (.), *** Λ= wHH t . 
The labour supply function derived from shadow wages and shadow income is different than 
the traditional one with the observed wages and full income. Shadow wages and shadow income are 
considered as endogenous variables in the non-separable (or non-recursive) model. In the traditional 
labour supply model (assumed as the recursive model), wage rate and income are exogenous and all 
households are assumed to be price takers. The relationship between household labour allocation 
and wages ( *w ) is determined by the shadow income ( *Λ ) associated with other endogenous vari-
ables such as the level of remittances ( R ) and credit and labour constraints. In order to understand 
this explanation, we can analyse the comparative static by differentiating *nF , *nX  and *H with re-
spect to migrant’ wage rates ( mw ). 
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Under the assumption of missing factor markets, ambiguities grow with the number of en-
dogenous variables in the model (Taylor and Adlemen, 2003). The relationship between house-
holds’ labour allocation among different sectors and remittances may depend on the constraint 
faced by the particular household. For instance, if the household is constrained by working capital, 
remittances ease the budget constraints, then we assume that 0
*
>
∂
Λ∂
R
. An increase in the level of 
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remittances encourages households to invest more in on-farm that will increase the marginal prod-
uct of farm labour (F), suggesting that the relationship between F and  *Λ  would be positive. As we 
know 0>
∂
∂
mw
R
 (i.e. an increase in migrant’s wage will increase remittances), in this case, the rela-
tionship between on-farm (or self-employment activities) labour supply and remittances would be 
positive 






>∂
∂
>∂
∂ 0  and  0 
R
S
R
Fi.e. (that is, an increase in the investment through increase in remit-
tances would increase work hours in on-farm sector and self-employment activities), if new tech-
nologies are more labour-intensive. Households may also buy more time of hired labour to compen-
sate labour loss due to migration that leads to positive relationship between remittances and hired 
labour 






>∂
∂ 0 
R
Hi.e. , even if the labour market is partially functioning. 
 Likewise, in the case of off-farm work (5.35), if remittances loosen the liquidity constraint 
and increase the marginal product of labour in on-farm sector, then  0
*
<
Λ∂
∂X
. If we assume that 
family labour is a perfect substitute to hired labour, then, 0<
∂
∂
R
X
, meaning that an increase in re-
mittances will decrease off-farm work hours and will buy more leisure. If family labour is not per-
fect substitute to hired labour due to missing labour markets, non-migrant members may reallocate 
their labour hours back to on-farm to compensate their labour loss due to migration 



<∂
∂ 0 i.e. 
R
X
, 
particularly in the case of more investment in farm sector through easing liquidity constraints by 
remittance income. Conclusively, an increase in remittances will decrease the work hours in off-
farm sectors both in the case of perfect substitution as well as imperfect substitution between family 
and hired labour. 
As we discussed above, migration decisions are made by the migrant and other non-migrant 
household members. If we substitute equations (5.30 to 5.33) into utility function (5.8), then we can 
obtain household’s indirect utility function characterizing the household’s decision of whether or 
not to send a migrant. 
(5.36)  }{ }{ (.),(.),, ***** Λ−Λ= wVwwVM m , 
where 1=M if 0* >M  and 0=M if 0* ≤M . 
The model implies that migration process occurs, if the indirect utility of resource-
constrained household with a migrant member is greater than if this member stays at home. It can 
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also be possible that household takes migration decision to come out from poverty trap, meaning 
that burden of credit may be more critical than the labour loss due to migration.  
Given the theoretical structure of the model of labour supply and welfare, the expected signs 
between labour supply and remittances could be negative, if remittance income substitutes to other 
non-labour income of household that reduces the pool of family and hired labour work hours.  On 
the other hand, the relationship could be reversed, if remittances relax the credit constraints that in-
duce investment on farm sector or self-employment activities, which increase household labour and 
hired labour hours.  Moreover, the conventional model suggests that work hours of labour will in-
crease with the off-farm wage, if leisure is a normal good.  Due to the intrinsic endogeneity and se-
lectivity involved in decisions surrounding migration, there is the potential for reverse causality, as 
hours worked may influence emigrants’ decision to send remittances home. 
5.5 Data and descriptive statistics 
The data used for the analysis of the impact of remittance on household work hour’s alloca-
tion is from the Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) carried out by the Central Bureau of Statis-
tics, Government of Nepal with financial and technical assistance from the World Bank.  The NLSS 
was conducted in 1995/96 and 2003/04 consisting the detailed information of income and expendi-
ture on both food and non-food items, demographic composition, wages both in kind and in cash, 
and transfer of remittances. 
NLSSs have wide level of data set providing the information of demographic characteristics, 
household activities both farm and off-farm, education and literacy, employment status both farm 
and off-farm, wage rates and remittances covering  administrative and ecological zones.  For the 
purpose of this study, information includes the time allocation of household members in farm, off-
farm and self-employed, remittance income and other socio-economic characteristics.  
The survey includes the detailed information on remittance receiving households both from 
rural and urban, as well as internal and external migration including their amount and the frequency.  
Information also includes remittance received in both cash and kind, and different remittance send-
ing channels (i.e. financial institutions, Hundi63, person, and others).  
                                                 
63
 Hundi refers to financial instruments evolved on the Indian sub-continent used in trade and credit transactions. They 
were used: (i) as remittance instruments (to transfer funds from one place to another); (ii) as credit instruments (to bor-
row money); and (ii) for trade transactions (as bills of exchange) [Source: http://www.rbi.org.in/currency/museum/m-
hundi.html ]. This system is common in Nepal especially among illegal immigrants, who do not have legal documents 
to send remittances to the country of origin. According to Wikipedia, Hundi is an informal value transfer system based 
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The study on the household labour allocation behaviour will depend on the information re-
lated to remittance-receiving households, implying that the analysis will cover only those house-
holds who reported receiving remittances in the previous year.  So, the analysis will exclude those 
households, which did not receive any remittance even though they had a migrant member in the 
family due to either recent departure in abroad for work, or due to the migrant being unable to send 
money by other reasons.  It could also be possible that households did not report their remittance in-
come because of afraid of taxes.  
 The data from the NLSS conducted in 1996/97 and 2003/04 show that more than 23 percent 
and 30 percent of the total 3373 and 3912 sampled households received remittances from internal or 
external sources respectively.  In the panel data, out of 962 sample households, 21.5 percent house-
holds received remittances in 1996/97, and this figure increased by 33.47 percent in 2003/04.  The 
average amount of remittance also increased by NRs. (Nepalese Rupees) 15,160 to NRs. 34,698 
from 1995/96 to 2003/04 with an increment of the share of remittances in total household income 
(from 26.6 percent to 35.4 percent).  Per capita remittance income has also significantly increased 
by NRs. 625 in 1995/96 to NRs. 2100 in 2003/04.  Individual profiles of the migrants using data 
from NLSS II show that about 97 percent aged between 15-44 years are male, while only 51 percent 
of recipients are males. The survey report further shows that remittance flows are very high in rural 
areas than urban areas. According to NLSSs, 72.6 percent and 75.1 percent of remittance receiving 
households are from rural areas in 1995/96 and 2003/04 respectively.  
 Descriptive statistics used for the analysis of the impact of remittance income on the alloca-
tion of work hours of remittance-receiving households are given in Table 5.1.  Remittance income 
is measured as the income received by sample households both from internal migrants and those 
who have migrated abroad, where other income (or non-labour income) includes pensions, allow-
ances and dividends.  Work hours are the aggregate time spent by each household in different ac-
tivities such as on-farm, off-farm and self employment activities, and hired labour.  Land is total 
farm size either owned, or rented or sharecropped by the household and measured in hectares, while 
the value of the livestock is the total value of livestock owned by households during the survey.  
Farm size and the value of the livestock are often included in labour supply model, assuming that 
                                                                                                                                                                  
on performance and honour of a huge network of money brokers which are primarily located in the Middle East, Africa 
and Asia. 
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such variables could have effect on household labour allocation.  Moreover, the number of children 
below 6 years and senior population may also matter for the time allocation of households. 
 The data further reveal that out of total remittance-receiving households, about 28.5 percent 
and 36 percent of households in NLSS I and II are headed by females, but this figure is quite low in 
the total samples of both remittance receiving and non-receiving households (12.68 percent in 
1995/96 and 18.92 percent in 2003/04). 
 The panel data show some change in the work hour allocation in different sectors, indicating 
a shift from the farm sector to off-farm sectors among the remittance-receiving households.  There 
is also a slight change in average family size from 6.27 to 5.64.  The data show some positive 
changes in remittance income and non-labour income over the last 7 years of the first NLSS.  In ad-
dition, farm size decreased over the time covered by NLSS I and NLSS II.  
5.6 Econometric specification 
The econometric model for this analysis assumes that the household decision for migration 
is purely based on the objective of utility maximization. Decision to migrate is often done by both 
migrant and non-migrant family members by sharing costs and returns as an implicit contractual ar-
rangement between two parties as discussed by Stark (1991).  In other words, patterns of remit-
tances could be better to explain as an intertemporal contractual arrangement between migrant and 
other family members than as the result of purely altruistic considerations as explained by Stark and 
Bloom (1985) in their seminal paper of “The New Economics of Labour Migration”. Remittances in 
this context may not be considered as random, and are modelled as the outcome of a joint utility 
maximization made by the prospective migrant and other non-migrant household members (Hod-
dinott, 1994).  It is also reasonable to assume that households decide migration and remittances 
jointly with other income activities as a part of their livelihood strategies (Stark and Bloom, 1985). 
In other words, migration decisions, remittances, and other household activities like expenditure, 
labour allocation, and school attendance are usually made simultaneously (McKenzie and Sasin, 
2007).  Such complicated relations have raised a number of methodological issues relating to the 
application of econometric models, particularly identification issues in the context of standard OLS 
techniques in the presence of simultaneity that can manifest themselves in the problem of endogene-
ity in the labour supply model.   
Furthermore, sample selection bias and omitted variables are common problems in migra-
tion and remittance analyses which can affect the estimated labour supply model.  For instance, 
there are fundamental differences between migrants and non-migrants, and selection of only mi-
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grants can result in a bias sample.  This gives rise to the problem of selection bias64.  This sample 
selection of migration may be a problem of omitted variable bias, arising from the exclusion of both 
observable and unobservable characteristics of non-migrants in the model. 
The instrumental variable (IV) technique is the most common way to address the problem of 
endogeneity between labour hours, remittances and migration.  In addition, the literature also sug-
gests that the use of panel data can significantly reduce those biases arising from omitted variables 
(including unobservable individual and household characteristics), selection biases, and endogene-
ity and can control for household level unobserved effects (e.g., see Stark, 1991 for detail). Because 
panel data allow to control for issues of time-invariant unobservable characteristics, as well as to 
address biases by taking differences (McKenzie and Sasin, 2007). The labour supply equation we 
estimate attempts to take into account the endogeneity problem using panel data from NLSSs con-
ducted in 1995/96 and 2003/04. 
Due to the presence of pervasive endogeneity in the migration decisions, there is a need to 
address this problem in the model. The general approach to address such problem is to find good in-
struments for remittances65. Previous studies usually used probit models for binary variable of mi-
gration in order to find the inverse Mill’s ratio, which is considered as an instrument of migration 
decisions.  Then the equations on household work hours are estimated by two-stage least squares 
using the inverse Mill’s ratio of migration decisions as an instrument for remittance equation. How-
ever, this study applies the count regression model, because the number of migrants is an integer, 
where about 6 percent sample households have more than one migrant member in the family.  
Count regression models have several advantages over other specification (Taylor, Rozelle and 
Brauw, 2003). Among many count regression models, we estimate zero inflated Poisson (ZIP) 
model due to the high incidence of zero counts in the panel data set in order to find the best instru-
ments for remittances (for equation 5.40), and predicted value of migrants also includes in the 
model to control endogeneity. However, the model does not include the inverse Mill’s ratio in re-
mittance equation as exogenous variable (5.40) due to possible bias in the estimation of the inverse 
Mill’s ratio in the presence of higher number of zero count. On the other hand, zero-inflated Poisson 
regression models introduced by Lambert (1992) are a useful class of models for excessive count 
data that account for the zeros by the non-migrant households.  The density function is: 
                                                 
64
 McKenzie and Sasin (2007) have given an example of healthier, educated and wealthier household regarding this is-
sue.  They point out as positive selection if such households might be more likely to migrate and as negative selec-
tion, if less likely to migrate. 
65
 Migration is also a function of households and other socio-economic characteristics, and written 
as iititit XM ωpiδδ +++= 10 .  The functional form reflects that the number of migrants from a household should always be 
a non-negative integer.     
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Where, )0(1f is a logit model and )0(2f can be either a Poisson or a Negative Binomial Den-
sity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
 The number of migrants in the household is the dependent variable for ZIP model with a set 
of exogenous variables that induce to migrate.  These exogenous variables are assumed to be corre-
lated with migration and not to be correlated with error terms. As explained before, the migration 
equation for this analysis is: 
(5.38)  iitit XM υδδ ++= 10 ,       
where itX is the vector of exogenous variables such as percentage of migrants from the district, per 
capita household income without remittances and migrant belonging rural or urban (dummy).  In 
addition, the model includes a number of demographic variables, specifically family size, the de-
pendent ratio (i.e. number of dependent divided by adult members), age and sex (1=female) of the 
household head.  It is often assumed that family size and other democratic characteristics do matter 
in the presence of incomplete factor markets in most developing countries such as Nepal.  The edu-
cation level of the household head has also included in the model as a proxy for educational status 
of the household, implying that higher educated household can have effect on migration decisions.  
After the estimation of the Zero Inflated Poisson model, variables which are significant in the ZIP 
model (equation 5.38), are used as instruments for remittance equation (5.40), when applying two-
stage least squares regression for equation (5.39). 
In order to estimate labour allocation decisions of remittance-receiving households, two 
types of equations such as sector specific (i.e. farm, off-farm, self-employment) time allocation 
(5.39) and individual time allocation (labour and leisure) of household members (5.41) are applied. 
The functional form of labour supply equation for instrumental variables regression which is the 
main interest of this analysis is expressed as follows: 
(5.39)  iitititit RZH εηβββ ++++= 210 ,      
where, Hit is a measure of labour hours allocated for on-farm, off-farm, self-employment and hired, 
combined with aggregate of all, Zit is the vector of household characteristics, Rit is the level of re-
mittances received by the household, and ηit and εi are respectively the household specific and ag-
gregate error terms.  As discussed above, the level of remittances received by households is consid-
ered as endogenous, because migration and remittances are endogenously determined together with 
other income sources.  To control the problem of endogeneity, the equation of remittance income is 
instrumented by a set of exogenous variables, which are supposed to be correlated with remittances, 
but not to be correlated with labour hours of the household.  The equation for remittances is: 
(5.40)  iitititit MXR εηααα ′+′+++= 210 ,      
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where Xit is the vector of exogenous variables such as percentage of migrants from the district, the 
number of migrants from the household, working region of migrant and region belonging to mi-
grants in the country of origin.  Mit is the number of migrants from the household. 
 The dependent variables in the regression model (equation 5.39) are the total hours of house-
hold’s work on farm, off-farm and self employment activities, and total work hours of hired labour 
with a set of exogenous variables, specifically household size, farm size, non-labour income, value 
of livestock, off-farm wages, dependent ratio, number of children (< 6 years) and the number of 
elderly members (65+ years) in the household, and the sex of household head.  
 A growing body of evidences suggests that the labour supply response of individual mem-
bers may not necessarily give the same response at aggregate levels even within the same house-
hold, perhaps due to difference in responses among gender, or the regions or the amount of remit-
tances. For instance, Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) estimated probit models for the participation 
of labour force in Manila, and  they obtained higher probabilities (about double) of reducing work 
by women than men among the households with migrant members. The further application of la-
bour supply responses by gender in remittance-receiving households will give more insights to un-
derstand the relationship between remittance income and the hours of work.  The study also esti-
mates labour supply models of remittance-receiving households by gender based on the 
demographic characteristics. 
The labour supply equation66 of Tobit model for time allocation decisions of males and fe-
males in the remittance-receiving households follows as: 
(5.41)  iii ZRL ωγγγ +++= 210* ,         
where iω ~N (0, 2σ ) and iL = max (0, *iL ), and L measures the individual work hours of remittance 
receiving households with sample i (i=1,……n).  R is the per capita remittance income of the 
household, and Zi is the set of exogenous variables, particularly demographic characteristics of the 
individual and average non-labour income.  The dependent variable L= *L , if = *L ≥ 0, and L=0, if 
*L < 0, implying that work hours of some individuals are reported as zero.  Use of the OLS method 
for this model will give biased and inconsistent estimates of the impact of remittances on the house-
hold work hours.  
 The Tobit model, which can address the problem of the partially discrete and particularly 
continuous nature (i.e. censored) of dependent variable, would be a better choice against OLS.  In 
addition, Tobit model with instrumental variables for remittances will give unbiased and consistent 
estimates with taking into account the presences of a number of zeros in the dependent variable 
(e.g., censored at zero). The model, thus, uses Amemiya Generalized Least Square (AGLS) as de-
                                                 
66
 The theoretical idea for this model is mainly drawn from the papers of Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), and 
Acosta (2006).  
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scribed by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) with endogenous regressors.  The instruments for 
remittances are the same as before used in equation (5.32) and (5.33) for migration decisions, where 
the dependent variable is the zero inflated continuous variable, measuring the work hours of indi-
vidual members of remittance receiving households. 
5.7 Empirical results  
5.7.1 Migration decision of the households 
 As discussed earlier regarding migration and remittances as joint decisions of migrants and 
non-migrant family members, it is plausible to examine the variables of household and other social 
characteristics that may induce migration. In econometric literature, there are a number of count 
models, such as the Poisson Regression Model (PRM), the Negative Binomial Regression Model 
(NBRM), the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP), and the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB). There 
are also various tests in order to select the preferred count model in the data set. The common proc-
esses for the selection of the best model in the data set are often done by tests, such as the tests of 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)67 and the Vuong 
test68. Table 5.3 displays econometric results of the factors that encourage to take migration deci-
sions, as well as the test results for the selection of preferred model. The estimated parameters were 
consistent in all most all models (e.g., ZIP, PRM, NBRM and ZINB) with some exceptions, but the 
estimated parameters applying the ZIP model seem to be more compatible with the theory than 
other count models for our interest.  A number of tests were also done for the selection of preferred 
model to the analysis of migration decisions.  For this, the smaller values of AIC and BIC in ZIP 
model allow to conclude that the ZIP is more preferred than other models. The result of Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) test69 of 0=α for the NBRM against the PRM is insignificant, suggesting that the PRM 
is favourable over the NBRM.  Likewise, the result of the Vuong test ( 0001.0,70.3 <= pz ) for the 
ZIP model against the PRM is significant at 99 percent confidence level, implying that the ZIP 
model is preferred to the PRM.  We also estimated random effect models for the PRM and the 
                                                 
67
 AIC is a measure of the goodness of fit of an estimated statistical model and BIC is also a criterion for model selec-
tion which is closely related to AIC. All these being equal, the model with the smaller AIC and BIC is considered as a 
better fitting model. For detail, see Long and Freese (2001). 
68
 Vuong (1989) test is a likelihood ratio test for model selection and non-nested hypotheses. Vuong test statistics allow 
both models to have explanatory power, but provides direction concerning which of the two is closer to the true data 
generating process. 
69
 The likelihood ratio test examines the null hypothesis of 0=α . The LR statistics follows the Chi-squared distribu-
tion with one degree of freedom. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the NBRM is favoured to the PRM. 
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NBRM and tested panel data against pooled data in order to control unobserved effects in panel 
data.  The result of LR test of α ( )1(2χ =0.00  with 00.1=valueP ) does not reject the null hypothesis, 
suggesting that panel estimators are not significantly different from pooled estimators, which allows 
to use pooled estimators for the analysis of migration decision. After conduction of various tests to 
select the preferred model for the analysis of migration decision, the following part only presents 
the results of the ZIP model. 
 The LR 2χ  test which is same as F-statistics in OLS shows that the model has explanatory 
power. The parameters estimated in the ZIP model can be interpreted as the effect of the variables 
on the probability of expected number of migrants from the household, for example, the significant 
and positive sign of family size imply that an increase in the number of family member will on av-
erage increase the probability of migrating by 7 percent.  Likewise, residence in the district with the 
higher migration rate also encourages migration, perhaps due to social and economic impact in the 
society (i.e. network effects).  The sex of the household head is significant and positive, implying 
that female head households are more likely to have sent migrants out.  This is in line with the ob-
servations that female-headed households increased by 19.27 percent of the total sample households 
by 39.77 percent of remittance-receiving households.  In addition, the rural dummy shows that peo-
ple from rural areas are more likely to migrate in compared to urban inhabitants.  The intuition may 
be that this is due to fewer off-farm employment opportunities and possible lower wages in rural ar-
eas in comparison to urban areas.  The significant and positive sign of the age of household head 
also indicate a high percentage of migrants are relatively young and that this may lead them to work 
more for senior family members who remain at home. Household per capita income also shows a 
positive relation to migration, suggesting that household income from own businesses, such as in-
come from farm sector and other non-farm sectors, does affect migration decisions, but the magni-
tude of coefficient is relatively low. The education level of household head has no effect on migra-
tion decisions. The dependence ratio of the household also does not show any impact on migration 
decisions.  
5.7.2 Time allocations of remittance-receiving households 
 Table 5.4 gives estimates for the impact of remittances on household labour allocation, par-
ticularly on farm, off-farm, self-employment activities, as well as hired labour.  Models use the 
same explanatory variables.  Remittance income, the main focus of interest in this study, is consid-
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ered as endogenous.  As discussed above, remittance income depends on the number of migrants in 
the households.  So, the presumption that migrant families are systematically different from non-
migrants in observable (wealth) and non-observable (ability and income shocks) characteristics 
complicates the identification of the effect of remittances using standard Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) (Acosta, 2006).  The instrumental variables method (IV) is the most common way to control 
the problem of endogeneity.  Instrumental variables70 for remittance income include the number of 
migrants from the household, percentage rate of migration from the district, family size, sex of fe-
male head household (dummy), per capita income calculated by household production, and region 
(rural or urban).  The econometric models were estimated two years of panel data (1996 and 2004) 
of 962 households.  Out of this sample, only 529 households (207 from the survey year of 1995/96 
and 322 from the survey year of  2003/04) received remittances.  This result is thus based on the 
panel data of 529 observations. The results of Wald Chi-squares which are same as F-statistics in 
OLS, are significant in all models, showing explanatory power in the model. R-square (overall) val-
ues are between 0.07 to 0.14 which are normal in two-stage random effects models. 
 The coefficient of remittances in the equation for total household labour supply is significant 
at 10 percent level with a negative sign, supporting the contention that remittance income is a sub-
stitute of non-labour income (e.g. pensions, allowances etc.).  It implies that the level of remittances 
is more likely to result to a decrease total work hours of remittance-receiving households.  This re-
sult is also supported by the coefficients of farm work hours of household, suggesting that remit-
tance income decreases the hours of work on farm sector of remittance-receiving households, which 
is similar to the result of Acosta (2006) for adult female labour supply in El Salvador.  Remittances 
also decrease off-farm work hours as well as self-work hours, but the coefficients are not signifi-
cantly different from zero, which is contrary to the results of Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) 
and Funkhouser (1992).  However, the coefficient of hired labour shows those remittance-receiving 
households are more likely to increase work hours of hired labour.  This result is to some extent in 
favour of the view that factor markets are incomplete and that remittances relax liquidity constraint 
so that household can hire more labour in the case of inadequate family labour. 
 The result of the relationship between household work hours and non-labour income does 
not support the hypothesis of the traditional labour supply model except hired labour hours, where 
                                                 
70
 Instrumental variables are the same variables, which were significant with positive sign in Zero-Inflated Poisson 
(ZIP) model.  The intuition to include these variables as instruments for remittance equation is that such variables can 
induce to migrate. 
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higher non-labour income is more likely to reduce the work hours of household, if leisure is normal 
good. But it may be possible for liquidity-constrained households that non-labour income increases 
the opportunity for self-employment, because it lifts household budget constraint, particularly in the 
presence of missing credit markets, as viewed by Funkhouser (1992). However, the coefficients of 
non-labour income for all models are not statistically significant.   
 The estimated coefficients of farm size measured in hectares give rise to mixed results in 
different equations.  As usual, farm size increases the hours of work on the farm sector.  In addition, 
farm size has also positive effect on self employment activities and hired labour hours, perhaps due 
to the fact that Nepal is an agrarian country where the agricultural sector is the primary means of 
livelihood for the majority of people and the main sector for self employment activities.  On the 
other hand, farm size does not show any effect on the aggregate and off-farm work hours at least in 
these models.  However, the value of livestock is significant in all equations except that of the farm 
work.  The results show that higher livestock value is more likely to increase the hours of work on 
off-farm and hired labours, and decrease farm and self employment.  This result is a bit surprising 
for developing countries such as Nepal, where livestock and farms are often considered as comple-
mentary goods for farm households.   
 Demographic variables give almost the same results for household work hours showing that 
higher family size is more likely to lead higher work hours, while a higher number of children under 
six years and the adult above 65 years are more likely to reduce hours of work in different activities.  
Moreover, a higher dependency ratio also reduces total work hours of the household, and increases 
the hours of hired labour. Female-headed households have relatively high working hours than 
households headed by their male counterparts, but this effect is not significantly different from zero. 
The result shows that family member has significant role in the labour market in Nepal. 
 Finally, the coefficient of off-farm wages shows an a priori result that higher wage in the 
off-farm sector is more likely to increase the total work hours as well as off farm work hours of the 
sample households.  Contrary to this, higher off-farm wage rates draw the labour hours away from 
the farm sector and self-employment activities, possibly due to higher attractiveness of the off-farm 
sectors,  but most of the coefficients are not significantly different from zero except that for off-
farm work hours.  The result also shows that higher off-farm wage reduces farm labour hours. This 
is perhaps due to higher opportunity cost in the off-farm sector than farm sector.   
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5.7.3 Instrumental variable Tobit models  
 The results of the instrumental variable Tobit (IV-Tobit) models for men and women, and 
pooled of both are given in Table 5.5.  The models use the same explanatory variables for all equa-
tions in order to explore gender differences in hours worked, taking remittance income as endoge-
nous.  The results of a Wald test for exogeneity are significant, implying that remittances are indeed 
endogenous.  Most of the significant explanatory variables for both men and women show the same 
effects with previous models. For instance,   the results do not show significant differences of the 
hours of work between men and women with per capita remittance income and non-labour per cap-
ita income, implying that an increase in remittance income is more likely to reduce work hours for 
both men and women, which is consistent with the results of aggregate household work hours in 
different sectors (see in Table 5.4). However, per capita non labour income increases the labour 
hours of both men and women, but the coefficients of both remittances and non labour income are 
very small in magnitude.  Moreover, the level of education also increases the hours of work for 
both, showing that higher educated people are more likely to increase the hours of work than rela-
tively lower educated people. The coefficient of age shows a positive for men, implying higher 
work hours with higher age. However, for females work hours, education and age do not show any 
significant effect.  The number of children below six years reduces the hours of work for men but 
not for women, but the coefficients are not significant at any required level.  In addition, the coeffi-
cients of ethnicity71  do not show any significant effects either for males or for females.  The result 
is also the same for the coefficients of senior citizens (>65 years). The coefficient of the rural 
dummy shows that individuals from rural areas are likely to work more than urban individuals.  In 
addition, larger family size is likely to reduce the individual work hours. The coefficients for a fe-
male headed household are negative for women, but not significant for men. 
 The result of pooled men and women shows the same effect as in men and women, indicat-
ing consistency and robustness in our models. For instance, remittance income is more likely to re-
duce work hours of remittance-receiving household members. In general, rural people work more 
than urban people and higher family size reduces the individual work hours of remittance- receiving 
households. 
                                                 
71
 The variable ethnicity measures the so-called caste groups in Hindu religion.  Caste Systems are traditional and 
hereditary systems of social classification that evolved due to the enormous diversity in India and Nepal. The systems 
divides into four major castes from highest to lowest like Brahmin (i.e. Vedic priest), Kshetriyas (warriors and rul-
ers), Vaishyas (merchants), and Shudras (artisans). 
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5.8 Discussion of the results 
 A number of examinations related to migration decisions and remittances with the hours of 
work in their receiving households tested using NLSS panel data.  The study tried to capture the 
methodological issues related to migration decisions and the impact of remittances on household 
work hours, and a number of econometric models such as the Zero-Inflated Poisson model for mi-
gration decisions, random effect instrumental variables for household aggregate work hours in dif-
ferent sectors (i.e. farm, off-farm, self employment, and hired labour) and the Instrumental Vari-
ables Tobit (IV-Tobit) for the labour supply of working age men and women as well as pooled of 
men and women were used to explore the impact of remittances on the labour supply decisions in 
remittance-receiving households.  
The results from the different models especially that for the impact of remittances on the 
hours of work in recipient households are consistent with remittances, as remittances decrease both 
aggregate and individual hours of work in remittance-receiving households, implying that leisure is 
a normal good. In other words, the income effect appears to be dominant in our data, where an in-
crease in remittances decreases the hours of work. The result also shows that higher remittance in-
come increases the hours of work of hired labour by relaxing the liquidity constraint, indicating an 
existence of partly missing credit markets in Nepal, rural areas in particular. From a development 
prospective, remittances create positive externalities in neighbouring families or villages by hiring 
more labour, as pointed out by Acosta (2006).  In contrast to this, the results of non-labour income 
are surprising both at the aggregate and individual levels, showing that non labour income increases 
household work hours. Nevertheless, these coefficients are not statistically significant.  Further in-
vestigation may be needed to understand this relation.    
Consistent with the hypothesis, demographic characteristics such as family size, have shown 
the result as expected that larger family size leads to higher work hours in all sectors, but reduces 
individual work hours. However, the number of children under six years does not show significant 
effects in household work hours, but family members over 65 years normally reduce work hours for 
women and increase for men with some exceptions. The possible explanation is that the adult fe-
male members have to spend more time taking care of their children and senior citizens that reduces 
to the hours of work on farm and off-farm sectors, which is also consistent with the result of de-
pendency ratio. 
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Farm size and livestock, which are key characteristics of rural settings, have given rise to 
mixed results, implying that higher farm size leads to higher work hours on farm sector, self em-
ployment activities and hired labour, but not in off-farm sectors.  However, the result of the value of 
livestock, which shows a positive relation with off-farm work hours and negative with farm work 
hours, is counter-intuitive. More investigation is needed to justify this result. 
5.9 Conclusions 
Remittances are becoming a stable source of income for many people living in developing 
countries.  Policy-makers in Nepal have sought to explore the opportunities in developed and mid-
dle-income countries, especially in South East Asia and the Gulf countries to absorb their surplus 
labour to improve living standards.  This policy is popular to some extent due to increasing impact 
of migration and remittances on the living conditions of the remittance-receiving households in Ne-
pal.  Due to enormous effects of remittances on receiving countries both at the macro and the micro 
levels, it is obviously a matter of interest for economists.   
 The study attempts to explain the impact of remittance income on the hours of work in re-
mittance-receiving households both individual as well as sectoral levels  in Nepal using panel data 
from the Nepal Living Standard Surveys conducted in 1995/96 and 2003/04.  The study estimates 
first a Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model in order to find out the factors that motivate to migrate. 
We then examine econometric models of household work hours in various sectors (such as farm, 
off-farm, self-employment activities, hired labour and the aggregate of all) with remittance income 
and other explanatory variables to measure the effects of labour hour allocation in remittance re-
ceiving households which are the primary interest of this study.  The level of remittance income is 
assumed to be an endogenous variable because of multiple effects of migration and remittances on 
living standards and human capital outcomes. We apply the instrumental variables method to con-
trol the endogeneity problem in the model.  Econometric models for working age men and women 
(16-65 years) are also estimated to examine the effect of remittances on work hours of recipient 
households in the country of origin applying an IV-Tobit model. 
 The result of the ZIP model shows several factors as motivating migration from Nepal.  For 
instance, people from rural areas and the district with higher percentage of migration rate have 
higher probabilities of migration.  Households with larger family size and income per capita without 
remittances have also a higher probability to migrate.  Female-headed households are more likely to 
have sent migrants out.  Large number of children and higher level of education in the household 
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reduce the probability of migration.  This finding supports the view that multiple factors affect for 
migration decisions. 
The empirical analysis of the impact of remittances on the allocation of labour hours in dif-
ferent sectors implies that remittance income increases the consumption of leisure in almost all sec-
tors, the exception being that of hired labour in remittance-receiving households. However the re-
sults do not show any significant effect in the hours of work on off-farm and self- employment 
activities, implying that remittance income appears to be a substitute for non-labour income in the 
sample households.  The evidence in relation to non-labour income is inconsistent with the tradi-
tional theory of labour economics, suggesting that leisure is not a normal good. The coefficient of 
hiring labour with remittances suggests that remittance income relaxes the budget constraint and 
then raises the hours of hired labour to meet the labour demand in the migrant’s household.  By 
contrast, households with higher non-labour income prefer to work themselves rather than to hire 
labour.   
Econometric results of the impact of remittances on the labour supply of men and women 
aged between 16-65 years in remittance-receiving households show that remittances increase the 
hours of leisure of individual members.  However, individuals having higher non-labour income are 
more likely to increase their hours of work.  
 Further studies should focus on the impact of remittances on different income level of 
households residing in different ecological zones.  Information on migrant characteristics could be 
useful to obtain better insights on the impact of remittances and returns to scale in migration.  
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APPENDIX-5 
Figure 5.1: Remittance flow in Nepal
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Figure 5.2: Share of remittances in the GDP of Nepal
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of remittance receiving households   
NLSS 1995/96 NLSS  2003/04 Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Remittance income72 20,801.21 93,425.28 34,798.26 70,567.58 
Non labour income 6,375.22 27,346.98 31,032.62 13,1702 
Total household(HH) size 6.27 2.99 5.64 3.02 
Child<15 2.57 1.85 1.95 1.79 
Old pop>65 0.26 0.52 0.30 0.56 
Total work hours/HH 433,123.3 10,11436 573,625.9 11,086,047 
Total work hours on farm/HH 211,900.7 457,120.3 7,487.54 58,940.5 
Total work hours on off-farm/HH 128,498.1 409,962.5 557,881.3 1,080,031 
Total work hours on self employment 
activities/HH 
92,724.48 306,663.7 8,257.03 13,341.21 
Land in hectares 10.61 16.74 0.71 1.19 
Livestock value 12,080.15 13,164.82 35,227.48 33,411.08 
Education level of HH head (no. of 
years) 
1.94 3.62 1.82 3.55 
No. of migrants from HH 1.24 0.55 1.29 0.60 
Female HH head (percent) 28.5 36.02 
No. of HH received remittances 207 322 
Total observations 962 962 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72
 All income sources both remittances and non-labour are given in Nepalese currency (i.e. Rupees), where US$1=63.9 
Nepalese Rupees. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of non-migrant households 
NLSS 1995/96 NLSS  2003/04 Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Remittance income - - - - 
Non labour income73 19,985.03 28,6230.7 84,417.89 483,987.5 
Total household(HH) size 5.92 2.63 5.78 2.54 
Child<15 2.51 1.76 2.1 1.72 
Old pop>65 0.25 0.52 0.30 0.57 
Total work hours/HH 420,800.3 941,358.8 754,517.8 152,940 
Total work hours on farm/HH 197,745.2 423,899.6 6,046.98 31,428.19 
Total work hours on off-farm/HH 12,6573.9 349,393.7 737,526.3 1,518,645 
Total work hours on self employment 
activities/HH 
96,481.11 294,612.7 10,944.52 17,504.34 
Land in hectares 9.56 19.99 0.73 1.03 
Livestock value 10,937.77 12,505.21 31,912.03 34,733.79 
Female household head (percent) 8.34 - 10.31 - 
Education level of household head (no. 
of years) 
2.80 4.19 3.42 4.49 
No. of HHs without any migrant 755 640 
Total observations 962 962 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73
 All income sources both remittances and non-labour are given in Nepalese currency (i.e. Rupees), where US$1=63.9 
NRs.) 
  178 
 Table 5.3: The effects of migration using ZIP model 
Explanatory variables Coefficients Std. Err. 
Family size 0.07*** 0.018 
Percentage of migration of the district  0.04*** 0.013 
Per capita household income without remittances 0.001*** 0.002 
Dependent ratio 0.10 0.068 
Age of household head .001*** 0.003 
Education level of household head -0.02*** 0.012 
Sex of household head (dummy) 0.42*** 0.129 
Rural or urban (dummy) 0.74*** 0.190 
Constant -2.548*** 0.303 
LR Chi2 test statistics 90.17*** 
Vuong test (ZIP vs. PRM) 3.70*** 
AIC (for ZIP) 2716.093 
BIC (for ZIP) 2793.963 
AIC (for PRM) 2775.27 
BIC (for PRM) 2825.33 
AIC (for NBRM) 2765.45 
BIC (for NBRM) 2815.51 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of 0=α NBM against PRM 0.00 (Pvalue=1.00) 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test versus pooled: chi2bar (01) 0.00 (Pvalue=1.00) 
Number of observations 1924 
*** significant at 1percent level. 
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Table 5.4: Regression results of household labour hours using random effects instrumental variable 
Household work hours   Explanatory variables 
Total Farm Off-farm Self-employment activities Hired labour 
Remittance income -8.24*  
(4.68) 
-2.45* 
 (1.36) 
-5.40   
(3.79) 
-0.39   
(0.76) 
0.003*  
(0.001) 
Land per hectare 6439.82  
(4684.55) 
7251.19*** 
 (1361.37) 
-4575.32  
(3795.68) 
3749.20*** 
(763.83) 
14.74***  
(1.78) 
Non labour income 1.24  
(1.02) 
0.31  
(0.29) 
0.93    
(0.83) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
-0.0003  
(0.0003) 
Livestock value 5.95*** 
(1.96) 
-0.89  
  (0.57) 
7.25***    
(1.59) 
-0.42**   
(0.32) 
0.004*** 
(0.0007) 
Family size (including migrants) 150603.9*** 
(26661.86) 
25552.44***  
(7748.17) 
103358.7***  
(21602.9) 
19666.8***  
(4347.33) 
25.93** 
(10.15) 
Children <6 yrs -29749.53 
(66079.05) 
-9926.87 
(19203.15) 
-4801.36   
(53540.89) 
-14956.35   
(10774.49) 
-64.93*  
(25.17) 
Senior citizen>65yrs -331068.4*** 
(102045.5) 
-70899.13**  
(29655.31) 
-248716.1***  
(82682.87) 
-11462.96   
(16638.98) 
9.71  
(38.87) 
Dependent ratio -255225.5*** 
(86336.64) 
-43653.41* 
 (25.90.18) 
-197410.3***  
(69954.7) 
-14174.79 
(14077.58) 
12.96 
(32.88) 
Female household head (dummy) 230077.7 
(179662.7) 
41014.15 
 (52211.54) 
189266.5  
(145572.6) 
-84.03  
(29294.81) 
118.93* 
(68.44) 
Off-farm wage rate 1530.79  
(1075.79) 
-184.79 
(312.63) 
1873.88**  
(871.67) 
-121.88  
(175.41) 
-0.39  
(0.41) 
Constant -121010.2 
(167283.7) 
32281.68 
(48614.1) 
-115334.7 
(135542.5) 
-37900.46   
(27276.36) 
-56.69  
(63.72) 
Wald 2χ (10) 240.05*** 88.55*** 102.58*** 76.06*** 144.33*** 
R2 (overall) 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.14 
No. of observations 529 529 529 529 529 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance level respectively. 
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Table 5.5: Instrumental variable Tobit estimation of total household  work 
       hours by gender 
Explanatory variables Men  Women  Pooled(both)  
Per capita remittance income -0.002** 
(0.007) 
-0.001** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
Per capita non labour income (excluding 
remittance income) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
Age of individual 0.46*** 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.093) 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
Education level of the individual 2.29*** 
(0.44) 
0.28 
(0.42) 
1.38*** 
(0.33) 
Ethnicity of Individual  0.13 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
Number of children <6 years in household -0.21 
(1.13) 
0.01 
(1.16) 
1.72 
(1.12) 
Number of old person > 65 years in 
household 
-3.42 
(3.05) 
-4.40* 
(2.53) 
-4.48** 
(1.12) 
Household size -0.63 
(0.80) 
-2.04 
(0.65) 
-2.06*** 
(0.49) 
Rural or urban 3.80 
(6.04) 
19.38*** 
(6.05) 
13.88*** 
(4.83) 
Female head household -1.63 
(7.08) 
15.26*** 
(5.69) 
15.31*** 
(4.58) 
Constant 10.01 
(7.16) 
33.51*** 
(6.58) 
22.40*** 
(5.48) 
Wald 2χ (10) 83.36 (P< 0.000 
) 
46.97 (P< 
0.000) 
49.83(P< 0.000 ) 
Wald test for exogeneity (/ )0=α : 2χ (1) 5.18 (P< 0.022) 3.36(P< 0.066 ) 10.99(P< 0.000) 
No. of individuals(16-65 years) 644 890 1534 
***, **, * 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance level respectively.  
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CHAPTER 6  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Nepal, predominantly an agrarian country, has been operating under resource-
constrained environments and with formidable mandates of reducing poverty and hunger, 
and has given high priority on agricultural-led growth.  Despite a visible change in the 
political scenario over recent years, overall economic growth has not yet shown any sig-
nificant change. Hence the country still needs a high rate of economic growth both in the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.  Policy markers and economists see the causes 
of economic stagnation in Nepal during the last decade as resulting from the decade long 
conflict between government and the rebellion group, combined with regional disparities 
in access to resources, pervasive poverty, and food insecurity. This vulnerability has af-
fected many aspects of the economy, specifically unemployment due to limited opportu-
nities that increase the intensity of migration from rural to urban areas and abroad, low 
productivity, due to reduction in investment on farm and off-farm sectors, price rises re-
sulting from devaluation of the domestic currency, and a high trade deficit.  
This dissertation is motivated by the need to understand how price volatility and 
remittance income affect household income and labour allocation decisions and the fac-
tors affecting the adoption of new farm technologies. The microeconomic foundation 
thesis is formed by the theory of household choice in the presence of incomplete and im-
perfect markets  
After an introduction and literature review, which forms chapter 2, the disserta-
tion consists of three substantive essays. The first chapter outlines the motivation and ob-
jectives of the dissertation, and describes the data sources employed. The second chapter 
reviews the literature, giving an overview of the role of factor markets in rural economies 
and the application of theoretical framework in rural policies, combined with brief out-
look of existing literature, economic theories, and analytical approaches applied in re-
source poor economies. Chapter 3 examines the factors affecting the adoption decisions 
of new farm technologies, improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers in particular. The un-
derlying assumption is that farmers take adoption decisions of improved seeds and inor-
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ganic fertilizers jointly. Chapter 4 investigates agricultural commodity price volatility 
and its impact on household income variability. The motivation for this part is to under-
stand the Nepalese household responses in the context of the economic liberalization 
programs adopted consequent upon the country becoming a member of WTO. Finally, 
Chapter 5 examines the labour allocation of remittance-receiving households and factors 
motivating migration decisions. The flow of remittances during the last decade has in-
creased rapidly and the impact of remittance income is obviously a matter of interest on 
labour allocation decisions of remittance-receiving households.  
Sections 6.2-6.4 summarize the major findings of the three substantive essays 
which form Chapter 3, 4 and 5 of the thesis.  
6.2 Summary and conclusions of Chapter 3 
The first substantive part of the dissertation analyses the determinants of house-
hold’s adoption decisions of new farm technologies, improved seeds and inorganic fertil-
izers in particular, using two year panel data from the Nepal Living Standard Surveys. 
This study assumes simultaneity decisions in adoption of both improved seeds and inor-
ganic fertilizers in contrast to the conventional method that often deals technology (e.g., 
improved seeds, inorganic fertilizers and farm mechanization) adoption as independent 
decision to each other.  
The assumption of joint decisions in new farm technology is plausible, particu-
larly in developing countries where farmers are often constrained by labour and capital 
combined with poor infrastructure that affects timely distribution of improved seeds and 
chemical fertilizers. Decisions to adopt new technology may therefore depend on these 
constraints such as timely available of seeds and inorganic fertilizers, probability of ob-
taining credit, labour availability, and information about new technology rather than 
farmers’ choice of any one technology.  This study thus attempts to fill gaps in the litera-
ture, in particular in relation to Nepal.   
This paper applies both reduced form probit models for period 1(1996) and LPM 
and GMM probit with moment restrictions for the second period in lieu of the bivariate 
probit to solve the identification problem. The paper also examines the adoption deci-
sions of both technologies using both random effects and simple Tobit models from 
household level data in which the proportion of land using improved seeds and inorganic 
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fertilizers is the dependent variable in the exercise. These models control plot character-
istics, human capital, and market participation in order to explore the factors influencing 
adoption of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers.  
The results weekly support the assumption of joint decisions for both technolo-
gies. Adoption of improved seeds is more likely to be influenced by the adoption of inor-
ganic fertilizers but apparently not vice versa.  Adoption decisions are significantly influ-
enced by the factor markets for credit and for labour, agricultural extension services, and 
household labour endowment. Moreover, adoption rates are likely to be high with the 
household proximity to road transport and access to markets. Household head’s educa-
tion and age also show positive impact on adoption decisions with some exceptions. The 
results from random effects and simple Tobit models are mostly in line with the results 
from reduced form and structural models with few exceptions. Conclusively, well-
developed infrastructure along with smooth functioning of factor markets can signifi-
cantly lead to adoption of new technologies.   
These results have important policy implications. For instance, adoption of im-
proved seeds is more likely to be associated with inorganic fertilizers, so that policy 
needs to address this issue while introducing new varieties of seeds. However, the re-
verse effect is not established, implying that adoption of inorganic fertilizers is not nec-
essarily associated with improved seeds. In other words, this study only weakly supports 
the assumption of simultaneity decisions in adoption of both technologies and suggests 
instead a possible recursive structure. Moreover, well-developed infrastructure facilities 
with better road transport are prerequisites for the transformation of subsistence agricul-
ture into commercialized in Nepal.   
This analysis provides insights which will be useful in future studies in farm 
technology adoption in which adoption of single technology may not be a valid assump-
tion particularly in the developing world due to pervasive market imperfections, leading 
farmers with many constrains such as labour and capital, access to markets, and informa-
tion about new technologies.  Economists need to address these issues while analyzing 
farmers’ behaviour on technology adoption.  
Though this study analyzes adoption of both technologies as joint decisions, fur-
ther studies seems to be focused on the intensity of technology adoption over a period of 
time combined with the role of social learning in agricultural innovation and diffusions. 
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Plot level data for specific crops which additionally consider the role of gender may also 
provide better insights in technology adoption decisions in the developing world.  
6.3 Summary and conclusions of Chapter 4 
The second paper of the dissertation investigates how agricultural commodity 
price volatility influences the income variability of agricultural-dependent households in 
Nepal. This analysis is important in the context when the country has already imple-
mented market economic policies and has become an LDC member of the World Trade 
Organization. In order to capture this idea, this paper applies a more recent analytical 
framework that allows to use both price and yield variations to calculate the household 
income variance, combined with the price transmission coefficients  using VAR or auto-
regression models depending on whether the particular commodity tradable with the In-
dian markets, combined with statistical properties of the time series data.  Cross-section 
data from the NLSS for the calculation of the share of agricultural income in the total 
household income and time series data of both prices and yields for transmission coeffi-
cients and variances were used to analysis in this paper. A number of scenarios such as 
full, actual and no exposures with Indian markets were assumed in order to explore the 
extend of impact on different ecological belts as well as administrative zones among the 
different levels of agricultural income share households in Nepal.  
The results show a higher extent of variability of household income for household 
with a higher share of income from agricultural products (more than 65 percent), fol-
lowed by 30 to 65 percent share of agricultural products in the total household income. 
However, there is no significant difference in CVs between poor and non-poor house-
holds. The result also shows increased income variability of agricultural households in 
almost regions and ecological belts, relatively higher due to domestic shocks. Geographi-
cal heterogeneity seems to be major factor affecting the domestic market integration with 
international prices. The results from the Granger causality test show higher integration 
of border markets between Nepal and India, in which most of Nepalese commodity 
prices follow Indian prices with an exception of a small number of commodities in few 
border markets. 
The findings from this paper have significant policy implications. The results 
show that geographical heterogeneity, even in a country as small as Nepal, is a major 
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problem for market integration. Nepal needs to emphasize domestic market integration 
through the investment on road transport, irrigation and infrastructure development that 
can reduce the geographical heterogeneity and the extent of price and production vari-
ability within the country in addition to integration with regional and world markets. The 
integration of domestic markets through investment in infrastructure would further en-
hance farmer’s access to resources and lead to higher integration with regional and world 
markets. Market integration is therefore necessary to make food more easily available 
and to keep prices stable, because in well-integrated markets, price changes of compara-
ble goods in one location are consistently related to price changes in other locations.  
The methodology used in this study is relatively new approach to analyze the 
price volatility and its impact on agricultural household income instability, world in gen-
eral and Nepal in particular.  The study on the impact of Indian price volatility on Nepal-
ese household income instability has a great importance for Nepal rather than the world 
markets due to largest trade partner and also the major transit providing country. The 
analysis of price transmission across adjacent cities of both countries (Nepal and India) is 
also a significant contribution in the literature that can provide market integration at dif-
ferent level among adjacent cities of both countries in comparison to single Indian mar-
ket centre and the world markets. Moreover, the study on Indian and world price trans-
mission in Nepal is itself great significant for newly WTO member state such as Nepal in 
order to analyze the impact of agricultural trade liberalization,  
Further studies may be interesting to analyse income instability for cash and high 
value crops depending households (e.g. tea, tobacco, sugar, other vegetables). Price vola-
tility of cash and high value crops may give better insights of price transmission and its 
impact on income stability due to more commercial crops in comparison to subsistence 
staple crops.  
6.4 Summary and conclusions of Chapter 5 
 The flow of migration from rural to urban areas and abroad has increased over the 
past two decades as families seek improved living standards in the face of limited access 
to local employment opportunities. This phenomenon has been observed both in Nepal 
and throughout the developing world. In Nepal, migration has been further stimulated by 
political instability and conflict. Remittances earned by migrant workers have also sig-
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nificantly increased and become a major source of foreign exchange earnings in Nepal. 
The impact of remittance income on household welfare is a matter of interest for econo-
mists and policy makers.  
This paper examines the labour allocation decisions of remittance-receiving 
households in different sectors such on-farm, off-farm, self-employment activities and 
hired labour by drawing the insights from the New Economics of Labour Migration 
(NELM). The theoretical approach of NELM assumes that migration decisions are made 
by larger units of related people – typically families or households-in which people act 
collectively not only to maximize expected income, but also to minimize risks and to 
loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures in contrast to the neoclas-
sical approach that assumes migration decisions as an individual phenomenon which is a 
response to the urban-rural differential in wages (or future earnings).  The NELM also 
postulates that migration normally occurs due to incomplete or missing markets in the 
given area, in which labour allocation decision of remittance-receiving households (i.e. 
non migrant members) depends on the constraint (e.g. labour or liquidity) faced by the 
particular household. For example, liquidity constraint household may invest more on 
farm such as hiring labour hours. In the case of labour constraint, non migrant members 
may reallocate their labour hours back to on-farm to compensate their labour loss due to 
migration.  
This paper first applies the zero inflated Poisson (ZIP) model to analyse the mi-
gration decisions and then used random effects instrumental variables regressions for es-
timating the impact of remittance income on household labour allocation in different sec-
tors and instrumental variables Tobit models to estimate labour allocation decisions of 
remittance-receiving households separately for working age men and women and pooled 
of both men and women. 
The results show that rural people with larger family size and higher per capita 
income without remittances are likely to emigrate.  Remittances decrease work hours in a 
number sectors, but increases work hours of hired labour in remittance-receiving house-
holds. Remittance income seems as substitution of non-labour income for remittance-
receiving households. No significant effects on off-farm and self-employment activities 
were observed in the sample households. In contrast, non labour income appears to in-
crease work hours of household members.   Moreover, demographic characteristics seem 
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to be influential in the allocation of household work hours, implying that higher family 
size leads to higher work hours, and a larger number of children (<6 years) leads to a re-
duction of work hours of females and but not for males.  Educated people are also more 
likely to increase their work hours when a family member migrates. The results from the 
Tobit models for men and women aged between 16-65 years in remittance-receiving 
households show that remittances increase the hours of leisure of individual members.  
However, individuals having higher non-labour income are more likely to increase their 
hours of work. 
 The study is helpful to understand the behaviour of remittance-receiving house-
holds on labour allocation decisions under the assumption of incomplete or missing mar-
kets. The analysis provides the insights how remittance-receiving households allocate la-
bour hours in different sectors such as on-farm, off-farm, self employment activities, and 
hired labour under the presence of liquidity and labour constraints. The evidence pro-
vided can be useful for policy makers, in particular intra-household substitution and la-
bour allocation decisions in different sectors. Labour allocation decisions may go 
through the income effects and the use of remittance income. The results from labour al-
location decisions of remittance-receiving households can give insights on the function-
ing of  labour markets in relation to changes in household income and wage rates as well 
as the preference of household members in the labour markets in different sectors such as 
on-farm, off-farm and self-employment.  
 The study on the impact of remittance income on household labour allocation is 
relatively new area of research in comparison to the migration. This paper intends to con-
tribute in the literature of migration and labour allocation decisions by giving a detailed 
theoretical framework based on the agricultural household model under the assumption 
of both perfect markets and incomplete or missing markets. The paper also attempts to 
address a number of issues pertaining to the problem of endogeneity between labour 
hours, remittance and migration, sample selection bias, and omitted variables and applies 
a number of econometric models such as random effects instrumental variables regres-
sions and instrumental variables Tobit models to control household level unobserved ef-
fects. 
 The study, though, provides the insights of labour allocation of remittance-
receiving households; further research needs to focus on the impact of remittance income 
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on different income level of households in different regions. The study on the return to 
scale in migration could be interesting by obtaining the detailed information about mi-
grant characteristics.  
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